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Abstract  
The aim of the current studies was to first determine the convergent validity of several observer 
and self-report measures of defense mechanisms, and second to determine whether participants 
in the depressed and anxious groups could successfully be differentiated using observer and self-
report measures of defenses. In Study 1, defensive functioning of 150 university students was 
assessed using the Defense-Q, Defense Mechanism Rating Scale, Defense Style Questionnaire, 
and the Defense Mechanisms Inventory. The results of the Pearson r analyses indicated that the 
defense measures were correlated in a theoretically consistent manner at the overall and defense 
level analyses, with the strongest relations at the mature and immature ends of the scales. Four of 
the 17 individual defenses were correlated in a theoretically consistent manner. In Study 2, 1182 
university students completed the Personality Assessment Inventory and those scoring in the 
clinical range on depression or anxiety indices were selected for participation in this study. The 
extent to which these participants could be correctly classified into their respective groups using 
defense scores from the Defense-Q and the Defense Style Questionnaire was assessed using 
discriminant analyses. Results indicated that defense scores from both observer and self-report 
measures can be used to classify participants correctly into depressed and anxious groups. The 
Defense-Q discriminant function primarily identified depression-related defenses as important 
for differentiation, whereas the Defense Style Questionnaire discriminant function primarily 
identified anxiety-related disorders. Confirmatory stepwise discriminant analyses confirmed that 
the defenses previously identified in the literature were among the most effective in 
differentiating between the groups. The results from the present investigation identify substantial 
differences between the defenses assessed by observer and self-report measures and indicate that 
both methods can be informative for differentiating between depressed and anxious participants. 
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Can Defense Mechanisms aid in the Differentiation of Depression and Anxiety 
Defense mechanisms
1
 are “the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis 
rests” (Freud, 1914/2001, p. 16). As such, defenses have long been central to understanding 
personality and psychopathology from a psychoanalytic
2
 perspective (Cooper, Perry, & 
O’Connell, 1991) and they have become one of the most important contributions of 
psychoanalytic theory to the understanding of personality and psychopathology (Offer, Lavie, 
Gothelf, & Apter, 2000). There has been a recent resurgence of interest in defense mechanisms. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision 
(DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) has acknowledged the utility of defense 
mechanisms for the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders by including the Defensive 
Functioning Scale as an “axis for further study.” Also, Vaillant (2000) has been investigating the 
prospective relation between defenses and health in a number of longitudinal studies. 
Researchers have even proposed defenses as a possible metric by which to judge all mental 
health, in much the same way that IQ tests have been used as a metric to judge intelligence 
(Vaillant, 2000). In order for defenses to serve this important function, however, defense 
mechanisms assessment tools must demonstrate clinical utility in a number of domains. In two 
studies I will examine the convergent validity of several observer and self-report measures of 
defense mechanisms and then examine the utility of defenses in terms of differentiating between 
two overlapping types of symptomatology: depression and anxiety. First, I will review the 
psychodynamic theory related to defenses, depression, and anxiety. Next, I will broadly discuss 
defense research, including methods to assess defenses and how they relate to psychopathology. 
I will then focus on defense research as it relates to two specific types of disorders, depressive 
disorders and anxiety related disorders. And finally, I will describe the studies. 
THEORY 
Theory of Defense Mechanisms 
More than a century ago Sigmund Freud introduced the concept of defense mechanisms 
(Freud, 1894/2001). This revolutionary idea provided insights into puzzling psychiatric 
symptoms and later into everyday nonpathological behaviours (Cramer, 1998a). Freud explained 
psychiatric symptomatology as a compromise in the conflict among the id, ego, and superego. 
                                                 
1
 The terms “defense mechanisms” and “defenses” will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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This compromise was mediated by the defense mechanisms. This explanation added greatly to 
the understanding and diagnosis of illnesses from Freud’s time continuing to the present 
(Hentschel, Kiessling, Teubner-Berg, & Dreier, 2004).  
Freud originally conceived of defenses as “intrapsychic” mechanisms that mediate the 
internal struggles between the internalized societal expectations of the superego and the 
instinctual drives of the id (Brenner, 1991). Ego “mechanisms of defense” form compromise 
formations (Busch, Milrod, & Singer, 1999), which function to satisfy the drives of the id 
maximally under the constraints of the superego (Brenner, 1991). If the anxiety is completely 
mitigated by defenses, then the compromise formation will not result in pathology (Brenner, 
1991). If, however, the anxiety is not completely resolved by defenses, then it remains a part of 
the compromise formation and results in some level of pathology (Brenner, 1991). According to 
the theory, the presence or absence of psychopathology is directly related to the effectiveness of 
defenses in resolving anxiety. 
Freud argued that the ego is a psychic apparatus that organizes various functions such as 
cognition, memory, learning, mood regulation, anxiety, and defense mechanisms (Busch et al., 
1999; Freud 1926/2001; Shill, 2004). “Signal anxiety”, he argued, is unconscious anxiety, “in 
miniature,” that results from an assessment by the ego that psychologically meaningful danger is 
detected (Shill, 2004). Often this danger is the result of a conflict between internal wishes or 
drives of the id and either external reality or internalized prohibitions from the superego (Perry, 
1990). The assessment of danger and subsequent signal anxiety leads to a mobilization of the ego 
defense mechanisms (Busch et al., 1991; Shill, 2004). These ego defense mechanisms, mobilized 
after the miniature unconscious anxiety, then work to prevent or minimize the resulting 
“traumatic anxiety” (e.g., a panic attack; Busch et al., 1999; Shill, 2004). If they are effective at 
sufficiently reducing anxiety, then pathology is avoided. 
Throughout his writings, Freud outlined the role defenses play in several areas, including 
reality testing, judgement, cognition, ego functioning, psychopathology, and adaptation to 
conflict (Cooper, 1998). While his early writings used terms such as “mechanisms of defense” 
and “Repression” synonymously, Freud’s later writings outlined other individual defenses such 
as Denial, Displacement, Dissociation, Fantasy, Hypochondriasis, Isolation, Projection, Reaction 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 Despite some differences in meaning, the terms “psychoanalytic” and “psychodynamic” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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Formation, Regression, Splitting, Sublimation, Turning Against the Self, and Undoing 
(Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998; Bond, Gardner, Christian, & Sigal, 1983; Cooper, 1998; 
Vaillant, 1992; White, 1948). Despite using these terms throughout his writing, Freud never 
compiled a comprehensive list or developed a fully integrated theory of defense mechanisms 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Perry, 1996; Perry & Ianni, 1998). After his death others, including his 
daughter Anna, continued Freud’s work on defense mechanisms.  
One of the most significant theoretical contributions to defense mechanisms comes from 
object relations theory, which moved defenses out of the exclusivity of the intrapsychic realm 
(Cooper, 1998). Object relations theory posited that, in addition to managing the intensity of 
needs, desires, and affects stemming from basic drives, defenses also functioned in the cognitive 
and relational domains to protect self-esteem in interpersonal relationships (Cooper, 1998). The 
function of defenses was therefore expanded to include not only protecting persons from 
awareness of unacceptable thoughts and wishes, but also to protect them from actual or psychic 
loss of relationships (Battlegay, 1991; Brody, Muderrisoglu, & Nakash-Eisikovits, 2002).  
Contemporary theorists and researchers now commonly conceptualize defenses as 
managing anxiety from both internal and external threats (Cooper, 1998). Defense theory has 
been expanded to acknowledge defenses’ role in protecting individuals from unconscious 
thoughts that might produce overwhelming anxiety if they became conscious as well as their role 
in managing relationships with others, managing external stressors, promoting overall good 
psychological adaptation, and maintaining well-being, self-esteem, or self-concept (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Brody et al., 2002; Conte & Apter, 1995; Cooper, 1998; Cramer, 1998a; DeFife & 
Hilsenroth, 2005). Noting this change in the overarching theory of defenses, Cooper (1998) 
writes that since the late 1970s “contemporary psychoanalytic theory has shifted to thinking 
about needs, affect, and wishes much more prominently in the interpersonal context” (p. 954). 
Looking more specifically at defense mechanisms, Cramer (1998a) goes further, writing that “to 
continue to think of defense mechanisms as [only] linked to pathology and instinctual drives is 
only possible if one ignores all that has been written in psychoanalytic theory since 1930” (p. 
885).  
Although many aspects of defense mechanisms are commonly agreed upon by 
researchers and theorists, some aspects have resulted in considerably less agreement in the 
literature. For example, the number of defenses and what should and should not be considered a 
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defense mechanism remains somewhat controversial (Conte & Apter, 1995; Cramer, 1998b; 
Muris & Merckelbach, 1994; Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997; Skodol & Perry, 1993). 
More than 40 different defense mechanisms have been identified by various researchers (Cramer, 
1998b). Moreover, given the abstract nature of defense mechanisms, even similar or identically 
named defense mechanisms sometimes differ considerably on their definitions and 
conceptualizations (Conte & Apter, 1995). See Table 1 for a comparison of definitions of 
individual defenses from the observer report measures discussed below. Valliant and Drake 
(1985) also discuss the abstract nature of defenses, noting that despite being potentially useful 
for making diagnoses, precisely identifying defense mechanisms can be difficult. They write, 
“defenses are, after all, metaphors; they are a shorthand way of describing different cognitive 
styles and modes of rearranging inner and outer realities” (p. 601).  
In sum, defenses were originally conceptualized as mechanisms that were initiated by 
signal anxiety and functioned to mediate conflict between the overly harsh superego and the 
unbridled instincts of the id. Freud’s early work provided insights into psychiatric 
symptomatology and later revisions of his work  helped to explain normal personality. Modern 
theorists have expanded Freud’s work to include defenses as functioning to manage both internal 
and external threats. Finally, Freud’s original conception of a single defense mechanism, later 
expanded to a few defenses, has now blossomed into a large number of identified mechanisms of 
defense. The abstract nature of defenses in combination with the expanding number of identified 
defenses has led to some disagreement on the conceptualization of some defenses. 
Definitional Criteria of Defense Mechanisms 
 Despite the shift in focus from an exclusively intrapsychic understanding to a more 
interpersonal understanding, Freud’s (1894/2001) initial conceptualization of defenses has 
remained quite stable. Throughout his writing, Freud laid out what he considered to be the five 
most important criteria for defining defenses (Vaillant, 1992). The first criterion is that defenses 
manage instincts and affects and that they are the most effective method that the ego has 
available to do this. Second, defenses are unconscious at the time of use. The third criterion is 
that there exist many different defenses and these defenses can all be distinguished from each 
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other. Fourth, although defenses are often the hallmark of major psychiatric symptoms, they are 
dynamic and reversible. Finally, all defenses can be adaptive
3
 as well as pathological. 
More recent conceptualizations of defenses are somewhat expanded but retain the 
essential elements from Freud’s original conceptualization (Perry, 1990). For example, current 
researchers (Conte & Apter, 1995; Cramer 1998b; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998) identified six 
definitional criteria for defenses. The first and foremost criterion is that defense mechanisms are 
unconscious. Accordingly, the actual defensive behaviour may be conscious (e.g., persons may 
be aware that they “fidget” when they are feeling anxious) but the behaviour is not consciously 
intended to relieve the anxiety. While some researchers occasionally add a small element of 
conscious effort into definitions of defense mechanisms, there is a general consensus that 
conscious effort is more indicative of a coping strategy and not of a defense mechanism (Cramer, 
1998b). As Cramer (1998b) puts it, defense mechanisms’ “occurrence is not willed; rational 
decision making is not involved” (p. 925).  
The second definitional criterion of defense mechanisms is that they operate to manage 
psychic threat and protect self-esteem and integration of the self. For example, in the fidgeting 
example above, the person might be unaware that the fidgeting is a behavioural manifestation of 
defense mechanism Undoing, which is operating to protect against awareness of a desire to 
engage in unacceptable sexual behaviours (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). This criterion allows 
for threat to be both entirely intrapsychic, as Freud originally proposed, as well as external. For 
example, the psychic threat could be the loss of a spouse and the defensive response might be to 
write beautiful poetry about life via the defense mechanism Sublimation. 
Third, defense mechanisms work to help manage affect or protect persons from high 
levels of anxiety. An initial threat will cause negative affect or “signal anxiety” and then this 
signal anxiety will trigger the use of defense mechanisms to prevent more severe anxiety or 
“traumatic anxiety” (Busch et al., 1999). In this way defenses are mobilized in an effort to 
manage and prevent more severe levels of anxiety. For example, in an anxiety provoking 
situation signal anxiety might trigger the use of the defense mechanism Humour in order to 
relieve some of the uncomfortable anxiety by emphasizing an ironic aspect of the situation. This 
defense use effectively addresses the anxiety, thereby preventing resulting traumatic anxiety. 
                                                 
3
 Following the suggestion of other researchers (e.g., Bond, 2004; Kwon, 2000) I will use the terms “adaptive” and 
“mature” interchangeably as well as “maladaptive” and “immature” interchangeably. 
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The fourth definitional criterion of defenses is that they are part of normal personality and 
are relatively stable ways of dealing with anxiety. Throughout the lifespan people use defenses 
of varying levels of adaptiveness depending on their psychological maturity as well as the 
circumstances surrounding the situation (Cramer, 1991). Reliance on specific defenses may 
change slowly over time, but defenses are typically stable and change at a rate similar to other 
personality dimensions (Chaplin, John, & Goldberg, 1988; Cramer, 1991). According to this 
criterion then, persons will usually employ the same constellation of defenses over a broad range 
of circumstances. For example, a person might use Intellectualization to explain how his divorce 
is the result of a worldwide degradation of the sanctity of marriage and also how an overly 
competitive capitalistic society has forced him into being underemployed and underappreciated. 
Although typically considered stable, during periods of acute stress individuals may regress and 
temporarily rely on more immature defense mechanisms than are typically utilized (Cramer, 
1998b; Holi, Sammallahti, & Aalberg, 1999; Kipper et al., 2005; White, 1948).  
Fifth, excessive or rigid use of one or very few defense mechanisms may lead to 
psychopathology. This criterion helps to illustrate that defense use itself is not inherently 
maladaptive, but that rigid use of a small group of defenses or excessive use of developmentally 
inappropriate defenses contributes to psychopathology. Psychodynamic theorists argue that all 
people use a wide variety of defenses (Bond, 2004). Rigid reliance on even the most adaptive of 
defense, such as Humour, can become maladaptive. For example, although typically adaptive, 
unrelenting jokes via the use of the defense Humour may not be the most effective way to 
manage anxiety during the funeral of a spouse. Flexible use of a wide variety of defenses is 
essential in effectively reducing anxiety to prevent the development of psychopathology. 
Emphasizing the point that defenses are no longer considered inherently maladaptive, Cramer 
(1998a; 1998b) notes that since the 1930s it has been accepted that defense mechanisms are also 
a part of normal adaptive functioning.  
Finally, defenses are distinguishable. Each defense mechanism has criteria upon which it 
can be differentiated from other defenses (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). This criterion is 
crucial to the understanding of defense theory and how different psychopathologies are related to 
different patterns of defense use. While the precise definition and function of individual defenses 
sometimes lacks consensus (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Bond 2004; Conte & Apter, 1995; 
Cramer, 1998b; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994), there is a wide acceptance that individual defense 
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mechanisms with differing functions do exist and can be assessed and differentiated (Paulhus et 
al., 1997). As can be seen, there is a great degree of similarity between Freud’s original 
conceptualization and the current conceptualization of defenses.  
Finally, a current definition of the term “defense mechanism,” and the one used by all 
authors in the Journal of Personality special issue on defense mechanisms (Cramer & Davidson, 
1998), is: 
“defense mechanism” refers to a mental operation that occurs outside of 
awareness. The function of the defense mechanism is to protect the individual 
from experiencing excessive anxiety. According to older, classical psychoanalytic 
theory, such anxiety would occur if the individual became aware of unacceptable 
thoughts, impulses, or wishes. In contemporary thinking about defenses, an 
additional function is seen to be the protection of the self – of self-esteem and, in 
more extreme cases, protection of the integration of the self. (Cramer, 1998a, p. 
885) 
In summary, definitional criteria of defenses have remained relatively stable over 
the past century. Defenses are an unconscious and stable part of normal personality that 
functions to manage anxiety. There are many different defenses, each with its own 
function and circumstances where it would be considered adaptive. Recent 
conceptualizations include protection from internal as well as external threats and 
recognize defenses’ function in maintaining self-esteem and integration of the self. 
Maturity/Adaptiveness of Defense Mechanisms 
Terminology 
Although the terms “maturity” and “adaptiveness” of defenses are most often used 
interchangeably in the current literature, the two terms originated in slightly different contexts. 
Maturity stems from the idea that defense mechanisms are often conceptualized on a 
developmental continuum. Defenses that appear earlier in life are necessarily less complex, and 
therefore less mature (Paulhus et al., 1997). For example, Denial appears early in life as it is not 
very cognitively complex (i.e., the unconscious equivalent of simply not believing something; 
Cramer, 1991). Defenses such as Projection require the cognitive complexity to differentiate 
one’s own mind from the mind of others (Paulhus et al., 1997), which is an impossible task for 
very young children. Once persons begin to differentiate their own mind from the mind of others 
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and they can recognize that others can be deceitful, their own self-deceitfulness (i.e., Denial) 
becomes less effective. As such, reliance on less mature defenses begins to decline and other 
defenses such as Projection begin to dominate (Paulhus et al., 1997; White, 1948). Finally, even 
more complex defenses such as Intellectualization and Identification begin to appear later yet, 
often in adolescence (Paulhus et al., 1997). While development typically follows a predictable 
path, situations like acute emergencies may result in a regression of the maturity of defenses and 
temporary reliance on Denial or other less mature defenses may reoccur (White, 1948). 
 The term adaptiveness stems from the idea that some defenses are typically more 
effective at reducing anxiety in “acceptable” ways. Defenses were grouped in terms of their 
acceptability, which refers to both  how effectively anxiety might be reduced and what 
consequences might result from the defensive action (Bond et al., 1983). Those that are effective 
at reducing anxiety and had positive consequences were considered adaptive, whereas those that 
were either ineffective at reducing anxiety or led to negative consequences or reactions from 
others were considered maladaptive (Bond et al., 1983). Because adaptive defense are generally 
the more cognitively complex, theories of maturity and adaptiveness coincided to a large degree 
and the words are mostly used interchangeably. 
Hierarchy of Adaptiveness/Maturity 
In his writings, Sigmund Freud indicated that defense mechanisms differed in their ability 
to manage anxiety effectively (1917/2001). As such, he laid the foundations for modern ideas of 
a hierarchy of adaptiveness (i.e., healthiness) of defense mechanisms. Vaillant (1976) provided 
some of the first empirical evidence that supported Freud’s idea that defense mechanisms could 
be arranged on a hierarchy and that this could predict outcomes like success in life. Work by 
Vaillant and colleagues (Vaillant, Bond, & Vaillant, 1986), Perry and Cooper (1989) and Bond 
and colleagues (1983) among others empirically established the concept of a hierarchy of 
defense (Paulhus et al., 1997; Skodol & Perry, 1993). Despite the agreement that defense can be 
ordered in a hierarchy of adaptiveness, there remains some disagreement with regard to the 
ordering of the defenses within the hierarchy (See Table 2 for examples of the hierarchy in 
defense measures), and even with regard to the names, definitions, and conceptualizations of 
defenses to be included (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Bond 2004; Conte & Apter, 1995; 
Cramer, 1998b; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994). 
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In general, defenses can be classified into those that are relatively effective at managing 
anxiety (e.g., mature/adaptive), those that are somewhat effective but also somewhat problematic 
(e.g., neurotic), and those that are ineffective or cause additional difficulties for the individual 
(e.g., immature/maladaptive; Andrews, 1991; Andrews, Pollock, & Stewart, 1989). Mature 
defenses emerge later in life and they result in the fullest acknowledgement of the nature and 
extent of the threat and they directly work to limit the anxiety resulting from the threat until it 
can be dealt with (Andrews, 1991; Andrews et al., 1989; Kwon, 2000; Punamaki, Kanninen, 
Qouta, & El-Sarraj, 2002). This limiting of anxiety is often achieved by adding or transforming 
something minor rather than relying on heavy distortion (Hentschel et al., 2004). Because mature 
defenses involve acknowledging reality as something that can be influenced, they often lead to 
constructive action (Brody et al., 2002; Kwon, 2000; Punamaki et al., 2002).  
Neurotic defenses also result in acknowledgement of the occurrence of the threat but are 
used to manage anxiety by more heavily distorting the meaning (e.g., inverting it) and therefore 
the impact of the threat to oneself (Andrews, 1991; Andrews et al., 1989). The use of these 
defenses is typically somewhat effective at reducing anxiety, but comes with more negative 
consequences or less effective resolution than the use of more mature defenses (Vaillant, 1992). 
Neurotic defenses, by definition, represent psychological ambivalence (Oakley, Song, & 
McQuirter, 2005). 
Immature defenses emerge early in life and reduce anxiety by heavily distorting the 
occurrence of the event (e.g., denying or transferring responsibility for it) as well as its salience 
(Andrews, 1991; Andrews et al., 1989; Punamaki et al., 2002). Immature defenses lead to such 
extensive distortion of objective perception that a feeling may never reach consciousness (Brody 
et al., 2002; Hentschel et al., 2004; Kwon, 2000; Kwon & Lemon, 2000). As a result of the 
heavy distortion and lack of conscious awareness, immature defenses often lead to inaction or 
inappropriate action (Brody et al., 2002; Kwon, 2000; Kwon & Lemon, 2000).  
Although there is a generally accepted level of adaptiveness of defense mechanisms, as 
noted in the definitional criteria above, any defense mechanisms can be effective or ineffective in 
particular circumstances. For example, while typically considered a maladaptive defense, Denial 
can be useful in getting a soldier to function well in life-threatening situations (Punamaki et al., 
2002) and Splitting can be useful to conceptualize combat enemies as “all bad” (Shale, Shale, & 
Shale, 2003). Similarly, while Humour is typically considered an adaptive defense, rigid use of 
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Humour in an extreme situation such as when one is being victimized in a physical or sexual 
assault may not be as adaptive or effective at managing anxiety as a more immature defense such 
as Dissociation. It has been noted that regardless of typical patterns of use, in extreme situations 
individuals may utilize any and all defense mechanisms in an effort to manage the extreme 
anxiety (Cramer, 1998b; Holi et al., 1999; Kipper et al., 2005). In general, however, defense use 
is relatively stable with a reliance on a set constellation of defenses. 
While the terms maturity and adaptiveness of defenses originally came from somewhat 
different theoretical work, they have come to be used interchangeably in the defense literature. 
Over the past decades several researchers have empirically validated hierarchies based on 
maturity/adaptiveness of defenses. There is now a general consensus that defenses can be divided 
into categories such as mature, neurotic, and immature. Given the varying definitions of some 
defenses, however, debate remains as to where some defenses fall on the hierarchy. 
Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology 
Sigmund Freud (1926/2001) argued that there is an intimate link between certain 
defenses and specific forms of psychopathology. According to his daughter, Anna Freud (1995), 
everyone uses a characteristic pattern of defenses. Defense mechanisms, she argued, are used by 
the ego to “put the instincts [of the id] permanently out of action” (p. 7). Commenting on how 
defenses relate to psychopathological symptomatology, Anna (1995) wrote that “there is a 
regular connection between particular neuroses
4
 and special modes of defense, as, for instance, 
… between obsessional neurosis and the process of isolation and undoing” (p. 34). She argued 
that defenses function to maintain a balance and prevent excessive levels of anxiety stemming 
from intra– or interpersonal conflicts from entering into consciousness. Although Anna Freud 
never wrote that defenses would show a one-to-one relation with specific disorders, she did 
indicate that clusters of defenses would show some predictable relation to diagnostic categories 
(Hentschel et al., 2004). 
Many current researchers echo the idea that the presence and severity of certain 
psychopathologies is related to the frequency of use and level of adaptiveness of defense 
mechanisms (e.g., Andrews, Page, & Neilson, 1993; Hentschel et al., 2004; Offer et al., 2000). 
Commenting on the relation between defense use and psychopathology, Laplanche and Pontalis 
                                                 
4
 Neuroses is a general term that encompasses various symptomatology that today would be referred to as panic 
attacks, phobias, obsessions and compulsions, amnesias etc. (White & Watt, 1973a). 
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(1983) noted that, according to psychodynamic theory, “which [defense] mechanisms 
predominate in a given case depends upon the type of illness under consideration [and] upon the 
developmental stage reached” (p. 109). Andrews, Page, and Neilson (1993) further note that the 
relation between defenses and psychopathology has become so accepted that the intellectual 
culture of psychiatry in the modern age seemingly assumes that personality vulnerability such as 
immature defense use somehow contributes to neuroses. Further commenting on the relation 
between defenses and psychopathology, Andrews, Page, and Nielson go on to argue that “it is 
not difficult to become disabled by symptoms of anxiety or depression if one … preferentially 
uses nonmature defense styles in the face of adversity” (p. 585). Perry (1990) argues that 
“Although defenses may not be the principal cause of symptoms per se, it is assumed that the 
adequacy or adaptiveness of defense responses may trigger the onset or affect the course of 
symptoms” (p. 545). 
In addition to the relation of some individual defenses to certain pathologies, some 
theorists (e.g., Gothelf et al., 1995; Kennedy, Schwab, & Hyde, 2001; Offer et al., 2000) note 
that empirical research indicates that many psychiatric disorders have similar patterns of defense 
use and that disorders might all “share a common psychopathogenesis characterized by ego 
deficits or faulty ego development, causing a lack of maturation in defense mechanisms” (Offer 
et al., 2000, p. 39). Gothelf and colleagues argue that evidence supports the notion that all 
psychiatric patients share an overuse of immature defense in comparison to “normal controls.” 
Since the work of Sigmund and Anna Freud, a relation between defense use and 
psychopathology has been proposed. Theorists and researchers have produced sufficiently 
convincing work that modern psychiatry seemingly automatically assumes a relation between 
defenses and psychopathology. While not necessarily a one-to-one relation, specific defenses are 
thought to be linked to specific psychopathologies. In addition to the individual defense and 
individual form of psychopathology, there is some evidence that psychopathology in general 
may have some common defensive underpinnings. 
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Psychodynamic Theories of Depression
5
 
In 1917 Sigmund Freud (1917/2001) described how melancholic persons turn aggression 
felt for an ambivalently viewed loved one inwards toward the self. Freud noted that depression 
was the result of real or perceived loss and that persons often turned aggression toward the self 
or used Identification with the Aggressor to become more like the object
6
 to mitigate the loss 
(Freud, 1917/2001). Since Freud’s seminal article in the area, psychodynamic theorists and 
researchers concerned with depression have focused mostly on depression as a reaction to loss or 
on the relation between depression and defense mechanisms (Pinkus, Boncori, & Chimenti, 
1980; White & Watt, 1973b). As a result of this work, a considerable amount of evidence has 
shown that self-critical defenses are trait vulnerabilities for depression (Besser, 2004). 
Depending on the description of defense functions and definitions used these self-critical 
defenses could include several defenses such as Turning Against the Self, Passive Aggression, 
and Devaluation of the Self.  
One example of the application of psychodynamic theory to depression is given by DeFife 
and Hilsenroth (2005). Like Freud, they argue that those with depression mediate conflicts 
resulting from real or imagined loss in a variety of ways. These methods include turning anger 
away from others and towards the self by punishing the self for feelings of hopelessness, 
helplessness, or rejection (e.g., Turning Against Self, Passive Aggression), by seeking help then 
covertly rejecting it (e.g., Help-rejecting Complaining/Hypochondriasis), or by immediately 
acting on wishes or feelings without considering the consequences (e.g., Acting Out). DeFife and 
Hilsenroth argue that continued use of these defenses serves to provoke negative reactions from 
those around the individual and creates a downward spiral of negative events that causes and 
then maintains the individual’s feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, and hopelessness (DeFife 
& Hilsenroth, 2005).  
In addition to increased use of Turning Against the Self, Passive Aggression, Help-
rejecting Complaining and Acting Out, DeFife and Hilsenroth (2005) also discuss a deficit in the 
use of other defenses. Specifically, a reduced reliance on defenses that work to keep threatening 
thoughts and ideas out of consciousness (e.g., neurotic defenses such as Undoing, & 
Intellectualization) results in more severe and apparent symptomatology as persons with 
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 The term “depression” will be used to refer to depressive disorders in general.  When applicable, specific 
diagnoses such as Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder will be used. 
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depression are unable to keep the threats out of conscious awareness (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 
2005). In contrast, those with strong neurotic defenses might completely keep threatening 
thoughts out of awareness, although conflict might leak through “out of the blue” as is seen in 
those with panic attacks (Busch et al., 1999; DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005). 
White and Watt (1973b) describe a theory of depression that is also based on actual or 
perceived loss. Examples of loss range from the death of a spouse, the loss of moral support of a 
congenial group, down to the perception of a cooling of interest from close others (White & 
Watt, 1973b). This feeling of loss is complicated by feelings of anger and hostility toward the 
deserting person. Any feelings of anger toward the other is sensed as a weakness in one’s own 
self-reliance, and instead of being directed at the other, those feelings of anger and hostility are 
perceived as being directed toward oneself. There may also be a “stubborn refusal to cheer up” 
or a quick rejection of helpful suggestions by others, which may indicate the presence of Passive 
Aggression or Help-rejecting Complaining (White & Watt, 1973b).  
Like Freud (1917/2001), DeFife and Hilsenroth (2005), and White and Watt (1973b), 
Milrod (1988) also writes that sadness is the ego’s response to actual or perceived loss. Milrod 
agreed with Freud (1917/2001) that sadness, grief, or mourning were all the normal analogs to 
pathological depression. Depression then, is when the experiences of loss triggers rage or hostile 
responses that are turned inward toward the self. Self-directed aggression is the essential element 
of depression and it is that aggression that differentiates it from nonpathological sadness (Milrod, 
1988). Milrod notes that depression is preserved in part by Denial of all evidence of worthiness 
and self-value (Milrod, 1988). Instead, exaggerated self-blame predominates. The severity of the 
depression, Milrod argues, is partially dependent on the severity of the Denial. He further notes 
that the most important variable in determining the clinical picture and prognosis for the 
individual is the degree of maturity of their ego, specifically the ego’s ability to neutralize the 
anxiety through defenses (Milrod, 1988).  
Building on the work of many of the theorists above, Rudden and Colleagues (2003) note 
that most psychoanalytic theories of depression describe a narcissistic vulnerability stemming 
from early loss or experiences with parents that are perceived to be unempathic, frustrating, or 
rejecting. Whether this description accurately portrays the history of these individuals with 
depression or whether it is a by-product of their depressed view of the world is debatable, but 
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importantly it is a part of the individuals’ experience of themselves and others (Rudden et al., 
2003). This experience may lead to difficulty with self-esteem regulation and then acute episodes 
of depression exacerbate perceptions of themselves as unlovable, damaged, and inadequate 
(Rudden et al., 2003). Important others, often a parent, are blamed for the sense of injury. Envy 
or rage for those seen as more fortunate may also be present. Hostility towards others is typically 
turned inward toward the self, although it is sometimes projected outwards towards others 
(Rudden et al., 2003; White & Watt, 1973b). Guilt over the hostile, envious, or vengeful feelings 
is common.  
Rudden and colleagues (2003) acknowledge that neurobiological theories of depression are 
important for completely understanding depression and that neurobiology sets the stage for the 
psychodynamics. Like Milrod (1988), they further note that although there are numerous 
hypothesized and documented triggers to depression, “resulting hostility directed toward the self 
is crucial to the depressive experience” (p. 1000). They conclude that although many disorders 
might involve reflected hostility, the distinguishing feature for depression is the difficulties with 
self-esteem regulation coupled with aggression turned inward (Rudden et al., 2003). 
A similar theory of depression, utilizing Defense Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS) 
defenses (see Table 2), is proposed by Hoglend and Perry (1998). They argue that Action Level 
defenses are used by those with conflicts over basic issues of dependency, attachment, and 
autonomy. Painful affect from events such as real or imagined loss limit the persons’ defensive 
repertoire and they rely heavily on these immature defenses. Frustration is turned away from 
others and onto oneself (Passive Aggression), help is sought from others in a way that covertly 
punishes them for the persons’ painful affect (Help-rejecting Complaining), and painful feelings 
are acted on immediately, without thought of consequences (Acting Out). These maladaptive 
defense mechanisms provoke negative reactions from close others, which begins a cascade of 
negative effects and a worsening of one’s self-experience (Hoglend & Perry, 1998).  
As a result of negative reactions from others, Major Image Distorting Level defenses (i.e., 
Splitting of Self, Splitting of Others, & Projective Identification) are mobilized to prevent severe 
psychological harm (Hoglend & Perry, 1998). Much like the primitive Action Level defenses, 
these Major Image Distorting defenses provide some survival value in the short-term, but lead to 
spiralling negative reactions from others, ensuring continued use of the available but maladaptive 
defenses of the depressed individual. The negative reactions from others may trigger use of 
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Devaluation of the Self in an effort to manage negative reactions. If this Devaluation is 
disavowed, Projection may be utilized to keep painful feelings about the self at a distance 
(Hoglend & Perry, 1998). While Devaluation of the Self and Projection temporarily relieve 
distress, they leave underlying conflicts ignored and unresolved. In contrast, use of a mature 
defense such as Self-observation allows one to recognize one’s own maladaptive patterns and the 
effect they have on others. This allows persons to change their behaviour and address the 
underlying issue (Hoglend & Perry, 1998). In short, reliance on immature level defenses (e.g., 
Action Level, Major Image Distorting level) as opposed to neurotic or mature level defenses 
serves to aid the development and maintenance of depressive symptomatology. 
In summary, the primary conflict common among all the theories of depression is actual 
or perceived loss. Rather than express the negative affect towards the person they feel has 
abandoned them, the aggression is turned inward on the self. The various theories of depression 
indicate elevated usage of primarily immature defenses such as Acting Out, Denial, Devaluation 
of the Self, Help-Rejecting Complaining, Identification with the Aggressor, Passive Aggression, 
Projection, Projective Identification, Splitting of Self, Splitting of Others, and Turning Against 
the Self, and reduced usage of neurotic or mature defenses such as Intellectualization, Self-
observation, and Undoing. More generally, those with depression will demonstrate elevated use 
of immature defense and reduced use of mature defenses. These immature defenses serve to 
provoke negative reactions in others and result in a self-perpetuating cycle of depressive 
symptomatology. Finally, although several defenses are frequently referred to as characteristic of 
persons with depression (e.g., Acting Out, Passive Aggression, Help-rejecting Complaining), 
Turning Against the Self (Devaluation of the Self) is the essential element across all theories. 
Psychodynamic Theories of Anxiety
7
 
There are a number of psychodynamic theories related to anxiety. Each one differs in 
focus depending on the type of anxiety being considered (e.g., Panic Disorder, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder). For the sake of brevity, I will focus on a more thorough review of one 
anxiety disorder in particular. Because it has generated the most theoretical and research papers 
in relation to defenses, the psychodynamic theory of anxiety I will review is that related to Panic 
Disorder. Busch and colleagues (1991; 1999; Shear, Cooper, Klerman, Busch, & Shapiro, 1993) 
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delineated a comprehensive psychodynamic theory of Panic Disorder. Like Rudden and 
colleagues (2003) argued in their theory of depression, Busch and colleagues (1991) begin by 
writing that much can be learned from alternative perspectives on Panic Disorder. They note that 
genetics from the neurophysiological perspective and catastrophic misinterpretations from the 
cognitive behavioural perspective are well-supported and meaningful in understanding Panic 
Disorder and that trying to explain disorders solely with psychodynamics alone is a significant 
error (Busch et al, 1991; Rudden et al., 2003). They write further, however, that psychodynamic 
theory might be a useful tool in explaining why the lives of persons with Panic Disorder involve 
so much misinterpretation (Busch et al., 1991).  
Busch and colleagues (1999) noted that years of clinical observations indicate that 
separation and independence fantasies are common among persons with Panic Disorder. They 
further noted that these same patients have been found to have difficulty tolerating angry feelings 
and thoughts toward significant others (Busch et al., 1991; 1999; Shear et al., 1993). Based on 
this and other evidence, they hypothesized that panic attacks serve a self-punitive function in 
which persons atone for their guilty transgressions (e.g., angry impulses towards significant 
others; Busch et al., 1999). These fears of separation and anger are therefore central to panic 
onset and persistence.  
Busch and colleagues (1991; 1999; Shear et al., 1993) write that the difficulty tolerating 
angry feelings usually starts early in life with fearful dependence, which can either be inborn or 
result from actual or perceived trauma. The person then begins to perceive others as providing 
inadequate attention and protection and therefore become angry at the important others (e.g., 
parents). This anger is initially unconscious and it triggers anxiety (i.e., signal anxiety) because 
of a fear that the anger will further disrupt relationships with loved ones and perhaps alienate 
them (Rudden et al., 2003; Shear et al., 1993). This anxiety and fear then leads to more fearful 
dependence, resulting in a self-perpetuation cycle of unconscious anger and conscious feelings of 
dependence (Busch et al., 1991; 1999; Rudden et al., 2003). 
Busch and colleagues (1999) argue that although this fearful dependence relational 
pattern is set up early in life, it can be triggered in adulthood by life events. In support of their 
argument for relational patterns being present early in life, they note that observers from varied 
theoretical perspectives have written about premorbid personality traits such as pervasive 
unassertiveness, fearfulness, and dependency in persons with Panic Disorder (Busch et al., 1991) 
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and that many patients describe themselves as fearful, nervous, or shy as children (Shear et al., 
1993). In an effort to manage the anxiety, the person often utilizes Reaction Formation and 
Undoing in an effort to strengthen attachment relationships and prevent the anger from becoming 
conscious. The unconscious nature of the angry feelings, however, results in an inability to 
modulate the experienced threat to the attachment with the significant other fully, and thus 
results in panic symptoms (Busch et al., 1999).  
In addition to unconscious anger, avoidance of the unfamiliar prevents the person from 
learning to predict threats and from developing more mature defense mechanisms (Shear et al., 
1993). As a result the person remains reliant on the more immature defenses they already possess 
(Shear et al., 1993). An effort of the more primitive defenses to deny the presence of negative 
affects may mean that somatic aspects become the focus of attention, leading to the 
catastrophizing noted by many researchers and clinicians (Shear et al., 1993). Shear and 
colleagues note that their model predicts that those with Panic Disorder would use more 
immature defenses than would a “normal comparison group” and that those with Panic Disorder 
would differ from other psychiatric groups on their defense use. 
Those with Panic Disorder are hypothesized to use defenses that protect the relationship 
with the needed object against strain from the person’s angry impulses and feelings (Bush, Shear, 
Cooper, Shapiro, & Leon, 1995). Persons with Panic Disorder can be expected to rely more 
heavily on defenses such as Denial, Displacement, Reaction Formation, and Undoing. Denial 
allows the person to acknowledge that the anxiety provoking event occurred, but then to deny 
any of the threatening impulses that resulted from it, thereby preserving the important 
relationship with the needed other. Displacement allows the person to redirect anger from the 
close object towards a less threatening object, which preserves the close relationship with the 
target. Similarly, Reaction Formation allows the person to reject the anger directed at the close 
other while at the same time strengthening the bond with the display of the opposite emotion. 
Undoing is used to make amends for the anxiety-provoking feelings felt toward the close object 
symbolically (Busch et al., 1991; 1995; Rudden et al., 2003).  
 Busch and colleagues (1991; 1999) argue that DSM-IV emphasis on symptoms coming 
“out of the blue,” is actually just a lack of conscious awareness of the stressors and the 
intrapsychic conflict that led to the symptoms. They cite literature suggesting that even if persons 
do not cite or are not aware of the effects of events in their lives, there is often identifiable “life 
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events” that occur just prior to the panic onset (Busch et al., 1991; 1999). They also note that 
many persons with Panic Disorder will initially deny pre-existing anxiety, or deny a relation 
between panic and stressful life events, only later to realize in therapy that this denial was untrue 
(Shear et al., 1993). These life events often involve major changes and threats to security such as 
loss, rejection, a change of job, or increased expectations (Busch et al., 1991). Often the defenses 
are forming a “compromise formation”, which involves trying to manage angry impulses as well 
as feelings and fantasies stemming from the id with fears of abandonment stemming from an 
overly harsh superego (Busch et al., 1999). This compromise formation is described as the “least 
unpleasurable” solution. Sometimes the panic symptoms themselves serve as a less distressing 
alternative to undistorted angry impulses towards important others (Busch et al., 1999). For 
example, angry impulses directed at a loved one, perhaps even unconscious wishes for their 
death can be managed by a panic attack. This would then make the individual feel weak and 
unable to bring about the death of the more powerful loved one (Busch et al., 1999; Rudden et 
al., 2003).  
In summary, inborn fearfulness followed by excessive fearfulness of the unknown as a 
child lead to heightened dependency on the parents. Since parents will invariably fail at always 
being available, the child is left feeling ashamed, helpless, and incapable of handling the 
unfamiliar. This fearfulness is blamed on the parent who is seen as the source of the anxiety. 
This anger toward the parent is threatening to the relationship the person has become dependent 
on and defense mechanisms such as Denial, Displacement, Reaction Formation, and Undoing are 
used to minimize conflict resulting from these angry impulses. The internal representation of 
others as controlling continues on into adulthood where any sufficient threat to attachment can 
trigger the cycle anew. 
Comparative Summary of Depression and Anxiety Theory 
 Both depression and Panic Disorder involve difficulties with self-esteem regulation and 
guilt over aggression. The most apparent difference between the two disorders is how the guilt 
over aggression towards others is managed. In depression, guilt is primarily turned towards the 
self or managed via other immature defenses. In Panic Disorder, however, the aggression is 
reversed, denied, or diverted to less threatening others in an effort to preserve the relationship 
(Busch et al., 1991; 1999; Rudden et al., 2003). Whereas depression is related primarily to 
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increased use of immature defenses, Panic Disorder is related primarily to increased use of 
neurotic defenses. 
RESEARCH  
General Research on Defenses 
In the century since Freud originally identified the concept, there has been numerous 
research studies investigating defenses. With regard to Freud’s writings on defense mechanisms 
and psychopathology, Baumeister and colleagues (1998) note that “any accuracy at all would be 
impressive” (p. 1083) given the advances in knowledge and science itself over that period. In 
fact, as will be apparent through this literature review, many of Freud’s original defense 
mechanisms can be said to have substantial support and evidence of their existence and function. 
Moreover, this evidence can be found not only from psychodynamic or even clinical researchers, 
but also from related fields such as cognitive and social psychology working with “normal” 
participants (Baumeister et al., 1998; Norem, 1998; Paulhus et al., 1997). Impressively, Freud’s 
late 19
th
 century observations of persons suffering from severe psychopathology remain 
informative over 100 years later in understanding both normal and abnormal personality 
functioning (Baumeister et al., 1998). The following research is a brief summary of relevant 
defense research. 
Methods to Assess Defenses 
Although Freud did not develop a formal method by which to identify defenses, many 
different approaches have since been developed to achieve this goal (Perry & Ianni, 1998). The 
three main methods used to assess defenses are projective tests, self-report, and observer report 
(Perry, 1990; Skodol & Perry, 1993). The first method to assess defenses, projective tests, 
follows directly from psychoanalytic literature. One projective instrument from which defenses 
are frequently assessed is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935). The 
most frequently used defense mechanism scoring system for the TAT uses the Defense 
Mechanism Manual (Cramer, 1991). Participants are shown TAT cards (black & white pictures 
with ambiguous social situations) and are asked to explain what is happening in the scene. 
Participants’ responses are transcribed and then coded for defenses using the Defense 
Mechanism Manual, which is based on factors such as omissions and misperceptions. For 
example, if a person did not mention a prominently placed weapon in a card, then the defense 
Denial would be coded. 
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One strength of projective measures is that they are more theoretically supported than 
some other methods of assessing defenses (e.g., self-report) since they involve the interpretation 
of unconscious material (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998; Perry & Ianni, 1998). Additionally, 
projective measures typically have well-defined testing situations and involve minimal influence 
by the tester (Perry & Ianni, 1998). Limitations, however, include the labour intensiveness of 
projective testing and the fact that projective testing is not as conducive to large scale testing as 
other methods of assessing defenses (Perry & Ianni, 1998). Also, most projective measures 
require an extensively trained researcher or clinician to test participants individually and scoring 
these measures can be very time consuming. 
A second method of assessing defenses is the self-report method. Using this approach 
participants are given a number of situations or statements and asked to rate how likely each one 
is for them. Responses are then combined to create scores for different individual defenses or for 
different defense styles (see Table 2). One of the most common self-report methods of assessing 
defense mechanisms is the Defense Style Questionnaire
8
 (DSQ; Bond et al., 1983). The DSQ has 
72 statements that participants respond to using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 9 (strongly agree). Examples of DSQ statements are “I’d rather starve than be forced to eat” 
(Passive Aggression) and “If someone mugged me and stole my money, I’d rather he be helped 
than hurt” (Reaction Formation).  
Strengths of the self-report approach include the relative ease of self-report data 
collection from large groups of participants and the minimal amount of training that is needed on 
the part of those administering the measure (Bond et al., 1983). It is easy to ensure each 
participant receives a standardized presentation and therefore observer and experimenter effects 
are greatly reduced. As well, scoring is relatively straightforward and not overly time-
consuming. Finally, self-report does not require independent observers like some other methods 
and therefore the difficulties with low inter-rater reliability between observers are avoided (Bond 
et al., 1983; Skodol & Perry, 1993).  
A limitation of this approach is that it is questionable whether the self-report 
questionnaires actually elicit defense mechanisms (Cooper & Kline, 1982). Also, as with most 
self-report questionnaires, social desirability is a concern. Participants may be choosing 
                                                 
8
 The DSQ has numerous versions assessing different defenses and defense styles.  Following Bond (2004) these 
will be discussed interchangeably. The interested reader is directed to Appendix A for more details. 
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responses they feel are appropriate, thus making the data difficult to interpret (Cramer, 1991). 
This is supported in part by Besser and colleagues, who found that participants rate themselves 
higher on Mature Defense Style (Besser, 2004; Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 2005) and lower 
on Immature Defense Style (Flett et al., 2005) on the DSQ than their friends rate them. Finally, 
there has been much criticism of self-report measures of defenses because they purport to 
measure the unconscious in a conscious manner. Various researchers have argued that persons 
can recognize their behavioural patterns in hindsight (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Bond et 
al., 1983), that persons’ belief systems will be indicative of their pattern of defense use 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), that persons may be aware of “residuals” of their defensive 
behaviour (Punamaki et al., 2002), or that defensive behaviour might be pointed out to persons 
by those around them (Bond et al., 1983; Nishimura, 1998). Andrews and colleagues (1989) 
summarize the argument that persons can self-report defense use by stating that “the way one 
behaves under pressure is all too predictable, that one is all too aware of it, and relatively 
powerless to modify it” (p. 459). Although there is a general consensus that it is possible to 
assess some aspects of defensive behaviour through self-report (Bond et al., 1983; Corruble et 
al., 2003; 2004; Sammallahti, Aalberg, & Pentinsaari, 1994; Wastell, 1999), questions remain as 
to whether specific defenses such as Repression or Denial inherently interfere with self-report. 
(Besser, 2004; Brody et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 1991; Cramer 1998a; 1998b; Joiner et al., 2000; 
Kwon, 1999; Norem, 1998; Skodol & Perry, 1993). 
 The final method to assess defenses is the observer report method. In early defense 
mechanism research the observer report method was the most widely used with patient samples 
(Skodol & Perry, 1993). The observer report method involves participants being rated by trained 
observers for their defense use. An example of this approach is Davidson and MacGregor’s 
(1996) Defense-Q. Using this instrument, observers rate participants for their relative use of 25 
defenses using a Q-sort. The Q-sort profile of 25 defenses can then be compared between 
participants to norms or to theoretical profiles.  
A strength of this approach is that less training is required on the part of the observer than 
with projective assessment. In addition, observer report methods such as the Defense-Q involve a 
rater who is inferring defense use from the participant’s behaviour. This inference allows for the 
assessment of behavioural manifestations of unconscious material. This assessment of 
unconscious material is consistent with psychodynamic theory and allows for assessment of 
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defenses that are more difficult to assess through some other methods (e.g., Repression or 
Denial). In addition, the utilization of an independent observer reduces concerns of social 
desirability of the respondent.  
Limitations of this approach include that it is more labour intensive to score than self-
report methods and that participants must be observed and coded individually, thus making large 
sample sizes difficult to obtain (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). Secondly, although the addition 
of an independent observer addresses some of the limitations of other methods (e.g., self-report) 
it also introduces difficulties such as low inter-rater reliability (Perry & Ianni, 1998; see 
Measures section for further discussion of inter-rater reliability). Finally, some observer report 
methods require up to 20 hours worth of clinical data per person to assess defense mechanisms 
reliably (Skodol & Perry, 1993). 
There are three main methods to assessing defense mechanisms. Each method has 
strengths and weaknesses. While some methods such as self-report are especially conducive to 
large-scale testing, others are much more labour intensive and make large-scale testing difficult. 
Methods such as observer report are recommended because they involve outside observers 
interpreting unconscious material, but with the interpretation comes difficulties with inter-rater 
reliability. Given the strengths and weaknesses of the different methods, it is recommended that 
research with defense mechanisms utilize more than one method in each study (Davidson & 
MacGregor, 1998; Perry & Ianni, 1998). 
Research on Defenses and Psychopathology 
As there is an abundance of research involving defenses and psychopathology in general 
and depression and anxiety specifically, the following review will focus on two of the most often 
used measures. As self-report has become the most common method of assessing defenses, I will 
review research involving the most commonly used self-report measure, the Defense Style 
Questionnaire (DSQ). In addition, as observer report measures were once the most commonly 
used method and are currently the most applicable method to clinical work, I will review 
literature pertaining to the most commonly used observer report measure, DMRS, as well as 
literature related to the DSM Defensive Functioning Scale, which is based on the DMRS. 
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Defense Mechanisms and General Psychopathology 
Defenses and Psychopathology Scores in Patient Populations  
Several researchers have examined the relation between defense styles from the DSQ and 
symptom indices from the Symptom Check List – 90 (SCL-90) or Symptom Check List–90–
Revised (SCL-90-R). While some authors (e.g., Holi et al., 1999) note that numerous studies 
have failed to replicate the factor structure of the SCL-90-R scales, that the scales are highly 
intercorrelated, and that many researchers have noted that the scales (e.g., depression, anxiety) 
do not actually assess what they are named after, a few researchers continue to use the individual 
scales. Most, however, use only the Global Severity Index (GSI), which is a measure of overall 
severity of symptomatology. Caution is warranted in interpreting the individual scales. 
Defenses have been compared to symptoms assessed by the SCL-90 in outpatients (Holi 
et al., 1999), patients with neurosis (Sammallahti, Holi, Komulainen, & Aalberg, 1996), patients 
with personality disorders (Sammallahti et al., 1996), patients with any mental health diagnosis 
(Spinhoven et al., 1995), patients without a mental health diagnosis (e.g., a V-Code; Spinhoven, 
van Gaalen, & Abraham, 1995), and community control participants (Holi et al., 1999; Muris & 
Merckelbach, 1996; Sammallahti et al., 1996; Spinhoven et al., 1995). Results indicate that those 
persons using an Immature Defense Style (i.e., scoring higher than 0.5 SD above the mean; Bond 
et al., 1983; Bond & Perry, 2004) report the most severe symptomatology on all nine SCL-90 
scales (i.e., Somatization, Obsessive Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, 
Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, & Psychoticism), followed by those that used a 
Neurotic Defense Style, those who do not predominantly engage in any particular defensive 
style, and finally followed by those using a Mature Defense Style (Holi et al., 1999). The use of 
Mature Defense Style has been found to be negatively related to all nine SCL-90 scales while 
Neurotic, Immature, and Borderline Defense Style have been found to be positively related to all 
SCL-90 scales (Sammallahti et al., 1996).  
Most defense research using the SCL-90 focuses on the GSI score. Researchers have 
found the GSI to be negatively related to Mature Defense Style (Spinhoven et al., 1995) and 
positively related to Neurotic (Sammallahti et al., 1996; Spinhoven et al., 1995), Immature 
(Sammallahti et al., 1996; Spinhoven et al., 1995), and Borderline Defense Styles (Sammallahti 
et al., 1996). Looking at individual defense mechanisms, researchers have found the GSI to be 
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negatively related to Humour and positively related to Acting Out, Devaluation, Fantasy, Passive 
Aggression, Projection, Somatization, and Undoing (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
Researchers have also examined the extent to which variance in GSI scores can be 
accounted for by defenses. The Immature Defense Style consistently accounts for the most 
variance (Holi et al., 1999; Sammallahti et al., 1996) followed by the Mature (Holi et al., 1999) 
and Neurotic Defense Styles (Holi et al., 1999). For individual defense mechanisms researchers 
have found that (in descending order) Devaluation, Passive Aggression, Somatization, Acting 
Out, and Humour all accounted for a significant amount of the variance in GSI scores even after 
controlling for general levels of neuroticism (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
Defenses and Psychopathology Differentiation  
Researchers have found that defense mechanisms can be used to differentiate persons 
with different mental health diagnoses and varying levels of psychopathology. For example, 
using DSQ defense styles, researchers have been able to differentiate between participants in 
control, neurotic, high functioning personality disorder, and low functioning personality disorder 
groups (Sammallahti et al., 1994), and between control participants, patients with no mental 
health diagnosis, and patients with a mental health diagnosis (Spinhoven et al., 1995).  
Early attempts to differentiate participants based on disorders were not successful. For 
example, using the five defense level version of the DMRS, Perry and Cooper (1986) attempted 
to differentiate persons with three similar mental health diagnoses (Borderline Personality 
Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, & Bipolar II Disorder) using a discriminant analysis. 
Only 8 to 10 participants with each disorder were involved in the study (total sample = 27 
patients across 3 groups), which may have contributed to the null findings. It should be noted, 
however, that despite the small group sizes, the participants were successfully differentiated on 
five psychodynamic conflicts (Perry & Cooper, 1986). 
Summary  
Defense styles as well as individual defenses display a generally consistent relation 
across various indices of symptomatology. Research using the SCL-90/SCL-90-R has 
demonstrated that all types of symptoms are negatively related to Mature Defense Style and 
mature defenses and positively related to Neurotic, Immature, and Borderline Defense Styles and 
defenses on the DSQ. Defense styles (at least from the DSQ) have been shown to differentiate 
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participants with various disorders from community participants, patients not warranting a 
psychiatric diagnosis, and from those with other diagnoses.  
Depression 
Depression Scores and Defenses in Nonclinical Samples 
Researchers have investigated the relation between DSQ defenses and depression scores 
on a number of measures in a wide variety of samples. Depression measures used include the 
Beck Depression Inventory/Beck Depression Inventory-2 (Flannery & Perry, 1990; Kwon, 2000; 
Kwon & Lemon, 2000; Oakley et al., 2005), Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Watson, 2002); 
Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression (CES-D; Besser, 2004; Flett, Besser, & Hewitt, 
2005), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Nishimura, 1998). The 
samples examined include college students from Canada (Watson, 2002), Japan (Nishimura, 
1998), and the United States (Flannery & Perry, 1990; Kwon, 2000; Kwon & Lemon, 2000), as 
well as low-income African American women (Oakley et al., 2005), and former members of the 
Israeli army (Besser, 2004; Flett, Besser, & Hewitt, 2005).  
Depression scores have been found to be negatively related to the Mature (Kwon, 2000; 
Kwon & Lemon, 2000; Oakley et al., 2005) and the Self-sacrificing Defense Style (Flannery & 
Perry, 1990), and positively related to the Image Distorting (Flannery & Perry, 1990), 
Maladaptive (Flannery & Perry, 1990), Neurotic (Flett et al., 2005), Immature (Besser, 2004; 
Flett et al., 2005; Kwon, 2000; Kwon & Lemon, 2000; Nishimura, 1998; Oakley et al., 2005), 
and Emotion Avoiding Defense Styles (Besser, 2004). Both Besser (2004) and Flett and 
colleagues (2005) used self- and friend reporting of depression and defenses. While the above 
mentioned relations from Flett and colleagues were consistent across both types of ratings, self 
(but not friend) ratings of depression were positively related to self (but not friend) ratings of 
Mature Defense Style (Flett, et al., 2005). The authors argue that this is an indication that 
participants overestimate their use of mature defenses while outside observers (e.g., friends) 
provide a more accurate portrayal of their defense use. 
Researchers have also investigated the relation between depression scores and individual 
defenses. For example, Watson (2002) examined the extent to which individual defenses could 
account for the variance in depression scores. Results (in descending order) indicate that 
Displacement, Projection, Fantasy, (negative) Denial, and Somatization contributed to the 
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variance in depression scores for females and Projection, Fantasy, (negative) Humour, 
Somatization, Isolation, and (negative) Dissociation contributed for males (Watson, 2002).  
In summary, across numerous measures of depression, various countries, and diverse 
samples, DSQ defenses have demonstrated a relatively consistent relation with depression scores 
in nonclinical samples. Depression scores are negatively related to Mature Defense Style and 
defenses and positively related to Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles and defenses. In 
addition, those defenses accounting for the largest proportion of variance across sex are the 
Immature Defense Style and individual defenses of Fantasy, Projection, and Somatization. Other 
defenses that were related to depression include lower use of Denial, Dissociation and Humour 
as well as higher use of Displacement and Isolation. These studies have exclusively used self-
report measures of defenses and primarily assessed broad defense levels rather than individual 
defenses. The one study that did examine individual defenses identified participants in the 
depressed group using the BSI. The BSI is a shorter form of the SCL-90-R, which has been 
demonstrated to be problematic when using the individual scales to identify particular disorders 
(Holi et al., 1999). 
Diagnosed Depression 
Presence Versus Absence of Mood Disorder 
Many researchers have investigated the difference in defense use between those with and 
without a mood disorder diagnosis. Early work (e.g., Bond & Vaillant, 1986) showed no 
difference in defense use between those with and without a mood disorder diagnosis. 
Researchers (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) noted, however, that a small sample size (n = 16 in 
mood disorder group) may have led to the null findings. Later research revealed that patients 
with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) have been shown to rely less on a Mature Defense Style 
(Akkerman, Carr, & Lewin, 1992; Akkerman, Lewin, & Carr, 1999; McMahon, Barnett, 
Kowalenko, & Tennant, 2005; Milgrom & Beatrice, 2003), and more on Neurotic (Akkerman et 
al., 1992; Milgrom & Beatrice, 2003) and Immature/Maladaptive Defense Styles (Akkerman et 
al., 1992; Kennedy et al., 2001; McMahon et al., 2005; Milgrom & Beatrice, 2003; Spinhoven & 
Kooiman, 1997) than persons in the control group.  
Researchers have also examined differential use of individual defenses between those with 
and without a diagnosis of a mood disorder. Milgrom and Beatrice (2003) found that mothers 
diagnosed with MDD scored lower on Humour and Suppression and higher on Somatization at 3 
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months postbirth than did mothers with no diagnosis. Spinhoven and Kooiman (1997) found that 
persons with Dysthymic Disorder used Devaluation, Isolation, and Somatization more than 
persons in the control group. Perry and Cooper (1986) noted that presence of chronic depression 
was positively correlated with Devaluation, Passive Aggression, and Hypochondriasis. Perry 
(Perry & Kardos, 1995) notes that he also found Devaluation, Passive Aggression, and 
Hypochondriasis to be more common in persons with Dysthymic Disorder than persons with 
Panic Disorder (Bloch, Shear, Markowitz, Leon, & Perry, 1993). 
Depression Scores  
Numerous researchers have examined the relation between defense mechanisms and 
severity of depressive symptomatology in individuals with diagnoses of MDD. Depression 
symptom severity has been assessed with the CES-D (McMahon et al., 2005) Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression (Corruble et al., 2004), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; DeFife 
& Hilsenroth, 2005), the SCL-90-R Depression scale (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005; Hilsenroth, 
Callahan, & Eudell, 2003; Holi et al., 1999), and the SCL-90-R GSI (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). Results indicate that depression severity is negatively related to use of a 
Mature Defense Style (Corruble et al., 2004; McMahon et al., 2005) and Overall Defensive 
Functioning (ODF; Hoglend & Perry, 1998; Perry & Hoglend, 1998) and positively related to 
Neurotic (McMahon et al., 2005) and Immature Defense Styles (McMahon et al., 2005) on the 
DSQ. Similarly, depression severity has been found to be negatively related to Mental 
Inhibitions Level – Obsessive Defenses (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005), and ODF (DeFife & 
Hilsenroth, 2005; Hilsenroth et al., 2003), and positively related to Action Level Defenses 
(DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005) on the DSM-IV-TR Defensive Functioning Scale, which is based on 
the DMRS. DeFife and Hilsenroth note that presence of low-level defenses appears to be a poor 
prognostic sign while presence of at least some higher level defenses is a good prognostic sign. 
Midlevel defenses (i.e., those not at the extremes of the hierarchy) do not appear to be 
consistently related to depression symptomatology (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005). 
Researchers have found depression severity to be negatively related to the individual 
defenses Humour and Sublimation and positively related to use of Projection as assessed by the 
DSQ (Corruble et al., 2004). Additionally, Holi and colleagues (1999) found Displacement to 
account for the most variance in depression scores, followed by Projection, Somatization, 
Fantasy, and Anticipation using the DSQ. The authors note that the defense that accounted for 
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the most variance, Displacement, contains items about drinking alcohol, using drugs, eating, and 
daydreaming to relieve anxiety. In the original version of the DSQ, these items were related to 
Consumption and Fantasy. The concern raised by the researchers is that the Displacement items 
on this version of the DSQ may be more indicative of depression related behaviours than of the 
defense Displacement (Holi et al., 1999). These items were dropped in subsequent versions of 
the DSQ. 
Defense Change with Treatment for Depression 
A number of studies have been conducted to examine the extent to which defenses change 
after treatment for depression. Researchers have found an increase in the use of a Mature 
Defense Style at treatment termination (Kneepkens & Oakley, 1996), and at 1 month (Bronnec et 
al., 2005), 6 months (Akkerman et al., 1999), and 2 years (Akkerman, et al., 1999) post-
treatment. Researchers have also found a reduced reliance on Immature Defense Style at 
treatment termination (Kneepkens & Oakley, 1996; Mullen, Blanco, Vaughan, Vaughan, & 
Roose, 1999), and at 1 month (Bronnec et al., 2005), 2 months (Akkerman et al., 1992), and 2 
years (Akkerman et al., 1999) post-treatment. Finally, researchers have found an increase in the 
ODF Scale of the DSQ at the termination of 10-12 weeks of depression treatment (Mullen, et al., 
1999). While some authors (e.g., DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005) have argued that change found in 7 
days of treatment (e.g., Kneepkens & Oakley, 1996) is an indication that the DSQ is assessing 
acute state reactions as opposed to the trait like personality variables like defenses, evidence 
from longer follow-ups suggest that lasting change does occur with treatment (Bond & Perry, 
2004). 
With regard to individual defense mechanisms, researchers have found that, post-treatment, 
patients’ self-report indicated an increase in the use of Humour, Sublimation, and Suppression 
and a decrease in the use of Denial, Fantasy, Idealization, and Passive Aggression (Bronnec et 
al., 2005). Informant ratings (family members rating the patient on the DSQ) indicated an 
increase in Anticipation, Humour, Sublimation, and Suppression as well as decreased use of 
Dissociation, Passive Aggression, Projection, and Splitting post-treatment (Bronnec et al., 2005).  
Noting that not all patients improved with treatment, some researchers (e.g., Hoglend & 
Perry, 1998; Mullen et al., 1999) have examined differences in the defenses of those that 
improve with therapy compared to those that do not. With regard to defense styles on the DSQ, 
Mullen and colleagues (1999) noted that that those that completed treatment relied less on Image 
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Distorting defenses than those that dropped out. Moreover, those that responded to treatment 
used less maladaptive defenses at the end of treatment than those that did not and had a healthier 
ODF than did those that did not respond (Mullen et al., 1999). 
Looking at individual defenses from the DMRS, Hoglend and Perry (1998) examined 
whether previous researchers’ (Bloch et al., 1993, Perry, 1990; Perry & Cooper, 1986; 1989) 
findings that eight immature defenses (i.e., Passive Aggression, Acting Out, Help-rejecting 
Complaining, Projective Identification, Splitting of Self-images, Splitting of Others’ Images, 
Projection, & Devaluation) rated by the DMRS played a causal role in the functional outcome of 
those diagnosed with MDD. Hoglend and Perry found that the eight immature defenses were 
found more often in those that changed less than predicted by their GAF scores than those that 
improved more than predicted by their GAF scores. No difference was found in the use of other 
immature defenses between the groups. Perry and Hoglend argue that this is evidence that it is 
these eight immature defenses in particular and not simply immature defenses in general that 
have a role in the development and maintenance of MDD. Additionally, Self-observation was 
found to be higher in those that improved in treatment than those that did not.  
Bond (2004) notes that evidence suggests that use of immature and mature defenses 
changes during therapeutic treatment for depression whereas use of neurotic defenses such as 
Reaction Formation, Pseudoaltruism, Primitive Idealization and Undoing does not change. He 
argues that neurotic defenses might be more characteristic of personality than defenses such as 
Suppression and Acting Out (Bond, 2004). This is consistent with the aforementioned research 
that demonstrates that depression is primarily related to Mature and Immature Defense Styles 
and defenses and much less often related to Neurotic Defense Style and defenses.  
Differential Defense use Within Mood Disorders 
Perry and Hoglend (1998) further found that the DMRS ODF was negatively related to 
severity of depression (i.e., no symptoms, Dysthymic Disorder diagnosis, or MDD diagnosis). 
Corruble and colleagues (2003) found the Immature Defense Style to be higher in those with 
recurrent depressive episodes than those with only a single episode. Additionally, those with 
recurrent episodes were higher on Denial, Fantasy, Projection, and Somatization (Corruble et al., 
2003). In sum, defense use between different mood disorder groups may vary with severity and 
chronicity of symptomatology. 
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Summary 
In summary, presence as well as severity of a mood disorder has been negatively related to 
the Mature Defense Style and positively related to the Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles. 
Depression severity has also been positively related to Action Level Defenses and negatively 
related to the Mental Inhibitions Level and ODF on the DMRS and ODF on the DSQ. Recovery 
from depression has been related to a decrease in the use of an Immature Defense Style and an 
increase in the use of the Mature Defense Style and ODF. Similarly, high reliance on the Image 
Distorting and Maladaptive Defense Styles has been shown to be related to poorer prognosis for 
recovery. Research indicates that depression is negatively related to Anticipation, Humour, Self-
observation, Sublimation, and Suppression, and positively related to Acting Out, Denial, 
Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Fantasy, Hypochondriasis, Isolation, Idealization, 
Passive Aggression, Projection, Projective Identification, Splitting, and Somatization. Overall, 
depression seems to be related to greater use of immature defenses and less use of mature 
defenses. While numerous aspects of the relation between defenses and depressive 
symptomatology have been explored, more work remains to be done. Several of the defenses that 
are used more often by persons with depressive symptomatology are the same defenses used by 
persons with other disorders. This was previously noted by Offer and colleagues (2000) and 
remains an issue in need of further exploration. Secondly, while both observer and self-report 
measures were used in the aforementioned studies, none of these studies used both methods 
concurrently. This research provides a framework from which future hypotheses can be 
generated, but more work is needed to address unanswered questions.  
Anxiety 
Anxiety Scores in Nonclinical Samples 
 Researchers have investigated the relation between DSQ defenses and anxiety scores on 
various measures in a wide variety of samples. Anxiety measures used include the BSI (Watson, 
2002), MMPI (Nishimura, 1998), State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Muris & Merckelbach, 
1994), and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Flannery & Perry, 1990). The samples examined 
include college students from Canada (Watson, 2002), Japan (Nishimura, 1998), and the United 
States (Flannery & Perry, 1990), as well as general members of the community and university 
staff (Muris & Merckelbach, 1994). 
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 Anxiety scores have been found to be positively related to the Maladaptive/Immature 
(Flannery & Perry, 1990; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994; Nishimura, 1998), Neurotic (Muris & 
Merckelbach, 1994; Nishimura, 1998), and Image Distorting Defense Styles (Flannery & Perry, 
1990). Interestingly, Flannery and Perry used both the 14 and 20 defense versions on the DSQ in 
their 1990 study. While the Mature Defense Style in the 14 defense version of the DSQ was not 
significantly related to anxiety scores, it was significantly positively related to anxiety scores 
with the 20 defense version. 
Researchers have also investigated the relation between anxiety scores and individual 
defenses. For example, Muris and Merckelbach (1994) found that Projection accounted for the 
most variance in STAI scores, followed by, Somatization, Humour, Undoing, and Suppression. 
In a similar study Watson (2002) looked at anxiety related scales on the BSI using stepwise 
multiple regressions. For the Anxiety scale, in descending order of importance, Displacement, 
Somatization, Undoing, (negative) Denial, and Idealization contributed unique variance to 
Anxiety scores for females while Projection, Somatization, Pseudoaltruism, (negative) 
Suppression, and Passive Aggression contributed for males (Watson, 2002). For the OCD scale, 
in descending order of importance, Displacement, Undoing, Fantasy, Somatization and 
(negative) Denial contributed unique variance for females whereas Fantasy, Projection, and 
Splitting contributed for males (Watson, 2002). For the Phobic Anxiety scale, in descending 
order of importance, Displacement, Projection, Undoing, Anticipation, and Somatization 
contributed unique variance for females and Projection, Somatization, and (negative) 
Suppression contributed for males (Watson, 2002).  
In sum, anxiety scores have been consistently found to be positively related to 
Immature/Maladaptive as well as Neurotic/Image Distorting Defense Styles. Interestingly, higher 
anxiety scores were also found to be related to higher usage of the Mature Defense Style in one 
study. In addition, anxiety scores have been found to be negatively related to Anticipation, 
Denial, Humour, and Suppression and positively related to Displacement, Fantasy, Idealization, 
Passive Aggression, Projection, Pseudoaltruism, Somatization, Splitting, and Undoing. Similar to 
the nonclinical depression research, the nonclinical anxiety research is exclusively self-report 
measures and primarily focused on defensive levels. Much of the individual defense research is 
based on anxiety symptomatology levels as assessed by the BSI, which, as mentioned, is 
problematic. 
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Diagnosed Anxiety 
Overall Anxiety 
Presence versus absence of an anxiety disorder. Several researchers have examined the 
defensive functioning of persons with a specific anxiety disorder. Looking broadly at several 
different anxiety disorders, Andrews and colleagues (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) found that 
defense use of combined groups of persons with an anxiety disorder (Panic & Agoraphobia, 
Social Phobia, or OCD) differed from defense use of control participants. Persons with an 
anxiety disorder scored lower on the Mature and higher on Neurotic and Immature Defense 
Styles than did control participants. Similarly, Spinhoven and Kooiman (1997), found that 
persons diagnosed with an anxiety disorder scored lower on Mature Defense Style and higher on 
the Neurotic and Immature Defense Style than did those in the control group. 
 Looking at individual defenses, persons with an anxiety disorder reported lower use of 
Humour (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Sublimation (Andrews, 
Singh, & Bond, 1993), and Suppression (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 
1989) in comparison to persons in the control group. Persons with an anxiety disorder also 
indicated greater use of Devaluation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 
1989), Displacement (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Passive 
Aggression (Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Projection (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & 
Andrews, 1989), Reaction Formation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 
1989), Somatization (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), and Undoing 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) than did persons in the control group. Furthermore, Holi and 
colleagues (1999) found that Displacement accounted for the most variance in SCL-90-R 
Anxiety scores followed by Somatization, Projection, Dissociation, Sublimation, and Isolation 
(Holi et al., 1999). 
Differential defense use within anxiety disorders. Examining whether the anxiety disorders 
could be differentiated from each other using defenses, Pollock and Andrews (1989) initially 
found DSQ defenses could be used to differentiate between persons with Agoraphobia, OCD, 
Panic Disorder, and Social Phobia diagnoses. A later reanalysis of Pollock and Andrews’ data, 
however, revealed that removing 2 items from the DSQ that specifically tap OCD (i.e., item 78 
“I have habits or rituals which I feel compelled to do or else something horrible will happen”) 
and Social Phobia (i.e., item 41 “I’m very shy about approaching people”) diagnostic criteria 
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resulted in no significant differences in the defense use among persons with different anxiety 
disorders (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993). 
Summary. In research where persons with anxiety disorders are grouped together, those 
with anxiety diagnoses have been found to rely less on the Mature Defense Style and more on 
Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles than do participants in a control group. Those with 
anxiety disorders have been found to score lower on Humour, Sublimation, and Suppression and 
higher on Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, 
Reaction Formation, Somatization, and Undoing than participants in a control group. Moreover, 
although early work indicated it was possible to differentiate persons with different anxiety 
diagnoses based on defenses, later reanalyses that removed items linked to criteria indicated 
there was no significant difference in the defense profiles of persons with different anxiety 
disorders. Although a substantial amount of research has examined the relation between overall 
anxiety and both defense levels and individual defenses, this work has exclusively been using 
self-report. Adding observer report measures, especially assessed concurrently with a self-report 
measure, would add to the understanding of the relation between overall anxiety and defenses. 
Moreover, observer report measures might help to clarify whether anxiety disorders can be 
accurately differentiated based on defenses without the problematic DSQ items noted by 
Andrews, Singh, and Bond (1993). 
Panic Disorder/Agoraphobia 
 As mentioned above, more research regarding the relation between defenses and Panic 
Disorder exists than with any other anxiety disorder. As such, I will provide a more thorough 
review of research related to Panic Disorder, followed by a brief summary of research related to 
defenses and other anxiety disorders. 
Defense styles. Persons with Panic Disorder (with or without Agoraphobia) have been 
found to use the Mature Defense Style less (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) and the Neurotic 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Kipper et al., 2004; 2005) and Immature/Maladaptive Defense 
Styles (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Kennedy et al., 2001; Kipper et al., 2004; 2005; 
Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) more than control participants. It is noteworthy that only one of 
the three studies (i.e., Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) found persons with Panic Disorder using 
Mature Defense Style less than control participants. The remaining studies (i.e., Kipper et al., 
2004; 2005) demonstrated significantly higher scores on two of the four adaptive defenses for 
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persons with Panic Disorder compared to control participants. This pattern of relations 
approached significance in the opposite direction to the findings of Andrews, Singh, and Bond. 
Individual defense mechanisms. Persons with Panic Disorder/Agoraphobia used Humour 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989) and Suppression (Andrews, Singh, 
& Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989)
 
less than did those in the control group. Persons with 
Panic Disorder/Agoraphobia also used Acting Out (Kipper et al., 2004; 2005), Devaluation 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997), Displacement (Pollock & 
Andrews, 1989), Fantasy (Kipper et al., 2004; 2005), Idealization (Kipper et al., 2005; 
Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997), Passive Aggression (Kipper et al., 2005), Projection (Andrews, 
Singh, & Bond, 1993; Kipper et al., 2005), Pseudoaltruism (Kipper et al., 2005), Reaction 
Formation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Somatization (Andrews, 
Singh, & Bond, 1993; Kipper et al., 2004; 2005; Pollock & Andrews, 1989; Spinhoven & 
Kooiman, 1997), Splitting (Kipper et al., 2005), and Undoing (Kipper et al., 2004; 2005) more 
than did those in the control group. Kipper and colleagues (2004; 2005) found persons with 
Panic Disorder used Sublimation and Anticipation more than did those in the control group 
whereas Andrews and colleagues (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989) 
found that persons with Panic Disorder used Sublimation and Anticipation less than did those in 
the control group.  
Defense change with treatment for Panic Disorder. In a study on psychotherapy treatment 
for persons with Panic Disorder, Heldt and colleagues (2003) found that patients with higher pre-
treatment levels of Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles had poorer outcomes than those with 
lower scores. Kipper and colleagues (2005) noted that persons with Panic Disorder reported 
increased usage of Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles at pre-treatment assessment compared 
to those in the control group. Post-treatment, those that improved in therapy no longer showed 
any significant differences from those in the control group on any defense style. With regard to 
individual defenses, those who were successfully treated for Panic Disorder continued to report 
higher use of Sublimation and Anticipation than did those in the control group and at post-
treatment reported lower use of Humour than those in the control group (Kipper et al., 2005). 
Summary. In summary, persons with Panic Disorder have been found to rely more on 
Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles than persons in control groups. There is also some mixed 
evidence that they may rely less on Mature Defense Style than persons in a control group. Those 
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persons that respond to treatment for Panic Disorder return to similar defense use as those in a 
control group. With regard to individual defenses, Panic Disorder seems to be related to lower 
use of Humour and Suppression and increased use of Acting Out, Devaluation, Displacement, 
Fantasy, Idealization, Passive Aggression, Projection, Pseudoaltruism, Reaction Formation, 
Somatization, Splitting, and Undoing. Panic Disorder has also been shown to be related to both 
higher and lower use of Anticipation and Sublimation. To explain the counterintuitive relation 
with mature defense, Kipper and colleagues (2005) argue that higher use of some adaptive 
defenses in persons with Panic Disorder compared to those in the control group might be 
indicative of a generally higher use of defenses overall in an effort to minimize anxiety. In other 
words, patients with Panic Disorder might not have “more adaptive” defense use, they may just 
have a reasonably adaptive defense use that is more active than the defense use of those in the 
control group. This theory has been supported by the findings of other researchers (e.g., Kennedy 
et al., 2001). Although Panic Disorder has had a substantial amount of research investigating its 
associated defense level and individual defense relations, this research has been entirely based on 
self-report defense assessment. Including the use of an observer report measure such as the 
DMRS would allow for determining the number of defenses used as well as the proportional 
defense use. This would aid in the determination of whether the mixed results are due to 
increased defense use overall or perhaps are indicative of differences in proportional defense use. 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
Andrews and colleagues (1989; 1993) found persons diagnosed with OCD to use the 
Mature Defense Style (Andrews et al., 1989; Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) significantly less 
than controls. Treatment for OCD has been shown to address this deficit in use of Mature 
Defense Style, with usage returning to the level of those in the control group (Albucher, Abelson, 
& Nesse, 1998). Looking at individual defenses, Andrews found persons with OCD use less 
Humour (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Suppression (Andrews, 
Singh, & Bond, 1993), and Sublimation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) and more Acting Out 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), Devaluation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), Projection 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), and Undoing (Pollock & Andrews, 
1989), than those in the control groups. Treatment for OCD has been shown to result in a 
reduction in the use of the individual defense Undoing (Albucher et al., 1998). Holi and 
colleagues (1999) found that the DSQ defenses of Projection, Displacement, Fantasy, and 
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Somatization all accounted for significant amounts of the variance in SCL-90-R Obsessive 
Compulsive scores. 
Social Phobia 
Persons with Social Phobia have been found to rely less on the Mature (Andrews et al., 
1989; Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993)
 
and more on the Image Distorting (Kennedy et al., 2001), 
Neurotic (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) and Immature/Maladaptive Defense Style (Andrews 
et al., 1989; Kennedy et al., 2001) than those in a control group. With regard to individual 
defenses, those with Social Phobia report using less Anticipation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 
1993), Dissociation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), Humour (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; 
Pollock & Andrews, 1989), Sublimation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), and Suppression 
(Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993), than those in a control group. Furthermore, persons with 
Social Phobia used more Devaluation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 
1989), Displacement (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), and Reaction 
Formation (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) than did those in a control group. 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
Kennedy and colleagues (2001) found that persons diagnosed with GAD scored higher on 
Maladaptive Defense Style than did those in the control group. For individual defenses, Yuan, 
Bao Zhang, and Qin Wu (2002) found persons with GAD scored higher on Affiliation and 
Undoing and lower on Humour than did those in the control group. 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Birmes and colleagues (2000) found that eight participants diagnosed with PTSD (6 to 12 
months post-trauma) did not differ on Mature, Neurotic or Immature Defense Styles from a 
control group of 15 participants who experienced a trauma but did not develop PTSD. Analyses 
of specific defenses revealed that persons with PTSD had higher scores on Undoing than those 
without PTSD.  
Summary of OCD, Social Phobia, GAD, PTSD, and Defenses 
In terms of broad defense styles, persons with anxiety disorders appear to have relatively 
adaptive defense profiles in comparison to persons with other disorders. Persons with PTSD have 
not been found to differ on the use of defense styles when compared to those in a control group. 
Persons with OCD have been shown to rely less on the Mature Defense Style than those in a 
control group, but this difference disappears after treatment. In addition, persons with GAD have 
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been found to use the Maladaptive Defense Style more, but did not differ from those in a control 
group on Adaptive, Self-sacrificing, or Image Distorting Defense Styles. Persons with Social 
Phobia appear to have a somewhat more severe defense profile, relying less on the Mature 
Defense Style and more on the Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles than do persons in the 
control group.  
With regard to individual defenses, those with PTSD show little difference in their defense 
use in comparison to those in a control group, only demonstrating a higher use of Undoing. 
Those with GAD have also been found to have elevated use of Undoing as well as higher use of 
one mature defense (i.e., Anticipation) and a lower use on another mature defense (i.e., Humour). 
Other disorders such as OCD and Social Phobia show somewhat more divergence from controls 
with regard to individual defenses. Those with OCD or Social Phobia rely less on Anticipation, 
Dissociation, Humour, Sublimation, and Suppression as well as more on Acting Out, 
Devaluation, Displacement, Fantasy, Projection, Reaction Formation, Somatization, and 
Undoing than do those in the control group. Across nearly all anxiety disorders, Undoing is 
consistently related to anxiety symptomatology. Given some of the previous research suggesting 
that there is substantial overlap between defenses use in people with different anxiety disorders, 
it is not surprising that there is limited research specifically examining defense use in a variety of 
different anxiety disorder groups. However, adding an observer report measure of defenses 
concurrently to these research studies might help clarify the relation between defensive 
functioning and anxiety symptomatology. 
Studies Comparing Defense use in Depression and Anxiety 
Defense Styles 
Relatively little research has directly compared defense use in those with a depression or 
anxiety diagnosis. Like research on anxiety disorders and defenses in general most of the 
research has compared defense use of persons with a depression diagnosis to defense use of 
persons with Panic Disorder. Persons with Panic Disorder have been found to score higher on the 
Neurotic (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) and Self-sacrificing Defense Styles (Kennedy et al., 
2001) on the DSQ than did those with Dysthymic Disorder or MDD. In a similar study using the 
DMRS, those with Panic Disorder scored higher on ODF and lower on the Narcissistic, 
Disavowal, and Action Level Defense Styles than did persons with Dysthymic Disorder (Bloch 
et al., 1993). In addition to research on Panic Disorder, persons with a GAD diagnosis have been 
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found to rely more on the Self-sacrificing Defense Style than do persons with a diagnosis of 
MDD (Kennedy et al., 2001).  
Individual Defenses 
Persons with Dysthymic Disorder demonstrated higher use of Acting Out, Devaluation, 
Hypochondriasis, Passive Aggression, Projection, and Projective Identification (Bloch et al., 
1993) on the DMRS and higher use of Isolation on the DSQ (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) than 
did persons with Panic Disorder. Conversely, persons with Dysthymic Disorder demonstrated 
lower use of Reaction Formation and Undoing (Busch et al., 1995) on the DMRS and lower use 
of Idealization on the DSQ (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) than did persons with Panic Disorder.  
Summary 
Persons with an anxiety disorder have been shown to use neurotic defense levels (i.e., Self-
sacrificing & Neurotic Defense Level) more and Immature Defense levels (e.g., Narcissistic, 
Disavowal, & Action Level Defense levels) less than those with a depression diagnosis. This 
general pattern is mirrored with individual defenses in that those with anxiety diagnoses use the 
neurotic level defenses of Idealization, Reaction Formation, and Undoing more and the immature 
level defenses of Acting Out, Devaluation, Hypochondriasis, Isolation, Passive Aggression, 
Projection, and Projective Identification less than those with a depression diagnosis. Overall, 
evidence from studies comparing defense use in those with depression and anxiety 
symptomatology suggests that anxiety is related to a general pattern of more neurotic and less 
immature defense use than depression. Despite a somewhat limited amount of research in this 
area, the methodological variety is more impressive than for either depression or anxiety research 
alone. The studies comparing depression and anxiety groups on defensive functioning have 
included defense style and individual defense analyses as well as utilized observer and self-
report measures. Combining both observer and self-report measures in a single study to examine 
the defensive functioning of those with depression or anxiety symptomatology is an important 
next step to extending this research. 
SUMMARY OF DEFENSES, DEPRESSION, AND ANXIETY 
With regard to specific defenses, an extensive overlap can be seen in defenses that are 
theoretically and empirically related to depression and anxiety. For depression, both theory and 
empirical research indicate an increased use of Denial, Devaluation (of the self), Help-rejecting 
Complaining/Hypochondriasis, Idealization, Passive Aggression, and Projection. Similarly, both 
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theory and empirical research have indicated anxiety symptomatology is related to increased use 
of Denial, Displacement, Reaction Formation, and Undoing. A general pattern can be noted that 
depression is primarily related to increased use of immature defenses and anxiety is related to 
increased use of neurotic defenses. This can also be seen when defense use and depression and 
anxiety are compared in the same study. In these studies depression is related to higher use of the 
immature defenses Acting Out, Devaluation, Help-rejecting Complaining/Hypochondriasis, 
Passive Aggression, Projection, and Projective Identification whereas anxiety is related to higher 
use of neurotic defenses such as Idealization, Reaction Formation, and Undoing. Commenting on 
this pattern in the literature, Kipper and colleagues (2005) write that there is abundant evidence 
that suggests an association between defenses and disorders such as depression and anxiety. 
Examining the studies, they argue “leads one to consider that immature defenses are more related 
to the depressive state and that the neurotic defenses are more associated with anxiety and its 
severity” (p. 623). 
Although it appears depression and anxiety can be differentiated based on individual 
defense mechanisms, there is less evidence that the two types of symptomatology can be 
differentiated based on broader defense styles. Both depression and anxiety have been shown to 
be positively related to immature and neurotic level defense styles and negatively related to 
mature defense styles. Some studies, however, indicate that defense use in persons with 
depressive symptomatology may be more maladaptive overall (i.e., related to greater use of 
maladaptive defenses as well as less use of adaptive defenses) than defense use in persons with 
anxiety symptomatology. In addition, there is mixed evidence that suggests anxiety 
symptomatology may be positively related to increased adaptive defense use. 
CURRENT INVESTIGATION 
My research consists of two studies aimed at first examining how several measures of 
defenses relate to each other and second at investigating the utility of defenses in differentiating 
groups of individuals with anxious and depressive symptomatology. In the first study, I will look 
at the convergent validity of the Defense-Q and DSQ by comparing them to other well-
established self-report and observer-report methods of assessing defenses. I will then briefly 
discuss the results of this study before moving on to present the second study. In Study 2, I will 
examine the extent to which defenses assessed by self-report (DSQ) and observer report 
(Defense-Q) are useful to discriminate between students with high depression scores and 
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students with high anxiety scores. Next, I will briefly discuss the results from the second study 
before finally moving on to a general discussion of conclusions based on the two studies 
combined. 
STUDY 1 
Although the current recommended standard in defense research is to use multiple 
measures of defenses, very little work has directly looked at the relation among the various 
measures of defenses. For example, no research currently exists examining the relation between 
the DMRS and Defense Mechanisms Inventory (DMI) or the Defense-Q. Understanding the 
differences due to the various methods and measures used to assess defenses is an important first 
step for interpreting results of defense mechanism investigations. It is difficult to understand and 
interpret results and the literature fully if one does not know how the defense measures used 
relate to each other as well as to other well-established measures of defenses. Therefore, in Study 
1, I examined the relation among the self-report (i.e., DSQ) and observer report (i.e., Defense-Q) 
measures that I used in Study 2 and another commonly used self-report (i.e., DMI) and observer 
report (i.e., DMRS) measure of defenses. 
Among defense measures, two that have been frequently used concurrently are the DSQ 
and the DMRS. Early work using the four-factor structure of the DSQ and six defensive levels of 
the DMRS (Action, Disavowal, Borderline, Narcissistic, Obsessional, & Mature Level) 
demonstrated limited overlap between the two measures. The DMRS Action Defense Level was 
positively related to the Maladaptive, Image Distorting, and Self-sacrificing Defense Styles 
(Bond et al., 1989). In addition, the DMRS Disavowal Defense Level was positively related to 
Self-sacrificing Defense Style on the DSQ (Bond et al., 1989). No other styles were significantly 
correlated. Individual defenses of Neurotic Denial, Omnipotence/Devaluation, Projective 
Identification, and Splitting all showed positive correlations with their respective defenses 
between the DSQ and DMRS (Bond et al., 1989). Overall, however, less than 25% of the items 
on the DSQ were significantly related to the DMRS defenses that they were supposedly 
assessing (Bond et al., 1989). Later research (Perry & Hoglend, 1998) using the ODF from the 
DSQ and ODF from the DMRS showed the two measures had only a small positive relation (r = 
.26). In sum, the DSQ and DMRS have been shown to have few significant relations to each 
other. Significant relations seem to be primarily at the immature level. 
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Similarly, few studies have examined the relation between the Defense-Q and other 
measures. MacGregor and Olson (2005) found that the overall measure of defensive healthiness 
from the Defense-Q, the Adaptive Defense Profile (ADP) Similarity Score, was negatively 
related to the two most maladaptive defense styles from the four-factor DSQ (i.e., Maladaptive & 
Image Distorting Defense Style) and positively related to the two most adaptive defense styles 
(Adaptive & Self Sacrificing Defense Styles). Similarly, MacGregor and Olson found that the 
Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score was positively related to the two most adaptive defense styles 
from the DMI (i.e., PRN & REV) and negatively related to one of the three maladaptive defense 
styles (i.e., TAO). 
Few studies use both the DSQ and DMI concurrently (e.g., MacGregor & Olson, 2005), 
and the relation between the two measures is rarely examined. In one study on self-report 
defenses Mehlman and Slane (1994) investigated limited aspects of the two measures and 
demonstrated that DMI defense styles were not related to similar individual defenses on the 
DSQ. Davidson and MacGregor (1998) sum up the research for self-report defense measures in 
general stating that convergent validity is “almost nonexistent” (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998).  
Not only is it important to understand how defense measures relate to each other, but it is 
also important to examine factors that might interfere with accurate defense assessment. An 
important critique of observer report measures for many constructs is potential bias of the 
observers. Researchers have noted a tendency for more attractive people to be rated as more 
healthy in many domains (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & 
Longo, 1991; Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995). This has been proposed as a plausible 
alternative explanation for the relation between observer report defense measures and other 
indicators of adaptive behaviour (Davidson, MacGregor, Johnson, Woody, & Chaplin, 2004). To 
ensure that the observational defense coders in the present investigation were not being biased by 
the attractiveness of the participants, the scores of the observer report measures were compared 
to ratings of attractiveness for each participant. Significant relations in either the positive or 
negative direction might indicate bias on the part of the raters and provide support for an 
alternative explanation for previously found relations between observer report defenses and other 
indicators of adaptive behaviours. 
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Hypotheses 
Because there is only minimal previous research investigating relations among defense 
measures, theoretical expectations will be used for the hypotheses in addition to the sparse 
previous research. It is hypothesized, primarily based on theory, that indicators of mature defense 
use on the Defense-Q and DSQ will be significantly positively correlated to indicators of mature 
defense use on other defense measures and significantly negatively correlated to indicators of 
immature defense use on other defense measures. Conversely, it is hypothesized that indicators 
of immature defense use on the Defense-Q and DSQ will be significantly positively correlated to 
indicators of immature defense use on other defense measures and significantly negatively 
correlated to indicators of mature defense use on other defense measures. No hypotheses are 
made regarding neurotic level defense styles.  
With regard to individual defenses, there is limited evidence from Bond and colleagues 
(1989) that there is some overlap between individual defenses assessed by observer and self-
report. However, numerous researchers indicate problems with self-reporting some defenses such 
as Denial and mature defenses in general (Besser, 2004; Brody et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 1991; 
Cramer 1998a; 1998b; Flett et al., 2005; Joiner et al., 2000; Kwon, 1999; Norem, 1998; Skodol 
& Perry, 1993), which may reduce the strength of the relation between the observer and self-
report of these defenses. Regardless, it is hypothesized that individual defenses assessed by the 
Defense-Q will show significant positive correlations to the similarly named individual defenses 
assessed by the DSQ. 
In terms of hypotheses for the attractiveness ratings, researchers (e.g., Davidson et al., 
2004) have proposed that it is important to investigate whether or not characteristics such as 
physical attractiveness might provide an alternative explanation for previously found relations 
between observer report defenses and other indicators of adaptive behaviour. Previous research 
has demonstrated that a person’s perceived attractiveness is positively related to perceived 
attributes such as job performance, parenting, intellectual competence, and psychological 
adjustment (Dion, et al., 1972; Eagly, et al., 1991; Jackson, et al., 1995). Although this finding is 
wide-ranging, it has also been shown to be most prevalent when there is a lack of other 
information available to the observer (Eagly et al., 1991). In the case of observationally rated 
defense measures, there is a large amount of information being considered for numerous defense 
mechanisms. It is therefore hypothesized that the Defense-Q Adaptive Defense Profile (ADP) 
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Similarity Score and the 25 individual defense scores will be not be significantly correlated to 
the general physical attractiveness scores. Similarly, the DMRS ODF and defense levels will not 
be significantly correlated to the general physical attractiveness scores of the participants. 
Specifically, between the Defense-Q and DSQ (Analyses 1 & 2), I hypothesize:  
1. Significant positive correlations between the scores on the mature index from the 
Defense-Q (ADP Similarity Score) and the scores on the mature indices from the 
DSQ (ODF & Mature Defense Style). Significant negative correlations between 
the scores on the mature index from the Defense-Q (ADP Similarity Score) and 
the scores on the immature index from the DSQ (Immature Defense Style). 
2. Significant positive correlations between the scores on similarly named defenses 
on the Defense-Q and the DSQ (i.e., Acting Out, [Autistic]
 9
 Fantasy, 
Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Humour, Idealization, Isolation, 
[Neurotic] Denial, Passive Aggression, Projection, [Pseudo]altruism, 
Rationalization, Reaction Formation, Splitting, Sublimation, & Undoing). 
For the Defense-Q and DSQ compared to the DMRS and the DMI (Analysis 3), I 
hypothesize: 
3a. Significant positive correlations for the scores on the mature index from the 
Defense-Q (ADP Similarity Score) as well as the scores on the mature indices 
from the DSQ (ODF & Mature Defense Style) when compared to the scores on 
the correspondingly mature indices of the DMRS (ODF & High Adaptive Level) 
and DMI (ODF, PRN & REV). Additionally, significant negative correlations for 
the scores on the mature index from the Defense-Q (ADP Similarity Score) as 
well as the scores on the mature indices from the DSQ (ODF & Mature Defense 
Style) when compared to the scores on the immature indices from the DMRS 
(Minor Image Distorting, Disavowal – including the Fantasy sublevel, Major 
Image Distorting, & Action defense levels) and DMI (TAS, TAO, & PRO).  
3b. Significant negative correlations between the scores on the immature index from 
the DSQ (Immature Defense Style) and the scores on the mature indices of the 
DMRS (ODF & High Adaptive Level) and DMI (ODF, PRN, & REV). 
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Additionally, significant positive correlations between the scores on the immature 
index from the DSQ (Immature Defense Style) and the scores on the immature 
indices from the DMRS (Minor Image Distorting, Disavowal - including the 
Fantasy sublevel, Major Image Distorting, & Action defense levels) and the DMI 
(TAS, TAO, & PRO).  
With regard to Defense-Q and DMRS scores compared to attractiveness (Analysis 4), I 
hypothesize: 
4. No significant correlations between scores on the Defense-Q (ADP Similarity 
Score or on the 25 individual defenses) or scores on the DMRS (ODF or on the 
defensive levels) with the general physical attractiveness scores of the 
participants. 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 150 participants (107 females – 71.33%) was recruited from an Introductory 
Psychology class at the University of Saskatchewan. The participants’ age in the sample ranged 
from 17 to 36 years (M = 19.60; SD = 2.52 years). All participants received partial course credit 
for participation.  
Measures 
 Defense-Q. The Defense-Q is an observer based Q-sort measure that is used to assess the 
relative use of 25 defenses. The instrument has 25 different cards, each card corresponding to a 
different defense. Using a Q-sort methodology, the cards are sorted into seven piles ranging from 
most to least characteristic of the defense use of the person being assessed (see Appendix B for a 
Defense-Q scoring sheet). One defense mechanism is selected as most characteristic of the 
person, two are selected as quite characteristic, five as somewhat characteristic, nine as neither 
characteristic nor uncharacteristic, five as somewhat uncharacteristic, two as quite 
uncharacteristic, and one as most uncharacteristic (Davidson & MacGregor, 1996).  
The Defense-Q was designed to produce an overall score of the adaptiveness of defense 
use and can be used with a wide variety of possible case material. This adaptiveness score is 
derived by comparing an individual’s defense profile to a theoretically “ideal” defense profile, 
called the Adaptive Defense Profile (Block, 1978; MacGregor & Olson, 2005; McKeown & 
Thomas, 1988). The ADP can be seen in Figure 1. The ADP was constructed using the input of 
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clinical psychologists, psychodynamically trained graduate students, and undergraduate honours 
students chosen for their familiarity with defense theory (Davidson & MacGregor, 1996). 
Profiles from the clinicians and students were discussed as a group. When disagreements about 
the optimal placing of a defense in the ADP occurred, the slot closest to the mean placement of 
the clinicians and students was used to create a prototypical ADP (MacGregor, 2000). This 
prototypical ADP is largely similar to other hierarchical orderings of defenses (e.g., DSQ, 
DMRS) and has demonstrated validity across several previous studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 
2004; MacGregor, 2000; MacGregor, Davidson, Barksdale, Black & MacLean, 2003; 
MacGregor, Davidson, Rowan, Barksdale, MacLean 2003; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). The 
comparison between an individual’s defense profile and the ADP is indexed as a within-subject 
correlation computed across all 25 defenses and is called the ADP Similarity Score. The ADP 
Similarity Score ranges from -1 (perfectly dissimilar from the ideal defense profile) to +1 
(perfectly similar to the ideal defense profile). The higher the ADP Similarity Score, the more 
adaptive the defense use of the individual. An example of a relatively adaptive defense profile 
(Participant 1, ADP Similarity Score = .73) and a relatively maladaptive defense profile 
(Participant 2, ADP Similarity Score = -.70) compared to the ADP can be seen in Figure 2. A 
score for the relative use of individual defense mechanisms can be obtained by summing the rank 
(e.g., 7 = Most characteristic defense of the participant, 6 = defense is quite characteristic etc.) 
given to the defense across all coders and dividing by the number of coders. This results in a 
score ranging from 1-7 (7 being most characteristic) that indicates how characteristic the defense 
is of the person being rated (MacGregor & Olson, 2005).  
MacGregor and Olson (2005) report inter-rater reliability for individual Defense-Q 
defenses that ranged from .32 - .91, with a mean reliability of .69. Davidson and MacGregor 
(1996) report an inter-rater reliability of .69 for the overall defense profile. Evidence for the 
validity of the Defense-Q has been shown in numerous areas. In a sample of 667 community 
participants, ADP Similarity Scores have been shown to be related to lower self-reported 
depression, hostility, alcohol use, and binge drinking even after controlling for age, income, 
education, and sex of the participant (MacGregor & Olson, 2005). Defense-Q profiles as well as 
individual defenses were found to differentiate between mentally healthy and mentally unhealthy 
participants in a university sample (n = 236; mentally unhealthy group had at least 1 clinically 
elevated clinical scale on the PAI) and also in a community sample (n = 667; mentally unhealthy 
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patients self-reported a current mental health diagnosis; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). In both the 
community and university samples Humour, Intellectualization, Idealization, and Sublimation 
were more characteristic of mentally healthy participants while Acting Out, Psychotic Denial, 
and Regression were more characteristic of mentally unhealthy participants. ADP Similarity 
Scores have also been shown to be related to lower resting diastolic and systolic blood pressure 
(MacGregor, Davidson, Barksdale, et al., 2003) and lower physician health care costs 
(MacGregor, Davidson, Rowan, et al., 2003). Finally, patient profiles scored by independent 
raters have been shown to be positively correlated with profiles scored by the patient’s treating 
therapist (Perry & Ianni, 1998)
10
.  
 Defense Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS). The DMRS is an observer-based measure that 
is used to assess 27 defense mechanisms. The DMRS was designed to be used on a 60 minute 
standard psychodynamic intake session (Perry & Henry, 2004; Perry & Kardos, 1995). The 
DMRS is currently in its fifth edition, with the most recent revision adding more adaptive 
defenses and modifying defense definitions to match consensus among researchers drafting the 
DSM defense definitions (Perry & Henry, 2004). The DMRS was originally scored using the 
“qualitative scoring method” but the most recent revision has added a “quantitative scoring 
method” (Perry & Kardos, 1995). In the original qualitative method, each of the individual 
defenses are rated on a three-point scale based on whether the participant definitely uses, 
probably uses, or definitely does not use the defense. Alternatively, the quantitative method is 
used to record the number of times each defense is used. Each defense is weighted according to 
its place in an overall hierarchy of defenses (Hoglend & Perry, 1998). 
Perry (Perry & Henry, 2004) argues that the quantitative scoring is preferable to 
qualitative, therefore only quantitative scoring methods will be addressed here. To obtain scores 
for an individual defense, the number of times that defense was observed in the interview is 
divided by the total number of defenses observed in the interview. Similar to the individual 
defense score for the Defense-Q, this score represents the frequency this particular defense is 
used in comparison to the other defenses used by the person (Perry & Henry, 2004). In addition 
to the 27 individual defense ratings, the DMRS can yield a defense level score. The defense level 
corresponds to one of seven levels of defense in the DMRS (Perry & Henry, 2004). In addition to 
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the seven defense levels, the Disavowal level has a sublevel that consists of a single defense 
(Fantasy) that is at the same level of adaptiveness, but does not fit under the disavowal label 
(Perry & Henry, 2004). See Appendix D for a DMRS scoring sheet with defense levels outlined. 
To obtain a defense level score the individual defense scores of the defenses comprising the 
defense level are summed (e.g., sum the individual defense scores of Isolation, Intellectualization 
and Undoing to obtain the Obsessional Defense Level score; Perry & Henry, 2004). See Table 2 
for defense hierarchy for the DMRS fifth edition. Alternatively, an Overall Defensive 
Functioning (ODF) score can be computed by summing the number of times each defense is 
used and then multiplying that score by the weight of the level to which it belongs. These scores 
are then summed and the total is divided by the total number of defenses observed in the 
interview. The ODF score is therefore an average level of adaptiveness of the defenses used 
(Perry & Henry, 2004).  
Reliability of the DMRS has been somewhat lower than for that of the Defense-Q. 
Median inter-rater reliability for individual defenses has been reported at .36 (range .11 to .59) 
using six individual Baccalaureate level coders (Perry & Cooper, 1989; Perry & Henry, 2004; 
Perry & Kardos, 1995) and .41 (range .04 - .80) using three Master’s level coders (Bond et al., 
1989). A somewhat higher reliability of .57 (range .35 - .79) for individual defenses has been 
reported when three coders rate persons together and come to a “consensus” and this score is 
compared to another group of three coder’s consensus code (Perry, 1990; Perry & Henry, 2004). 
Reliability for defense levels has been reported at .53 when coded by six individual 
Baccalaureate level coders (Perry & Cooper, 1989) and .57 when coded by three Master’s level 
coders (Bond et al., 1989). Again, a somewhat higher reliability of .71 was reported when 
consensus coding was used (Perry & Cooper, 1989; Perry & Henry, 2004). Test-retest stability of 
defenses has been shown to be .75 for the ODF using qualitative scoring over 4 weeks and .48 
for the ODF using quantitative scoring over 5 weeks (Perry & Henry, 2004). Several studies 
have demonstrated good validity for the DMRS as was outlined in the introduction
11
.  
Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ). The DSQ has undergone numerous revisions since 
its original inception in 1983. To follow the development of the measure the interested reader is 
directed to the work of Bond (Bond et al., 1983; 1989; 1995; Bond & Wesley, 1996) and 
Andrews (Andrews et al., 1989; Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993) or to a recent summary by 
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Cramer (2006). Also, for more information on the versions used in the research cited in this 
paper, see Appendix A. The DSQ is a 72-item questionnaire designed to assess three separate 
defense styles (Immature, Neurotic, & Mature), 20 defense mechanisms and provide one Overall 
Defensive Function (ODF) score (Andrews, et al., 1989; Bond & Perry, 2004; Perry & Hoglend, 
1998). Participants respond to the 72 items on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
to 9 (Strongly Agree).  
Each item for the DSQ corresponds to an individual defense mechanism. Scores for 
individual defenses are obtained by summing the scores from the items for each defense. To 
obtain a score for a defense style, the scores for each of the individual defenses in that style are 
summed (Andrews et al., 1989). More recently researchers have suggested computing an Overall 
Defensive Functioning (ODF) score. ODF for the three-factor DSQ has been calculated a number 
of different ways, one of which is by multiplying the score of each individual defense by a 
predetermined weight (1-7) assigned by a panel of expert ratings of the adaptiveness of the 
definition of the defense. These numbers are then summed and the result is divided by the sum 
total of all 72 items and results in a score between 1 and 7 that indicates overall adaptiveness of 
defensive functioning (Trijsburg, van t’ Spijker, Van, Hesselink, & Duivenvoorden, 2000). It is 
Trijsburg and colleagues’ (2000) ODF scoring method based on the definition of the defenses 
that was used in the present investigation. 
Given the self-report nature of the DSQ, the problem of inter-rater reliability is avoided. 
More important for self-report, however, is the extent to which scores are stable over time. The 
DSQ has been found to have satisfactory test-retest reliability over 6 weeks with the three factor 
structure (range = .76 - .86; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994) and over 6 months with the four factor 
structure (range = .68 - .73; Bond et al., 1989). Several studies have demonstrated good validity 
for the DSQ as was outlined in the introduction
12
. 
  Defense Mechanisms Inventory (DMI). The DMI is a self-report measure that assesses 
five separate defense styles: Principalization (PRN), Reversal (REV), Turning Against the Self 
(TAS), Turning Against the Object (TAO), and Projection (PRO; Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986). Of 
these defense styles, PRN is typically considered the most adaptive and PRO is typically 
considered the least adaptive (Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986). The measure involves reading 10 
vignettes, each of which is followed by four questions with five possible answers (corresponding 
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to the 5 defense styles) for each question. The four questions refer to what the participants’ 
actual reaction would be if the situation described just happened to them, what they would want 
to do in fantasy, what thoughts might occur to them, and how they would feel. For each of the 
four questions, participants choose one answer that is most like what their response would be and 
one answer that is least like what their response would be. The DMI is written in both a male and 
female version with minor wording differences to adjust for the different sexes.  
To obtain defense level scores, responses for each of the four sections (actual reaction, 
thoughts, fantasies, & feelings) are summed to create situational scores for each defense style. 
Total scores for each defense style are then obtained by summing the situational scores. 
Researchers have recently proposed combining the DMI scales to provide an Overall Defensive 
Functioning (ODF) score. One such overall score is obtained by summing the two most adaptive 
defense styles (PRN & REV) and then subtracting the sum of the three most maladaptive styles 
(TAS, TAO, & PRO; Kurtz & Schremp, in press). 
Reliability of the DMI has been extensively reviewed by Cramer (1988; 1991). She found 
test-retest reliability (1 – 8 weeks) and inter-item reliability to be approximately .78 and .78 
respectively over six independent investigations (Cramer, 1988; 1991). TAO was consistently 
the most reliable defense style (range = .70 - .93) while PRO was the least reliable defense style 
(range = .48 - .85). Depending on the study, the other defense styles fall variably in-between. 
Findings for convergent validity for the defenses have been mixed. REV has consistently shown 
high convergent validity. For example, REV has shown expected relations with Denial, 
Avoidance, and Repression (Cramer, 1988; 1991). PRN, however, does not relate in a 
theoretically consistent manner to criterion measures. For example, even though PRN is 
theoretically the most adaptive defense style, it has shown a positive relation to measures of less 
adaptive defenses such as Denial, Regression and Repression. The other three styles tend to have 
mixed support for their validity (Cramer, 1988; 1991)
13
. 
Attractiveness Rating Scale. The Attractiveness Rating Scale was developed in Dr. 
Michael MacGregor’s research laboratory for a related study. No previous studies have been 
published using the Attractiveness Rating Scale. Items were selected by examining the literature 
(e.g., Meerlink, Garbin, & Leger, 1990; Paunonen, Ewan, Earthy, Lefave, & Goldberg, 1999) to 
identify variables related to the attractiveness of participants. The scale consists of 39 items rated 
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on Likert scales by trained coders. The Attractiveness Rating Scale contains items related to 
physical features (e.g., skin complexion), clothing (e.g., neatness) and traits (e.g., friendliness) of 
the participant. Additionally, the scale contains a 7-point Likert scale item on the general overall 
physical attractiveness of the participant (higher scores = more attractive). Only this overall item 
was used for the present investigation. An averaged score between the two coders was used in 
the final analyses and only participants where both coders rated the participant were included in 
this analysis (n = 111). The correlation between the independent coders on this overall 
attractiveness item was r = .43, p < .001. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the DSQ and the DMI and underwent a video-recorded Expanded 
Structured Interview (ESI). The ESI is a 15-minute semi-structured interview designed to be 
interpersonally stressful. The ESI asks questions related to emotional responses, coping styles, 
and behaviours across a number of commonly experienced stressors (Hall, Davidson, 
MacGregor, & MacLean, 1998). The questions deal with social interactions at school and work, 
expression of emotions, competitiveness, and general interactions with others. The interview has 
been used as the basis for assessing defense use and defensiveness in several other studies (e.g., 
Davidson & MacGregor, 1996, MacGregor, Davidson, Barksdale, et al., 2003; MacGregor, 
Davidson, Rowan et al., 2003; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). All participants received the same 
questions delivered in the same order and in the same standardized manner (e.g., pace of 
interview, which words were stressed, when/if to cut people off, etc.). The video-recorded ESIs 
provided a sample of responses and behaviours from which defenses were rated using the 
Defense-Q and the DMRS and the images from which the attractiveness ratings were made. All 
interviews were independently watched and rated by the trained coders.  
ESI interviewer training. All ESIs were conducted by interviewers trained in ESI 
administration. The interviewers participated in approximately 12 hours of training. First, 
interviewers reviewed a copy of the ESI training manual (Hall et al., 1998). After reviewing the 
manual, interviewers watched an experienced interviewer conduct a live practice ESI interview 
with a volunteer. Following this live interview, interviewers watched several video-recorded ESI 
interviews to ensure they were familiar with all aspects of the interview as well as some typical 
responses by participants. Next, interviewers were taught interviewing skills such as which 
words required voice emphasis, pacing speed at various points in the interview, how to manage 
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interview duration, and when to be more empathic or businesslike. Interviewers then practiced 
their interviewing skills with each other while experienced interviewers monitored and corrected 
them. After interviewers had achieved a sufficient level of standardization they were asked to 
video-record a practice interview with someone they did not know well. These video-recorded 
interviews were watched and discussed with an experienced coder. After achieving acceptable 
interviewing skills, interviewers then started data collection. This procedure is similar to training 
described in previous research (e.g., Davidson & MacGregor, 1996; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). 
Defense-Q coder training. All coders initially participated in approximately 20 hours of 
training. Prior to training on the Defense-Q, coders were introduced to the theory of defense 
mechanisms. Coders subsequently reviewed the Defense-Q technical manual, which discusses 
how to rate the 25 defenses assessed by the Defense-Q (MacGregor & Davidson, 1998). Next, 
each defense included in the Defense-Q was reviewed with the coders in group training. This 
review included a discussion of the definition of each defense, classical examples of its 
manifestation, examples of its use in the ESI interview, and typical evidence that would indicate 
its presence or absence. Subsequently, video-recorded interviews were watched in group training 
where experienced coders discussed how they would code the participant for defenses using the 
Defense-Q. Finally, coders independently coded practice video-recorded interviews using the 
Defense-Q. These interviews were then watched as a group with experienced coders and defense 
ratings were discussed. Once a sufficient level of standardization was achieved, data collection 
began. During data collection weekly “coder reliability” meetings were conducted to ensure 
standardization was maintained and to prevent “coder drift”. Three Defense-Q coders completed 
training and participated in data collection. Prior to participating in data collection for Study 1, 
all three Defense-Q coders coded approximately 200 ESI interviews for a related study. This 
procedure is similar to training described in previous research (e.g., Davidson & MacGregor, 
1996; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). 
DMRS coder training. The coder initially participated in approximately 20 hours of 
DMRS training. Prior to training on the DMRS, the coder completed the above mentioned 
training for the Defense-Q and coded approximately 200 ESI interviews using the Defense-Q for 
a related study. The DMRS coder then read the DMRS fifth edition technical manual, which 
discussed how to rate each of the 27 defenses assessed by the DMRS. As was done for Defense-
Q coding, the DMRS manual was then reviewed in training sessions and classical examples as 
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well as examples of its use in ESI interviews were discussed. Practice interviews were then 
watched with the trainer until a sufficient level of coder reliability was achieved. During data 
collection weekly “coder reliability” meetings were conducted to ensure standardization was 
maintained and to prevent “coder drift”. The DMRS coder was a separate coder from the 
Defense-Q coder and he did not code any of the Defense-Q ratings for this study. 
Attractiveness Rating Scale coder training. The coders initially participated in 
approximately 10 hours of training. This training consisted of watching several ESI interviews 
with an expert coder while discussing the various items of the scale. Once coders reached a 
sufficient level of reliability between each other and with the expert coder, data collection began. 
During data collection weekly coder reliability meetings were conducted to ensure 
standardization and to prevent “coder drift”. Two coders completed training and independently 
rated participants’ attractiveness for this study. These Attractiveness Rating Scale coders were 
separate from the Defense-Q and DMRS coders and were not trained in observational defense 
mechanism assessment. 
Study 1 Results 
Analyses 
 Pearson r analyses were used to determine the relation between various measures of 
defenses (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2005). For broad level comparisons, the Defense-Q ADP 
Similarity Score, as well as the defense styles (Immature, Neurotic, & Mature) and the ODF 
from the DSQ were used. These broad levels of defense assessment from the Defense-Q and 
DSQ were compared to each other as well as to the seven defense levels (High Adaptive, 
Obsessional, Other Neurotic, Minor Image Distorting, Disavowal – including the Fantasy 
sublevel, Major Image Distorting, & Action Defense Levels) and ODF from the DMRS, and the 
five defense styles (PRN, REV, TAS, TAO, & PRO) and the ODF from the DMI. Additionally, 
the individual defense mechanisms assessed by both the Defense-Q and the DSQ (Acting Out, 
[Autistic] Fantasy, Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Humour, Idealization, Isolation, 
[Neurotic] Denial, Passive Aggression, Projection, [Pseudo]altruism, Rationalization, Reaction 
Formation, Splitting, Sublimation, & Undoing) were compared to each other. 
 Correlation assumptions. Pearson r analyses are based on the assumption that the 
variables are related in a linear (as opposed to curvilinear) manner and that they are normally 
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distributed (Leech, et al., 2005). Normality is predicated on the assumption that the variables are 
not significantly skewed or kurtotic and that there are no univariate outliers.  
Pairwise versus listwise. Correlation analyses can be run in either a pairwise or a listwise 
fashion. In a pairwise analysis a participant only has to have a score in each of the two variables 
in an individual analysis. In a listwise analysis, however, a participant must have a score in every 
variable in the analysis to be included in any analysis (Howell, 2002). Although the listwise 
analysis results in a lower number of participants being available for some analyses, it has the 
benefit of ensuring that each analysis contained all of the same participants. As such, the 
correlations were run in a listwise fashion requiring that participants have a score for every 
defense item to be included in any comparison of defense scores.  
 Error rate correction. Although individual analyses are set to have a specific acceptable 
rate of error (error rate per comparison; e.g., willing to accept that 1 in 20 times the analysis 
might incorrectly indicate a significant relation between variables), increasing the number of 
analyses increases the likelihood of having at least one spurious finding (Howell, 2002). 
Adjusting the error rate to account for the number of analyses can keep the rate of error steady, 
but comes at the cost of decreasing the likelihood of detecting actual differences (Howell, 2002). 
In the present study no adjustment was made on the error rates to correct for the number of 
analyses. It was decided that it was more important to detect actual relations in the present study 
than it was to control the familywise error. Previous research in the area (e.g., Flannery & Perry, 
1990; Perry, 1990; 1996) opted for not correcting for the number of analyses as well as including 
p values up to .10 to maximize the ability to detect relations for generating future hypotheses. 
Striking a balance, it was decided to look only at relations of p < .05 for the present study, but 
not to correct for the number of analyses. This should be taken into account when considering 
the results. 
Testing Correlation Assumptions for all Analyses 
I will begin by addressing the assumption of linearity. Next, I will address the assumption 
of normality, starting with skewness, then kurtosis, and finally univariate outliers. Assumptions 
were tested for all defense variables prior to running any of the correlation analyses. Bivariate 
plots for all correlations were examined to test the assumption of linearity. Evidence of a 
curvilinear relation on the plots would indicate the assumption was not met (Leech et al., 2005). 
No plots evidenced a curvilinear relation, indicating that linearity can be assumed. 
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 Screening for skewness and kurtosis was conducted by dividing the skewness or kurtosis 
score by the corresponding standard error score. Values with an absolute score higher than 1.96 
were considered significantly skewed or kurtotic (Field, 2005). Only variables that violated an 
assumption are discussed and all variables not mentioned were within the acceptable range. For 
the DSQ, seven of the individual defenses were skewed (Altruism, Denial, Displacement, 
Dissociation, Humour, Projection, & Undoing) and two were kurtotic (Fantasy & 
Rationalization). For the Defense-Q, five of the individual defenses were skewed (Acting Out, 
Idealization, Passive Aggression, Projection, & Reaction Formation) and six were kurtotic 
(Acting Out, Displacement, Fantasy, Idealization, Isolation, & Passive Aggression). All seven of 
the DMRS defense levels (High Adaptive, Obsessional, Other Neurotic, Minor Image Distorting, 
Disavowal, Major Image Distorting, & Action) and the Fantasy sublevel were skewed and five 
DMRS defense levels (Other Neurotic, Minor Image Distorting, Disavowal, Major Image 
Distorting, & Action) and the Fantasy sublevel were kurtotic. Finally, none of the DMI variables 
were skewed and only TAS was kurtotic. 
 Removing univariate outliers can sometimes address problems with skewness and 
kurtosis (Field, 2005). Therefore, the skewness and kurtosis aspect of the normality assumption 
was re-evaluated after addressing the univariate outlier aspect of the normality assumption. 
Screening for outliers was conducted on all variables using procedures outlined in Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001), where z-scores greater than z = 3.29 were considered outliers. The number of 
participants who had scores that were univariate outliers were as follows: Four on the DSQ 
(Denial x 2, Devaluation, & Projection), seven on the Defense-Q (Acting Out x 2, Displacement, 
Fantasy, Idealization, Splitting, & Sublimation), 12 on the DMRS (Action x 2, Disavowal x 2, 
Fantasy sublevel x 2, Major Image Distorting x 2, Minor Image Distorting, & Other Neurotic x 
3), and one on the DMI (TAS). In total, 21 of the 150 participants were outliers on at least one 
variable and three of those participants were outliers on two of the variables. All 21 participants 
who violated the normality assumption with a univariate outlier score were removed from further 
analyses, leaving 129 participants for the analyses.  
 Deleting the participants with univariate outliers corrected very few of the problems with 
skewness and kurtosis. Specifically, all of the seven skewed (Altruism, Denial, Displacement, 
Dissociation, Humour, Projection, & Undoing) and two kurtotic (Fantasy & Rationalization) 
variables on the DSQ remained skewed or kurtotic after deleting univariate outliers. For the 
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Defense-Q, skewness and kurtosis were corrected on Idealization while kurtosis (but not 
skewness) was corrected for Acting Out. Four Defense-Q variables remained skewed (Acting 
Out, Passive Aggression, Projection, & Reaction Formation) and four remained kurtotic 
(Displacement, Fantasy, Isolation, & Passive Aggression). In terms of DMRS variables, all seven 
of the defense levels (High Adaptive, Obsessional, Other Neurotic, Minor Image Distorting, 
Disavowal, Major Image Distorting, & Action) and the Fantasy sublevel remained skewed while 
three DMRS defense levels (Disavowal, Major Image Distorting, & Action) and the Fantasy 
sublevel remained kurtotic and two of the defense levels (Other Neurotic & Minor Image 
Distorting) were no longer kurtotic. Finally, removing the univariate outliers corrected the 
kurtosis for TAS, leaving no DMI variables skewed or kurtotic. 
 Although the outlier aspect of the normality assumption was now met, several of the 
variables remained skewed or kurtotic. In an attempt to address this assumption violation, several 
transformations of the data were attempted according to procedures outlined by Field (2005). 
Starting with the 17 DSQ individual defenses eight were skewed and two were kurtotic after 
removing outliers and prior to performing any transformations. Square root (8 skewed, 6 
kurtotic), log 10 (15 skewed, 8 kurtotic) and inverse (17 skewed, 15 kurtotic) transformations 
failed to improve the normality of the variables. None of the three DSQ defense styles or ODF 
were skewed or kurtotic after removing outliers and two of the transformations, log 10 (2 
skewed, 1 kurtotic) and inverse (3 skewed, 3 kurtotic), introduced problems with the normality 
assumption for these variables. Similarly, of the 17 Defense-Q individual defenses, five were 
skewed and three were kurtotic after removing outliers and prior to transformations. Square root 
(7 skewed, 4 kurtotic), log 10 (9 skewed, 4 kurtotic) and inverse (13 skewed, 7 kurtotic) 
transformations failed to improve the normality of the variables. The Defense-Q ADP Similarity 
Score was skewed after removing outliers and remained skewed after square root, log 10, and 
inverse transformations. The log 10 and inverse transformations, however, also made the ADP 
Similarity Score kurtotic. Next, of the seven DMRS scores, the fantasy sublevel, and the DMRS 
ODF, eight of the scores were skewed and four were kurtotic after removing outliers. Square root 
(8 skewed, 4 kurtotic), log 10 (8 skewed, 8 kurtotic), and inverse (9 skewed, 7 kurtotic) 
transformations failed to improve the normality of the variables. Finally, none of the five defense 
styles or ODF score on the DMI were skewed or kurtotic after removing the outliers. Square root 
(2 skewed, 1 kurtotic), log 10 (3 skewed, 2 kurtotic), and inverse (6 skewed, 5 kurtotic) 
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transformations all produced more violations of normality. In sum, although some of the 
variables were skewed or kurtotic, each of the transformations intended to correct the distribution 
resulted in a less normal distribution than the untransformed data. 
 Although Pearson r analyses assume normal distributions, several transformations of the 
data were unsuccessful at correcting the distribution. This tendency of transformations to correct 
one variable resulting in less normally distributed overall data has been noted as a complication 
of transformation in the literature (Dunlap, Chen, & Greer, 1994). Although some authors argue 
that Pearson r is robust to violations of normality (including combinations of skewness and 
kurtosis; e.g., Havlicek & Peterson, 1977; Norris & Aroian, 2004), others have noted that 
transforming data to correct skewness and kurtosis can increase power and correlation values 
compared to untransformed data with violations of the normality assumption (Dunlap, Burke, & 
Greer, 1995). Additionally, from an interpretation standpoint, transforming data often 
complicates theoretical or logical interpretation of the data and can limit the ability to compare 
results to other studies in the literature that were not similarly transformed (Dunlap et al., 1995; 
1994; Games, 1983). As such, I proceeded with nontransformed variables because the Pearson r 
analysis appears to be reasonably robust to the violations of normality, the nontransformed 
variables are the most normally distributed of the options, and because the nontransformed 
variables will allow for the most meaningful interpretations. This will result in more meaningful 
and conservative testing of relations (Dunlap et al., 1995; 1994; Games, 1983). 
Analysis 1: Defense-Q with DSQ (ODF & Defense Styles) 
ADP Similarity Scores from the Defense-Q were positively related to the ODF, r = .37 
(129), p < .001, and the Mature Defense Style, r = .23 (129), p = .008, of the DSQ, and 
negatively related to the Immature, r = -.26 (129), p = .003, Defense Styles of the DSQ. Neurotic 
Defense Style on the DSQ and the ADP Similarity Score on the Defense-Q were not correlated at 
the p < .05 level. See Table 3 for more information. 
Analysis 2: Defense-Q with DSQ (Individual Defenses) 
 Four of the 17 pairs of defenses were significantly correlated. Specifically, the defenses 
Acting Out, r = .33 (129), p < .001, Rationalization r = .22 (129), p = .012, Reaction Formation, 
r = .30 (129), p = .001, and Sublimation, r = .20 (129), p = .023, were significantly correlated. 
All remaining pairs of defenses were not correlated at the p < .05 level. See Table 4 for more 
information. 
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Analysis 3: Defense-Q and DSQ with DMRS and DMI 
ADP Similarity Scores from the Defense-Q were positively related to the ODF, r = .24 
(129), p = .006, and the High Adaptive Level, r = .26 (129), p = .003, of the DMRS and 
negatively related to the Fantasy sublevel, r = -.21 (129), p = .018, and the Action Defense 
Level, r = -.25 (129), p = .005, of the DMRS. ADP Similarity Scores from the Defense-Q were 
not significantly related to the ODF or any of the five defense styles from the DMI. Additionally, 
of the 18 hypothesized relations between the DSQ and DMI, 15 were significant in the 
hypothesized direction with only the three relations with TAS not being significant. However, 
neither the ODF nor any of the three defense styles from the DSQ were significantly related to 
the ODF, the seven defense levels, or the fantasy sublevel from the DMRS. See Table 5 for more 
information. 
Analysis 4: Defense-Q and DMRS Scores with Attractiveness 
 For the Defense-Q none of the 25 individual defense mechanisms or the ADP Similarity 
Score were significantly related to the general physical attractiveness item from the 
Attractiveness Rating Scale. See Table 6 for more information. Similarly, neither the defensive 
levels, sublevel, nor the ODF from the DMRS were significantly related to the general physical 
attractiveness item from the Attractiveness Rating Scale. See Table 7 for more information. 
Study 1 Discussion 
As was mentioned above, I will briefly discuss the results from Study 1 before moving on 
to presenting Study 2. Additional discussion from Study 1 results will be addressed in the 
General Discussion. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2: Defense-Q with DSQ  
ODF and defense styles. The results from the analysis 1 in Study 1 support the first 
hypothesis, which was that the mature index from the Defense-Q would be significantly 
positively related to the mature indices from the DSQ and negatively related to the immature 
index from the DSQ. This hypothesis was fully supported. This support suggests that the overall 
level of defensive functioning from the Defense-Q (the ADP Similarity Score) is related in a 
theoretically consistent manner to the broad level (both ODF and defensive levels) of defensive 
functioning from the DSQ. Using the standards from Cohen (1992)
14
, the effect for the relation 
                                                 
14
 All references to correlation size in this document refer to Cohen’s guidelines for effect size for correlations: 
Small (.10 - .29), Medium (.30 - .49) and Large (.50 and up) 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 58 
to the Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score was small for the Mature and Immature defense styles 
and medium for the DSQ ODF. This pattern of effect sizes indicates that the effect size increases 
within this sample as the level of analysis broadens (i.e., as it moves from more specific to more 
global level of defensive functioning).  
In comparison to previous research, the relation between the Defense-Q and DSQ is 
somewhat higher than previous results comparing observer and self-report measures. Perry and 
Hoglend (1998) found only a small relation (r = .26) between the DSQ and scores from the 
DMRS coders, compared to the present findings of a medium relation (r = .37). Although Perry 
and Hoglend’s work was using a previous version of the DMRS, these results suggest that the 
overall score of adaptiveness for the Defense-Q is at least as strongly related to the DSQ as is the 
DMRS. Previous research comparing the Defense-Q to the DSQ was limited to a comparison of 
the Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score to the four-factor structure of the DSQ (MacGregor & 
Olson, 2005). The results of the present study using the three-factor DSQ parallel the findings of 
MacGregor and Olson using the four-factor DSQ. Combined, this adds convergent validity to the 
Defense-Q as a measure of general defensive functioning and suggests that the Defense-Q might 
relate to the DSQ in a similar manner to how the DMRS relates to the DSQ. 
Individual defense mechanisms. Having examined how the Defense-Q and DSQ compare 
on an overall defensive level, it is important to examine how they compare to each other on a 
more specific individual defense mechanism level. Hypothesis 2 was that the 17 similarly named 
defense mechanisms shared between the Defense-Q and DSQ would be significantly positively 
correlated between the measures. Acting Out and Reaction Formation from the Defense-Q both 
had medium significant correlations with their DSQ counterparts, while Rationalization and 
Sublimation had small significant correlations between the measures. The remaining 13 defenses 
demonstrated no significant correlation between similarly names defenses between the Defense-
Q and DSQ. In general, hypothesis 2 was not well supported. This pattern of relatively little 
overlap at the individual defense level is consistent with what might be expected if the results 
from analysis 1 are extrapolated. In analysis 1, the broadest level of DSQ defenses demonstrated 
a medium correlation, the middle level demonstrated small correlations and now in analysis 2 the 
majority of defenses at the individual level demonstrated no significant relation.  
Although there was relatively little overlap between similarly named individual defenses 
between the Defense-Q and DSQ, this is generally consistent with the previous literature on 
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defense mechanism measures. In 1989, Bond and colleagues found that only 20 of the DSQ 
individual items correlated with the similarly named defense on the DMRS and when those items 
were combined into individual defense scores, only four DSQ defenses (Neurotic Denial, 
Splitting, Projective Identification, & Omnipotence/Devaluation) were significantly correlated 
with the similarly named DMRS defenses.  
Summary of Defense-Q and DSQ relations. One explanation for a limited overlap 
between the Defense-Q and the DSQ in this sample is that the DSQ was not completed at the 
same time as the remaining defense measures from Study 1. The DMI was filled out the same 
day that the participants were interviewed (the interview was the basis for the Defense-Q and 
DMRS coding), whereas the DSQ was filled out separately. All measures were completed during 
the same 8-month university course, but there may have been a few months between the 
completion of the DSQ and the interview in some cases. Although defenses are arguably stable 
parts of personality, life circumstances, mood, or gradual changes from maturity in this 
developing sample may have somewhat reduced the strength of the relations. It is unlikely that 
there would be substantial change, however, given the satisfactory test-retest reliability of the 
DSQ over 6 weeks and 6 months (Bond et al., 1989; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994). 
A second explanation for the decrease in the effect size of the relationship as we move 
from the overall level down to the individual defense level is the reliability of the scores. This 
applies not only to this sample in particular, but also generally to defense measures in general. 
Generally, previous research on the DMRS (Perry & Henry, 2004) indicates that reliability of 
scores decreases as the level of the defensive functioning becomes more specific (i.e., moves 
from global functioning to individual defense level). Moreover, other authors (Perry & Cooper, 
1986) have noted that “lower reliability tends to wash out potential findings” (p. 887). As was 
mentioned previously, although observer report measures avoid the problem of self-report of 
unconscious material, they have the added difficulty of lower reliability, which often obscures 
potential relations
15
. 
Looking at more global explanations for this pattern of results, it may be that observer 
report measures assess different aspects of defenses than self-report measures. Authors (e.g., 
Kwon, 2000) have indicated that although observer report has the benefit of assessing an 
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unconscious aspect of a defense, self-report can have the benefit of accessing internal 
experiences that may be indicative of a defense. For example, observable aspects of defenses like 
Undoing (e.g., repetitive stroking of one’s beard when anxious about giving a presentation) may 
be more easily assessed by observer report measures, whereas self-report measures of Undoing 
might be primarily assessing more internal aspects of Undoing (e.g., feeling compelled to engage 
in a ritual to reduce anxiety). Although both of these examples are indicative of the use of the 
defense mechanism Undoing, it may be that some persons engage more in either observable or 
internal aspects of the defense, thus accounting for some of the differences between scores on the 
observer and self-report measures. This possibility is rarely discussed in the literature and 
warrants further investigation. 
This point relates to a common criticism of self-report (i.e., that it is purported to assess 
unconscious processes through conscious reporting), but also highlights the limitation of 
observer report measures relying primarily on observable behaviours without immediate access 
to the internal mental processes that might be tapped by self-report. Similar arguments for 
different aspects of a defense being assessed between projective and observer report measures 
have been made by Cooper and colleagues (1991) and other authors (e.g., Bronnec et al., 2005). 
These authors, in addition to other authors (Besser, 2004; Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 2005), 
have noted differences of defense assessment for informant versus self-report, which may also be 
indicative of differences between observable and internal phenomena. This difference in what 
aspect of a defense the measure most accurately assesses both highlights the strengths and 
limitations of the assessment methods as well as the previously mentioned recommendation 
(Besser, 2004; Bond et al., 1989; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998; Offer et al., 2000) that multiple 
methods of assessing defenses be used to achieve the most accurate representation of a persons’ 
defensive processes. 
A final explanation for the general lack of relation between similarly named defenses on 
the DSQ and Defense-Q requires an examination of the conceptualizations of the defenses 
between measures. For example, two of the defense mechanisms with very low r values between 
the Defense-Q and the DSQ are Passive Aggression (r = -.02) and Devaluation (r = .03). Two of 
the three items on the DSQ Devaluation scale are items that assess devaluation of the self, which 
is captured under the defense Turning Against the Self (and specifically not coded under 
Devaluation) on the Defense-Q. Similarly, Passive Aggression is more broadly defined on 
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measures like the DSQ and DMRS and includes aspects of Turning Against the Self as well. 
Differences in conceptualization of defenses have been noted by other researchers (Bond et al., 
1989; Busch et al., 1995) as complicating factors in making comparisons between observer and 
self-report measures of defenses. As such, it will be important to address conceptualization 
differences in similarly named defenses in future studies. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b: Defense-Q and DSQ with the DMRS and DMI 
Defense-Q with the DMRS and DMI. Hypotheses 3a and 3b generally propose that among 
the overall and defense level indices of the Defense-Q, DSQ, DMRS, and DMI, indices of 
mature defense use will be significantly positively correlated to indices of mature defense use 
and significantly negatively related to indices of immature defense use. Conversely, indices of 
immature defense use will be significantly positively correlated to indices of immature defense 
use and significantly negatively related to indices of mature defense use. These hypotheses were 
examined in analysis 3, which indicated that the observer report Defense-Q is related in a 
theoretically consistent manner to the other observer report measure (DMRS) on the ODF level 
as well as at the most adaptive and maladaptive defensive levels. This is similar to the pattern of 
results from analysis 1, where on the broad ODF and the polar extreme scores of the self-report 
DSQ were significantly related to the Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score. Additionally, the 
Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score demonstrated a small relation to the Fantasy sublevel of the 
Disavowal Defense Level.  
Although the ADP Similarity Score from the Defense-Q was related to very few of the 
defensive levels of the DMRS, this is somewhat consistent with the literature on how other 
defense measures relate to the DMRS. In 1989, Bond and colleagues noted that the defense 
levels from the DSQ demonstrated small to medium correlations with only the Action and 
Disavowal levels of defense from the DMRS. In the present study we see the Defense-Q ADP 
Similarity Score demonstrated small correlations with the Action Defense Level and the Fantasy 
sublevel of Disavowal, and to the High Adaptive level and the ODF as well. The High Adaptive 
Level and ODF were not used in the Bond and colleagues’ (1989) study as it used a previous 
version of the DMRS before these levels were developed. The relation between these two 
observer report measures is similar to both the results from the earlier analyses in this study as 
well as with previous literature comparing defense mechanism assessment measures. The polar 
extremes of mature and immature generally demonstrate theoretically consistent relations among 
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measures whereas the indices in the mid-range of maturity are more ambiguous. In the case of 
the present study, it appears that the overall index of defensive functioning from the Defense-Q 
(the ADP Similarity Score) is related to the extremes of the DMRS, but the mid-range defensive 
levels of the DMRS are not differentiated clearly enough on the maturity scale to evidence a 
theoretically consistent relation to the overall Defense-Q score. 
Although research has generally not found consistent relations based on maturity of the 
mid-range defenses, some other possible explanations for the lack of relations for these DMRS 
levels in the present study are possible. First, only a single coder completed the coding using the 
DMRS. It is generally recommended that multiple coders independently code the data set 
(Davidson & MacGregor, 1998) and evidence has shown that increasing the number of coders 
increases the reliability as well as the strength of the correlations to other measures. This benefit 
for increasing the number of coders has been demonstrated on numerous observer report 
measures, including Vaillant’s measure (Vaillant, 1995, p. 395), Perry’s DMRS (Perry & 
Cooper, 1989; Perry & Henry, 2004) as well as on MacGregor’s Defense-Q (Davidson & 
MacGregor, 1996; MacGregor & Olson, 2005). It is possible that had the additional coders not 
dropped out during training or data collection, more theoretically consistent relations in these 
mid-range defense levels may have been evidenced. The second possible reason for the absence 
of the expected relations is that the DMRS is designed to be used with a 60-minute 
psychodynamic interview. The 15-minute ESI is substantially shorter than any other interviews 
assessed by the DMRS in the published literature. The ability to assess defenses in relatively 
short samples of behaviour is one of the advantages of the Defense-Q over the DMRS. 
Finally, although theoretically consistent relations were found at the extremes between 
the two observer report measures, there were no significant relations between the observer report 
Defense-Q and the self-report DMI. As was mentioned above, it is possible that this absence of 
theoretically hypothesized relations is related to the observer report and self-report measures 
assessing different aspects of defensive functioning. However, this does not account for the 
relations between the Defense-Q and DSQ that were evidenced in analysis 1. An examination of 
the method of assessing the defenses in the self-report measures may provide an answer. The 
DSQ utilizes statements that are intended to assess both internal and external derivatives of 
unconscious defense mechanism. For example, the item “Hard work makes me feel better” 
assesses a derivative on the internal experience of Sublimation, whereas the item “I’m often told 
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I don’t show my feelings” assesses external cues of Isolation. The DMI on the other hand, uses 
10 stories that are intended to illicit defensive reactions (e.g., imagining you were just splashed 
by a car or told you were not allowed to go out for the evening). While the two self-report 
measures share the same modality of assessment, it may be that the inclusion of some external 
aspects of defense assessment in the DSQ (i.e., using feedback from others to gather information 
about defensive functioning) increases the similarity of this measure to the observer report 
Defense-Q. Moreover, previous research (i.e., MacGregor & Olson, 2005) demonstrated positive 
relations between the Defense-Q ADP Similarity score and PRN and REV as well as negative 
relations between the ADP Similarity Score and TAO. Additional research is needed to 
understand this inconsistent pattern of relations between the Defense-Q and DMI. 
DSQ with the DMRS and DMI. While the observer report Defense-Q was related to the 
other observer report measure but not the self-report, the opposite is true of the self-report DSQ. 
Fifteen of the 18 hypothesized relations between the self-report DSQ and DMI were significant 
in the hypothesized direction. Similar to the previous results, all of the nonsignificant relations 
were at the middle (and therefore ambiguous) level of adaptiveness and all of the correlations 
were small to moderate in effect size.  
Although the DSQ and DMRS did not relate well in this study, this is again not 
inconsistent with the previous literature. Bond (2004) notes that previous research (Bond et al., 
1989) showed that the DMRS and DSQ related well at the extremes but not in the middle, but 
after the DMRS was restructured into its present seven level form, there was even more 
divergence between the scales (i.e., in Perry & Hoglend, 1998). Moreover, the overlap they did 
find was using a DSQ ODF score calculated by simply increasingly weighting items from 
defensive levels as the maturity of the level increased (Perry & Hoglend, 1998). This is a much 
more simplistic method of calculating the ODF than was used by other researchers (e.g., 
Trijsburg, et al., 2000) and in the present study. With the restructuring of the DMRS and the 
different method of calculating the DSQ ODF, it is possible the DSQ and DMRS are no longer 
related in the manner they have been found to be related in previous literature. 
In addition to the above reasons from the literature, several other explanations are 
possible for why the DSQ was related in a theoretically consistent manner to the self-report DMI 
but not to the observer report DMRS. One explanation is that the DMRS had only a single coder 
in the present study. As was mentioned above, increasing the number of coders has been 
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demonstrated to increase the relations to other variables. It is possible that the difficulties posed 
by having only a single coder were enough to “wash out” the limited relations that have been 
found in the past (Perry & Cooper, 1986). 
Also as mentioned above, observer report measures and self report measures assess 
defenses based on different information. While observer report measures primarily rely on 
observable information, self-report measures primarily rely on internal information. While the 
DSQ does have some items that also assess more external information, it is possible that the 
differences in what is being assessed, in combination with the difficulties from having only a 
single defense coder, decreased the small relations found in other studies.  
Finally, the DSQ and DMI showed numerous relations between the measures that were in 
a theoretically consistent direction. Part of the reason these self-report measures might relate so 
well to each other is that they share the same modality of assessment (i.e., self-report; 
Sammallahti et al., 1996). Although their method of self-report is somewhat different, an 
insightful and introspective person might be able to come to similar conclusions about 
themselves on either self-report measure. It is possible that this allowed for some level of overlap 
not found between the DSQ and the observer report DMRS in this study. Notably, the time 
between administration on these measures does not appear to have severely impacted the relation 
between their scores. 
Previous research has noted that the DSQ and DMI do not demonstrate expected relations 
between the measures (Mehlman & Slane, 1994). An examination of this study, however, reveals 
that the authors appear to have only examined the relation between REV from the DMI and 
Denial and Projection from the DSQ. The present investigation, however, took a much broader 
look at the two measures and found much more substantial overlap. When looking at expected 
level of adaptiveness for defense levels and overall defensive functioning, it appears these two 
self-report measures are much more related than previous research has indicated. 
Summary of Defense-Q and DSQ with DMRS and DMI. The pattern of findings where the 
Defense-Q was related to the other observer report measure but not to the self-report measure, 
whereas the DSQ was related to the other self-report measure but not to the observer report 
DMRS might further suggest that observer report measures are capturing something somewhat 
different than self-report measures. Previous researchers (Perry & Hoglend, 1998) have noted 
that differences in perspective or level of data collection result in lower correlations, and have 
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factored that into their hypotheses when looking at the similarity between observer and self-
report measures of defenses. Other researchers (Bond et al., 1989) have noted that people may 
respond differently in situations where they are filling out a self-report questionnaire as opposed 
to when they are in a stressful interview. Additionally, factors related to the type of measurement 
(e.g., difficulty assessing unconscious phenomena on self-report or reliability of coding for 
individual defenses for observer report) might account for some of the disparity. It does not, 
however, explain why there is no relation between the DSQ and DMRS as has been previously 
found (Bond et al., 1989; Perry & Hoglend, 1998). As was noted, it may be that this is related to 
difficulties from having only a single coder complete the DMRS coding. Training an additional 
coder and having them also code the interviews using the DMRS might increase the relations of 
both the Defense-Q and DSQ to the DMRS.  
Hypothesis 4: Defense-Q and DMRS with Physical Attractiveness 
The lack of any significant relation between the Attractiveness Rating Scale item and the 
Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score, the 25 individual defenses on the Defense-Q, the DMRS ODF, 
or the DMRS defense levels and sublevel supports the hypothesis that these observational ratings 
are relatively free of bias from the attractiveness of the individual being assessed. As was noted 
by Eagly and colleagues (1991), the tendency for people to rate more attractive people more 
positively on other attributes (e.g., psychological adjustment) is mitigated by the presence of 
other relevant information. In the present case, it may be that the lack of a significant relation 
between attractiveness and any of the observationally rated defense scores is the result of the 
coder’s attention being appropriately focused on the participant’s defensive functioning. 
Regardless, it seems that attractiveness of the participant did not systematically bias coders on 
either the Defense-Q or DMRS ratings of defenses. 
Overall Summary of Study 1 
Self-report and observer report measures have independently demonstrated theoretically 
consistent relations to other constructs in the past (e.g., psychopathology, treatment outcome), 
but overall have not show strong relations to each other. This pattern in the literature has been 
further supported by the results from Study 1. One explanation proposed for this disparity is that 
the two methods may be assessing different aspects of the same construct (e.g., different aspects 
of the defense Undoing). One of the problems noted in the literature and apparent in the present 
results is that different measures of defenses conceptualize similarly named defense mechanisms 
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in different ways (e.g., Devaluation, Passive Aggression, & Turning Against Self as mentioned 
above). Additionally, a previously cited concern (Davidson et al., 2004) about observational 
measures, namely that observers can be biased by external cues such as the attractiveness of the 
participant, has been investigated and determined not to be evident in the present investigation. 
Moving on to Study 2, it will be important to consider differences in the conceptualization of 
defenses and the decreasing level of overlap among the Defense-Q and DSQ as the level of 
analysis narrows. 
Having preliminarily examined the results of Study 1, I will now present Study 2. I will 
begin with a brief introduction and then I will present the method, results, and a brief discussion. 
Following the discussion for Study 2, I will conclude with an overall discussion of the results 
from both Studies 1 and 2 and discuss broader theoretical, research, and clinical implications. 
STUDY 2 
As indicated in the general introduction, there is a wealth of information on the relation 
between general maturity of defenses and both depression and anxiety. As Watson (2002) notes, 
however, there is a lack of information on whether specific defenses can predict particular 
disorders. As such, the current study will build on the research in the area and examine the extent 
to which the often found relations between defensive functioning and depressive or anxious 
symptomatology can predict group membership. 
 As noted, there are several methods of assessing defenses from which to choose when 
conducting research. Observer report measures provide interpretation of unconscious material 
that may not be accessible for individuals to self-report. They have demonstrated acceptable 
validity, but are often hampered by lower than desirable inter-rater reliability. Self-report 
measures, on the other hand, are more conducive to large-scale testing and have also shown 
acceptable validity. Furthermore, self-report measures are not hindered by inter-rater reliability 
problems. The limitation of self-report measures, however, is that they require a conscious 
reporting of unconscious processes. As such, authors have argued that self-report measures 
should be used alongside observer report measures of defenses (Davidson & MacGregor, 1998; 
Perry & Ianni, 1998). Spinhoven and colleagues (1995), for example, note that with the 
limitations associated with observer report methods as well as the limitations of self-report 
methods “it is preferable that these methods be used in conjunction with each other in order to 
improve the validity and reliability of the assessments of such elusive, complex, and subtle 
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processes as defense mechanisms” (p. 133). This is further supported by the findings of previous 
researchers (Bond et al., 1989), as well as those in Study 1 where it was found that similarly 
named individual defenses may have little relation between measures. The second study was 
therefore conducted with the Defense-Q and the DSQ. The observer report Defense-Q was used 
because it assesses a wide variety of defenses and because it has been demonstrated to have the 
highest inter-rater reliability even with a smaller number of coders on relatively brief pieces of 
clinical material (e.g., as opposed to the DMRS which has lower reliability for individual 
defenses and typically requires much longer clinical interviews). The self-report DSQ was used 
because it assesses a wide variety of individual defenses and has ample previous research to 
draw on given its status as the most widely used self-report measure of defenses. 
Although numerous studies have shown a relation between individual defenses and 
depressive symptomatology or between defenses and anxious symptomatology, the results often 
indicate several of the same defense mechanisms are associated with both depressive and anxiety 
symptomatology. For example, Watson (2002) noted that depression and anxiety differentiation 
based on defenses would be difficult as Displacement was the primary predictor of Depression, 
Anxiety, Phobic Anxiety, and OCD scores in females and Projection was the primary predictor 
of Depression, Anxiety, and Phobic Anxiety, and the second best predictor of OCD in males. 
Some defenses, however, do appear to be related more to one type of symptomatology than the 
other. For example, Watson (2002) found Undoing was a predictor in Anxiety, Phobic Anxiety, 
and OCD but not Depression in females, and unrelated to any of the above scales in males. It 
may be that a few defenses such as Undoing will be the most likely defenses to aid in 
differentiation of anxiety and depression.  
One issue to address for the present study is the debate as to the extent to which extreme 
scores from a nonclinical sample adequately represent scores of persons in a diagnosed clinical 
population. For example, some researchers (e.g., Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Depue & Monroe, 
1978) have argued that depression in college students is different from depression in psychiatric 
patients. Later research (e.g., Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997; Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 
1993) has refuted these claims, arguing that the earlier claims that depression is different in 
college students than in psychiatric patients “are not well founded and that they are not supported 
by existing empirical evidence” (Vredenburg et al., 1993, p. 339). Indeed, Vredenburg and 
colleagues (1993) note that college students may present an advantage when studying depression 
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because they are less likely to have comorbid disorders and are less likely to be currently 
undergoing treatment, which could possibly obscure research results. In addition, for the most 
part results from scores of nonclinical populations closely match those of clinical populations. 
For example, Muris and Merckelbach (1994) noted that the defenses they found to contribute to 
the explanation of variance in college students’ anxiety scores are the same defenses found to 
differentiate between those with and without an anxiety disorder in Pollock and Andrews (1989) 
research with patients. This, they indicate, is evidence that similar defense use can be found for 
those high in anxiety regardless of whether they have formal diagnoses. As such, it was 
determined that extreme scores in a nonclinical sample of university students was adequate to 
represent the groups of interest for the present study. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesized Analyses 
Due to a wealth of previous research investigating the relation of defenses to depression 
and anxiety, there is an abundance of information from which to draw upon when hypothesizing 
which defenses might best differentiate between the two types of disorders. The defenses most 
likely to enable a successful group differentiation are those that have previously been 
demonstrated to differ between persons with depression and persons with anxiety. Previous 
research has indicated that persons with depression score higher on Acting Out, Devaluation, 
Hypochondriasis, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, and Projective Identification than do 
persons with anxiety. Research has also shown that persons with anxiety score higher on 
Idealization, Reaction Formation, and Undoing than do persons with depression. In addition, 
defenses that are both theoretically and empirically linked to one disorder, but have no 
theoretical relation to the other disorder should aid in group differentiation. Splitting has been 
related to depression both theoretically and empirically and is not theoretically related to anxiety. 
Similarly, Displacement is related to anxiety both theoretically and empirically and is not 
theoretically related to depression. As such, these defenses are the ones which were selected as 
the predictor variables for the discriminant analyses. 
As mentioned above, each defense measure assesses different defenses and can 
conceptualize similarly named defenses differently. For example, although psychodynamic 
theories of depression have implicated Turning Against Self as a defense that is central to 
depression, many defense measures do not directly assess the defense. Bond (2004) 
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acknowledges his DSQ does not adequately assess the defense, stating “Turning Against the Self 
is not well measured by the DSQ” (p. 267). The DMRS and DSQ both incorporate aspects of 
Turning Against the Self in the defense Passive Aggression through noting that covertly resisting 
a more powerful other often results in self-sabotage. In addition, the self-loathing and blaming 
aspect of Turning Against the Self is captured within the defense Devaluation (of the self) on 
both the DMRS and DSQ. As such, in the analysis with the DSQ for Study 2, the defenses 
Devaluation and Passive Aggression will be used, and in the analysis for the Defense-Q the more 
theoretically consistent defense Turning Against Self will be used in their place. The argument 
that these similarly named defenses are conceptually different on the Defense-Q is supported by 
the results from Study 1, which indicate no relation between the Defense-Q and DSQ defenses 
for Devaluation (r = .03) and Passive Aggression (r = -.02). Instead, those aspects of Devaluation 
and Passive Aggression that are theoretically linked to depression appear in the more traditional 
Turning Against Self. Also, neither the Defense-Q nor the DSQ-72 assesses the defenses 
Hypochondriasis and Projective Identification so they cannot be tested in the present 
investigation. 
With regard to defense styles, research has generally found that those with depression score 
higher on immature defenses than do those with anxiety. Additionally, research has generally 
demonstrated that those with anxiety score higher on neurotic level defenses than do those with 
depression. Finally, there is limited evidence from the literature that those with anxiety have 
elevated scores on mature defense styles. As such, I hypothesize that the Mature, Neurotic, and 
Immature Defense Styles will result in significant classification of participants in the depressed 
and anxious groups. Mature and Neurotic Defense Styles will be more representative of anxiety 
whereas Immature Defense Style will be more representative of depression. 
Therefore, the three hypothesized (standard) discriminant analyses, assessing whether 
previously identified defenses can be used to classify participants correctly are: 
1. Acting Out, Displacement, Idealization, Isolation, Projection, Reaction Formation, 
Splitting, Turning Against Self, and Undoing from the Defense-Q as independent 
(predictor) variables and group membership from the PAI as the dependent variable. 
2. Acting Out, Devaluation, Displacement, Idealization, Isolation, Passive Aggression, 
Projection, Reaction Formation, Splitting, and Undoing from the DSQ as 
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independent (predictor) variables and group membership from the PAI as the 
dependent variable. 
3. Mature Defense Style, Neurotic Defense Style, and Immature Defense Style from 
the DSQ as independent (predictor) variables and group membership from the PAI 
as the dependent variable. 
Confirmatory Analyses 
Because of the large number of identified defenses and wealth of previous research, there 
are several individual defenses that have been found to be related to depression, anxiety, or to 
both depression and anxiety. The first two analyses in Study 2 will determine the extent to which 
specific individual defenses can differentiate between groups using the well-supported defenses 
from the literature. Because, however, numerous other defenses have been shown to be related to 
depression and anxiety, it is possible that other defenses will also aid in effective differentiation 
of the groups. As such, previous researchers (e.g., Fulde, Junge, & Ahrens, 1995; Spinhoven & 
Kooiman, 1997; Watson, 2002) have opted to use stepwise analyses to explore which defenses 
are related to variables of interest. Fulde and colleagues, for example, used a stepwise 
discriminant analysis to determine the extent to which defenses could correctly classify persons 
who had poor or good outcomes after lumbar surgery.  
Following the design of Fulde and colleagues, stepwise discriminant analyses were used 
to determine which defenses best differentiate between those in the depressed and anxious 
groups using both the Defense-Q and DSQ individual defenses. These stepwise analyses were 
used to confirm both that the hypothesized defenses are the most useful defenses in classification 
between the groups as well as to explore the extent to which other defenses might also contribute 
to group classification. As such, it is hypothesized that, in general, the defenses that contribute 
most to the differentiation in the stepwise analyses will be those highlighted in the hypothesized 
analyses. 
Specifically, the two confirmatory stepwise discriminant analyses, assessing whether 
additional defenses can add to the information from the previously identified defenses when 
classifying participants are: 
1. Acting Out, Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Fantasy, Grandiosity, 
Humour, Idealization, Identification With the Aggressor, Intellectualization, 
Isolation, Neurotic Denial, Passive Aggression, Projection, Pseudoaltruism, 
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Psychotic Denial, Rationalization, Reaction Formation, Regression, Repression, 
Splitting, Sublimation, Turning Against Others, Turning Against Self, and 
Undoing from the Defense-Q as independent (predictor) variables and group 
membership from the PAI as the dependent variable. 
2. Acting Out, Anticipation, Denial, Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, 
Fantasy, Humour, Idealization, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, 
Pseudoaltruism, Rationalization, Reaction Formation, Somatization, Splitting, 
Sublimation, Suppression, and Undoing from the DSQ as independent (predictor) 
variables and group membership from the PAI as the dependent variable. 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 1182 participants (868 female – 73.43%) were recruited from the 
Introductory Psychology classes at the University of Saskatchewan. The participant’s age ranged 
from 17 to 40 years (M = 19.56; SD = 2.58). All participants received partial course credit for 
participation. 
Measures 
 Defense-Q. See Study 1 for a description of the Defense-Q. 
 Defense Style Questionnaire. See Study 1 for a description of the DSQ. 
Personality Assessment Inventory. The PAI (Morey, 1991) is a 344-item self-report 
inventory that participants respond to on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (false, not at all true) to 3 
(very true). The 344 items can be combined into 22 nonoverlapping scales: Four validity scales 
(Inconsistency, Infrequency, Negative Impression, Positive Impression), 11 clinical scales 
(Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety Related Disorders, Depression, Mania, Paranoia, 
Schizophrenia, Borderline Features, Antisocial Features, Alcohol Problems, & Drug Problems), 
five treatment scales (Aggression, Suicidal Ideation, Stress, Nonsupport, & Treatment 
Rejection), and two interpersonal scales (Dominance & Warmth). In addition to full scale scores, 
each of the clinical scales is comprised of subscales. For example, Depression (DEP; cognitive, 
affective, & physiological), Anxiety (ANX; cognitive, affective, & physiological), and Anxiety 
Related Disorders (ARD; obsessive-compulsive, phobias, & traumatic stress), each have three 
subscales (Morey, 1991). Only the validity and three relevant clinical scales (i.e., DEP, ANX, & 
ARD) were used in the present investigation. 
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Scores on the PAI are converted to T-scores according to norms from the PAI manual 
(Morey, 1991). Each scale (e.g., DEP, ANX, & ARD) has a mean of 50t and a standard deviation 
of 10t. A score of 70t represents scores in the extreme 2% of normal scores and “represents a 
pronounced deviation from the typical responses of adults living in the community” (Morey, 
1991, p. 11). Moreover, Morey (2003) argues that “a score of 70t … represents a degree of 
problems and symptoms that is very unusual in the general population, thus most likely 
indicating a problem of clinical significance” (p. 28). 
The clinical scales of the PAI have been found to have good internal consistency across 
the community, college, and clinical samples for which norms are provided. Of the scales used in 
the current investigation ANX has consistently been found to have the highest internal 
consistency (.90, .89, & .94 respectively for community, college, & clinical samples) followed 
by DEP (.87, .87, & .93 respectively) and ARD (.76, .80, & .86 respectively; Morey, 1991). In 
addition, all clinical scales have demonstrated good temporal stability over 3-4 weeks. 
Specifically, mean test-retest reliability was .88 for ANX, .83 for ARD, and .87 for DEP (Morey, 
1991). In terms of T Scores, mean absolute difference in scores over the 3-4 weeks was 3.7t for 
ANX, 4.5t for ARD, and 3.5t for DEP (Morey, 1991).  
Procedure 
 Participants completed the DSQ and PAI. Also, participants underwent the ESI. It is this 
interview that was the data source from which coders observationally rated participants’ defense 
use using the Defense-Q. All interviews were independently watched and rated by trained coders 
using the Defense-Q. 
Groups. Participants were grouped according to their scores on the PAI. All participants 
with a score on the PAI DEP scale indicating that they likely have depressive symptomatology 
that warrants clinical attention (i.e., 70t or higher) were considered for the “depressed group”. In 
order to eliminate those students who also have prominent anxiety symptomatology, all students 
with either an ANX or ARD score on the PAI that is indicative of anxiety symptomatology that 
warrants clinical attention (i.e., 70t or higher) were excluded from the depressed group. 
Similarly, all students with a score of 70t on the PAI ANX scale or PAI ARD, and less than 70t 
on the DEP scale were considered for the “anxious group”. In total, 104 participants met criteria 
for the anxious group and 39 participants met criteria for the depressed group. 
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Prior to grouping participants were removed if they produced profiles that were likely 
invalid according to the PAI manual. Those with high scores on Inconsistency (ICN; ≥ 73t) and 
Infrequency (INF; ≥ 75t) scales were used to identify participants responding in a careless or 
idiosyncratic manner (Morey, 1991; 2003). The Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) was 
chosen as an additional validity index to identify malingering as it has been identified as the most 
effective index at identifying both coached and naive respondents trying to simulate 
psychopathology and is unrelated to actual psychopathology scores (Morey, 2003; Morey & 
Lanier, 1998). The cut-off score of 0.57 was chosen to identify malingering participants because 
it was identified by Morey and Lanier as providing the fewest incorrect decisions. Given that the 
present study is concerned only with removing those feigning psychopathology, no positive 
distortion validity indices were used. Of the 1182 participants, 83 had elevated RDF scores, 40 
had elevated INF scores, and 16 had elevated ICN scores. After eliminating invalid profiles, 96 
participants met criteria for the anxious group and 25 met criteria for the depressed group. 
Study 2 Results 
Discriminant Analysis  
Discriminant analysis was originally designed as a method of classification into groups, 
but has more recently gained popularity in studying group differences on several variables 
simultaneously (Pedhazur, 1997). Discriminant analysis has many similarities to MANOVA, 
with an important difference being that the independent and dependent variables are switched, 
reflecting a difference in the conceptual basis of studies employing this analysis (Leech et al., 
2005). An overall classification rate is produced and the predictor variables contributing to the 
overall classification rate can be determined by looking at their respective coefficients.  
Standardized versus structure coefficients. The discriminant analysis produces both 
standardized as well as structure coefficients. Standardized coefficients are useful for 
interpretation in that their relative magnitudes can be interpreted as the relative importance of the 
dependent variable to the discrimination between groups (i.e., the discriminant function; 
Pedhazur, 1997). The standardized coefficient, however, is affected by the variance and 
covariance of the other predictor variables in the study. That is, the extent to which a variable 
contributes to the discrimination between groups (i.e., it’s “importance” in the discriminant 
function) depends on which other variables are being simultaneously examined. It is possible that 
a predictor variable can be highly correlated with the final discriminant function, but have a low 
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standardized coefficient (and thus be interpreted as “unimportant” in predicting the group 
classification) because it is highly correlated with another predictor variable in the analysis 
(Leech et al., 2005; Pedhazur, 1997).  
Structure coefficients, on the other hand, are not affected by the other variables in the 
analysis in the same way that standardized coefficients are. They provide an index of the 
correlation between the predictor variable and the resulting discriminant function (Leech et al., 
2005). The structure coefficient, however, does not provide the relative importance of the 
dependent variable to the resulting discriminant function in the same way that a standardized 
coefficient does (Pedhazur, 1997). To compensate for the different strengths and weaknesses, 
both standardized and structure coefficients were reported for the present study. The analysis 
primarily uses the standardized coefficients, but the structure coefficients will be discussed 
where applicable. Following the guidelines of Pedhazur (1997) as well as Masters and Wallston 
(2005) coefficients of .30 or greater were considered meaningful for interpretation. 
Standard versus stepwise discriminant analysis. In addition to the standard discriminant 
analysis where the predictor variables are predetermined by the researcher, a stepwise 
discriminant analysis can be conducted if the aim is to develop a prediction equation 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The initial three (hypothesized) analyses in the present study used a 
standard discriminant analysis to enable the specific inclusion of defenses hypothesized to 
differentiate between groups, whereas the subsequent two (confirmatory) analyses used stepwise 
discriminant analyses to confirm that the hypothesized defenses are among the most important 
for differentiation and to explore the use of defenses in differentiating between the depressed and 
anxious groups further. The stepwise procedure adds variables into the equation in the order that 
maximizes differentiation between groups. Following the guidelines of Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001) an entering criterion of .20 was used to ensure entry of all important variables. If a 
variable no longer contributes to differentiation after originally entering the equation, it is 
removed from the analysis. Although the stepwise procedure is useful at determining which 
variables from a larger set of variables will contribute uniquely to differentiation between 
groups, the analysis selects predictor variables based on statistical criteria in a sample and 
sometimes works too well in that sample (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). As such, a cross-
validation procedure was used for all standard and stepwise discriminant analyses to minimize 
biases resulting from the specific sample.  
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Cross-validation. Various types of cross-validation procedures exist, all having the 
common feature of withholding cases so that the prediction equation is tested on cases that did 
not contribute to the equation itself. SPSS uses one of the most economical cross-validation 
procedures in terms of participant numbers. It ensures that each case is classified by functions 
derived from all cases other than the one being classified. This procedure minimizes trivial 
sample-specific differences and provides a more accurate representation of classification rates in 
the population (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Classification rates prior to and after cross-
validation were presented in the present study. 
Assumptions of discriminant analysis. The assumptions of discriminate analysis include 
multivariate normality and an absence of multicollinearity. Multivariate normality includes 
linearity, lack of homoscedasticity, univariate normality (no skewed or kurtotic distributions or 
significant univariate outliers) and no multivariate outliers (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2000). Although discriminate analysis is fairly robust to these assumptions with large and 
relatively equal sample sizes, a lack of multivariate normality may negatively affect accuracy of 
estimates or probability of correct classification (Leech et al., 2005). Therefore, equal sample 
size across groups will maximize classification rates, but is not necessarily required (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001). Additional considerations for conducting a discriminant analysis are that the 
sample size of the smallest group must be larger than the number of predictors unless a stepwise 
method is used (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Assumptions were reviewed for 
all discriminate analyses to ensure they had been met. 
Unequal sample size. As mentioned above, unequal sample sizes cause no special 
problems in discriminant analysis, although they do necessitate a decision on whether to factor 
the difference in group sizes into the classification process (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). A 
correction can be made in SPSS that sets probabilities to reflect group sample sizes (Field, 2005; 
Leech et al., 2005). While including group size into the equation might maximize the 
classification rate, the question in the current investigation is to what extent the participants can 
be classified on their defense use alone
16
. As such, group size was not reflected in the analysis 
and participants were classified by defense use only
17
. 
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 For this reason the groups are not separated on age, sex, or any other variable either. Only defense use is included 
in the analysis to differentiate the groups. 
17
 This changes the classification rates but not the rest of the analysis (e.g., significance or coefficient values). The 
interested reader is referred to Appendix J for a comparison of corrected vs. noncorrected classification rates. 
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Present study. As the goal of the present study is to predict group membership (i.e., 
depressed or anxious) based on a set of predictors (i.e., the defense mechanisms), discriminant 
analyses were used (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). The first discriminant 
analysis was used to determine the degree to which the hypothesized defenses from the Defense-
Q successfully predict membership in the depressed and anxious groups. Similarly, the second 
discriminant analysis was used to determine the degree to which the hypothesized defenses from 
the DSQ successfully predict membership in the depressed and anxious groups. Finally, a 
discriminant analysis was used to determine the degree to which the defense styles from the 
three-factor DSQ successfully predict membership in the depressed and anxious groups. In the 
first two analyses, group membership served as the dependent variable and the individual 
defenses served as the independent (predictor) variables (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2000). In the third analysis, group membership served as the dependent variable and the 
defense styles served as the independent (predictor) variables (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2000). To explore the extent to which defenses can be used to predict membership in 
either the depressed or anxious group further, two confirmatory analyses were conducted using 
all of the individual defenses from the Defense-Q (Confirmatory Analysis 1) and the DSQ 
(Confirmatory Analysis 2). In each of these confirmatory analyses, group membership served as 
the dependent variable and the individual defenses served as the independent (predictor) 
variables (Leech et al., 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). 
Hypothesized Analysis 1 (Defense-Q Individual Defenses) 
 Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which nine defenses (Acting 
Out, Displacement, Idealization, Isolation, Projection, Reaction Formation, Splitting, Turning 
Against Self, & Undoing) from the Defense-Q could accurately distinguish between participants 
in the depressed and anxious groups. In total, 58 participants in the anxious group and 19 
participants in the depressed group completed all measures and were included in the analysis. 
Assumptions. I will first address outliers followed by normality, and then 
multicollinearity. Screening for outliers was conducted separately for each group (depressed & 
anxious) using procedures outlined by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Assessment for univariate 
outliers was conducted using z-scores (greater than z = 3.29 was considered an outlier) and 
assessment for multivariate outliers was conducted using Mahalanobis distance scores, which 
vary according to the number of predictors in the analysis. No participants from either the 
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depressed or anxious group had z-scores over 3.29 on any predictor variable, which indicates that 
there were no univariate outliers. No participants produced a Mahalanobis distance value greater 
than the critical χ
2 
for 9 df (27.88) on any predictor variable in either group, which indicates that 
there were no multivariate outliers.  
No ideal test exists for testing multivariate normality. Instead, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001) recommend examining univariate normality and linearity for each group as well as 
homoscedasticity. Univariate normality was assessed separately for each group by examining 
predictor variables for skewness and kurtosis. No scores for any participant in either group were 
significantly skewed or kurtotic. The presence of a linear relation between all variables was 
assessed in the current study by examining matrix scatterplots (Leech et al., 2005). No 
curvilinear relations were noted, indicating that linearity can be assumed. Homoscedasticity was 
assessed by Box’s M test to assess the homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. Box’s M 
was not significant (p = .219), indicating that homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices 
can be assumed.  
The discriminant analysis in SPSS is designed to remove problematic variables if 
singularity/multicollinearity exists between two variables. As such, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) 
note that singularity screening can be done by running the analysis to see if the program reports 
tolerance violations. If the program runs the analysis, then no singularity exists. If tolerance 
levels for an individual variable are too low (between .01 and .0001 depending on the program 
used), then the variable will be automatically removed from the analysis. No variables in the 
current analysis had tolerance values less than .01 (Range = .57 - .97), indicating that there is no 
problem with multicollinearity for individual predictor variables. However, Tabachnick and 
Fidell also outline a procedure to assess multicollinearity of combinations of variables, rather 
than between two individual variables. The authors argue that multicollinearity for a combination 
of several variables may be present if a condition index is over 30 and at least two of the 
variance proportions for individual variables are greater than .50. Although two condition indices 
were greater than 30 in the present analysis, only one (condition index = 31.28) had a variance 
proportion greater than .50. None of the condition indices over 30 had at least two variance 
proportions greater than .50, indicating that there is no problem with multicollinearity for 
combinations of variables.  
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Results. Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.72, χ
2
 = 22.84, p = .007, which indicates 
that the overall model was able to distinguish between participants in the depressed and anxious 
groups significantly. Table 8 presents the standardized coefficients, structure coefficients, means 
and standard deviations for all variables. The standardized coefficients indicated that Acting Out, 
Turning Against Self, Projection and Isolation all uniquely contributed to distinguishing between 
participants in these groups. The mean scores for Acting Out, Turning Against Self, Projection 
and Isolation indicate that they are more representative
18
 of the depressed group than the anxious 
group. Additionally, although the standardized coefficient for Reaction Formation did not 
indicate that it uniquely contributed to the discriminant function, the structure coefficient 
indicated that Reaction Formation was significantly correlated with the resulting discriminant 
function. Table 9 displays the intercorrelation values for all of the defenses in the analyses, 
which indicates that Reaction Formation had a medium correlation with one of the significant 
predictors, namely Acting Out. Additionally, Reaction Formation had a small correlation with 
another variable in the analysis (i.e., Undoing). Classification results indicated that the model 
correctly classified 77.9% of participants overall, with 77.6% of anxious and 78.9% of depressed 
participants being correctly classified. On cross-validation the model continued to classify 71.4% 
of participants overall, with 72.4% of anxious and 68.4% of depressed participants being 
correctly classified.  
Hypothesized Analysis 2 (DSQ Individual Defenses) 
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which 10 defenses (Acting 
Out, Devaluation, Displacement, Idealization, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, 
Reaction Formation, Splitting, & Undoing) from the DSQ could accurately distinguish between 
participants in the depressed and anxious groups. In total, 92 participants in the anxious group 
and 25 participants in the depressed group completed all measures and were included in the 
analysis. 
Assumptions. The same procedures used to examine the analysis assumptions in the first 
discriminant analysis were used in the remaining discriminant analyses. As such, the results but 
not the procedure for testing the assumptions will be presented for the remaining analyses. There 
were no univariate outliers in either the depressed or anxious group. One participant (anxious 
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 Discriminant analysis does not assess whether individual variables are significantly different between groups. 
Discussion of representativeness is intended to highlight where high scorers are more likely to be classified. 
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group) had a Mahalanobis distance (32.38) larger than the critical χ
2 
for 10 df (29.59) and was 
removed from the analysis
19
. The predictor variable Splitting was kurtotic (z = 3.31) in the 
depressed group and no other variables were skewed or kurtotic in either group. Several 
transformations were tested (i.e., cubed, squared, log10, square root, inverse, & inverse squared) 
and a square root transformation best corrected the kurtosis of Splitting without creating 
skewness or kurtosis problems for Splitting in either group. However, because interpretation is 
difficult with transformed variables and the analysis was not meaningfully different with or 
without the transformed variable, the untransformed Splitting was retained for the analysis
20
. The 
assumptions of linearity and of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices were met (p = 
.140 for Box’s M) and there were no problems with multicollinearity on individual or 
combinations of variables (tolerance range = .51 - .87; no condition index over 30).  
Results. Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.83, χ
2
 = 21.00, p = .021, which indicates 
that the overall model was able to distinguish between participants in the depressed and anxious 
groups significantly. Table 10 presents the standardized coefficients, structure coefficients, 
means and standard deviations for all variables. The standardization coefficients indicated that 
Reaction Formation, Isolation (negative), and Undoing all uniquely contributed to distinguishing 
between participants in these groups. Reaction Formation and Undoing were more representative 
of the anxiety group and Isolation was more representative of the depressed group. Additionally, 
although Idealization and Displacement did not uniquely contribute to the discriminant function, 
their structure coefficients indicated that they were significantly correlated to the resulting 
discriminant function. As can be seen in Table 11, Idealization had a medium correlation with 
one of the significant predictors in the analysis (i.e., Reaction Formation) as well as with another 
predictor (i.e., Acting Out) and Displacement had a small correlation with two of the other 
predictor variables in analysis (i.e., Acting Out & Passive Aggression). Classification results 
indicated that the model correctly classified 69.0% of participants overall, with 70.3% of anxious 
and 64.0% of depressed participants being correctly classified. On cross-validation the model 
continued to classify 64.7% of participants overall, with 64.8% of anxious and 64.0% of 
depressed participants being correctly classified.  
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 Results from the analyses with and without this case were not meaningfully different in any way. 
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Hypothesized Analysis 3 (DSQ Defense Styles) 
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which three defense styles 
(Mature, Neurotic, & Immature) from the DSQ could accurately distinguish between participants 
in the depressed and anxious groups. In total, 91 participants in the anxious group and 25 
participants in the depressed group completed all measures and were included in the analysis. 
Assumptions. There were no univariate outliers and no participants had a Mahalanobis 
distance larger than the critical χ
2 
for 3 df (16.27). None of the predictor variables were 
significantly skewed or kurtotic in either group. The assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of 
the variance-covariance matrices (p = .682 for Box’s M) were met and there were no problems 
with multicollinearity (tolerance range = .84 - .99; no condition index over 30).  
Results. Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.85, χ
2
 = 17.90, p < .001, which indicates 
that the overall model was able to distinguish between participants in the depressed and anxious 
groups significantly. Table 12 presents the standardized coefficients, structure coefficients, 
means and standard deviations for all variables. The standardized coefficients indicated that 
Neurotic and Immature Defense Styles (negative) uniquely contributed to distinguishing between 
participants in these groups of the defenses entered in this analysis. Neurotic Defense Style was 
more representative of the anxiety group and Immature Defense Style was more representative of 
the depressed group. Additionally, although the standardized coefficient for Mature Defense 
Style was not significant, the structure coefficient indicated that Mature Defense Style was 
significantly correlated with the resulting discriminant function. Table 13 presents the 
intercorrelations for the defense styles, which indicated that Mature Defense Style had a medium 
correlation with one of the significant predictors, namely Neurotic Defense Style. Classification 
results indicated that the model correctly classified 64.7% of participants overall, with 64.8% of 
anxious and 64.0% of depressed participants being correctly classified. On cross-validation the 
model was unchanged and continued to classify 64.7% of participants overall, with 64.8% of 
anxious and 64.0% of depressed participants being correctly classified.  
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 In general, kurtosis is not a problem in discriminant analysis, as was noted by Joachimsthaler & Stam (1988) who 
found that over 4 kurtotic samples using 4 types of discriminant analyses, none produced lower classification rates. 
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Confirmatory Analysis 1 (Defense-Q Defenses) 
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which 25 defense 
mechanisms (Acting Out, Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, Fantasy, Grandiosity, 
Humour, Idealization, Identification With the Aggressor, Intellectualization, Isolation, Neurotic 
Denial, Passive Aggression, Projection, Pseudoaltruism, Psychotic Denial, Rationalization, 
Reaction Formation, Regression, Repression, Splitting, Sublimation, Turning Against Others, 
Turning Against Self, & Undoing) from the Defense-Q could accurately distinguish between 
participants in the depressed and anxious groups. In total, 58 participants in the anxious group 
and 19 participants in the depressed group completed all measures and were included in the 
analysis. 
Assumptions. A stepwise discriminant analysis allows researchers to use more predictor 
variables than the number of participants in the smallest group. Only the significant predictors 
are entered and the analysis protects against multicollinearity problems. The present analysis 
would not run due to insufficient tolerance values with both Acting Out and Pseudoaltruism in 
the analysis. In this situation, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend choosing the variable to 
delete on logical rather than purely statistical grounds. Given that Acting Out is one of the 
hypothesized defenses but Pseudoaltruism is not, Acting Out was chosen to remain in the 
analyses and Pseudoaltruism was removed prior to the remaining assumptions being assessed. 
One participant (anxious group) had a univariate outlier score on Psychotic Denial (z = 
3.54) and this participant was eliminated from the analysis
21
. No participant had a Mahalanobis 
distance larger than the critical χ
2 
for 24 df (51.18). No variables were skewed or kurtotic. The 
assumption of linearity and homogeneity were met (p = .349 for Box’s M). 
Of the remaining 24 variables, none had tolerance values less than .01 (Range = .20 - 
.56), indicating that there were no other problems with multicollinearity for individual variables. 
Of the 25 condition indices, 12 were greater than 30. Only the 25
th
 condition index (636.82) had 
at least two variance proportions greater than .50 (these variance proportions were for Humour, 
Isolation, Neurotic Denial, Regression, Repression, Turning Against Self, & Undoing). This 
indicated that there may have been a problem with multicollinearity for combinations of 
variables, which could affect the selection of defenses depending on the combination of other 
defenses already selected in the analysis. The defense mechanism with the highest variance 
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 Results from the analyses with and without this case were not meaningfully different in any way. 
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proportion (.65) was Neurotic Denial. Deleting this variable reduced the condition index 
(369.04) and only one variable (Repression) had a variance proportion greater than .50. The only 
meaningful difference between the analyses with and without Neurotic Denial, however, was that 
Neurotic Denial was no longer a predictor when excluded. As such, the variable was left in the 
analyses. No other variables entered or failed to enter and the top predictors did not change 
relative position, so multicollinearity from the combinations of variables did not adversely affect 
the analysis with Neurotic Denial included.  
Results. Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.54, χ
2
 = 42.72, p < .001, which indicates 
that the overall model was able to distinguish between participants in the depressed and anxious 
groups significantly. Eleven defenses were selected as improving the model that differentiates 
between the groups. The defenses entered in the following order: Acting Out, Turning Against 
Self, Repression, Projection, Turning Against Others, Fantasy, Dissociation, Idealization, 
Isolation, Psychotic Denial, and Neurotic Denial. Table 14 presents the standardized coefficients, 
structure coefficients, means and standard deviations for each variable selected. The standardized 
coefficients indicated the proportion to which the 11 defenses uniquely contributed to 
distinguishing between participants in these groups. Classification results indicated that the 
model correctly classified 84.2% of participants overall, with 84.2% of anxious and 84.2% of 
depressed participants being correctly classified. On cross-validation the model continued to 
classify 75.0% of participants overall, with 75.4% of anxious and 73.7% of depressed 
participants being correctly classified.  
Confirmatory Analysis 2 (DSQ Defenses) 
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which 20 defense 
mechanisms (Acting Out, Anticipation, Denial, Devaluation, Displacement, Dissociation, 
Fantasy, Humour, Idealization, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, Pseudoaltruism, 
Rationalization, Reaction Formation, Somatization, Splitting, Sublimation, Suppression, and 
Undoing) from the DSQ could accurately distinguish between participants in the depressed and 
anxious groups. In total, 91 participants in the anxious group and 25 participants in the depressed 
group completed all measures and were included in the analysis. 
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Assumptions. One participant (anxious group) had a univariate outlier score on Neurotic 
Denial (z = 3.44) and this participant was eliminated from the analysis
22
. No participant had a 
Mahalanobis distance larger than the critical χ
2 
for 20 df (45.32) in either group. Splitting was 
significantly kurtotic (z = 3.30) in the depressed group and no other predictor variable was 
skewed or kurtotic in either group. Several transformations were tested (cubed, squared, log10, 
square root, inverse, & inverse squared) and a square root transformation best corrected the 
kurtosis of Splitting without creating skewness or kurtosis problems in either group. Because 
transformation would add a level of complication to comparing the current results to the 
literature and Splitting did not enter into the analysis whether transformed or not, no 
transformation was made for the analysis. The assumption of linearity and homogeneity (p = 
.214 for Box’s M), were met. There were no problems with multicollinearity for individual 
variables (tolerance range = .41 - .77). Of the 21 condition indices, 2 were greater than 30. The 
20
th
 condition index (32.82) had only one variance proportions greater than .50 and no other 
condition index had any variance proportions over .50, which indicates that there was no 
problem with multicollinearity for combinations of variables.  
Results. Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.78, χ
2
 = 27.93, p < .001, which indicates 
that the overall model was able to distinguish between participants in the depressed and anxious 
groups significantly. Five defenses were selected as improving the model that differentiated 
between the groups. The defenses entered in the following order: Reaction Formation, Isolation, 
Undoing, Suppression, and Sublimation. Table 14 presents the standardized coefficients, 
structure coefficients, means and standard deviations for each variable selected in the analysis. 
The standardized coefficients indicated the proportion to which the five defenses uniquely 
contributed to distinguishing between participants in these groups. Classification results 
indicated that the model correctly classified 73.9% of participants overall, with 75.6% of anxious 
and 68.0% of depressed participants being correctly classified. On cross-validation the model 
was unchanged and continued to classify 71.3% of participants overall, with 72.2% of anxious 
and 68.0% of depressed participants being correctly classified. 
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 Results from analyses run with this participant did not meaningfully alter classification rates, although some 
predictors change relative position and Anticipation, Dissociation, and Fantasy are added as a predictor variables. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
Hypothesized Analysis 1 (Defense-Q Individual Defenses) 
 The first hypothesis for Study 2 was that the individual defenses from the Defense-Q that 
were selected from previous research and theory could be used to classify participants into the 
depressed and anxious groups correctly. Probability was set equally, giving each participant a 
50% chance to go into each group. After cross-validation participants were significantly more 
likely than chance to be correctly classified using the defense mechanism information. All four 
of the defenses that were important for classification using the discriminant function (Acting 
Out, Turning Against Self, Projection, & Isolation) were defenses identified in the literature as 
more predominant in people with depression than in people with anxiety. Consistent with these 
findings, all four defenses were more representative of the depressed than the anxious group in 
this analysis. Although Reaction Formation did not have a significant standardized coefficient in 
the present study, it did have a medium sized correlation with the resulting discriminant function. 
An examination of the correlation between the defenses revealed that Reaction Formation had a 
medium correlation with Acting Out, which was already a significant predictor. The medium 
correlation with Acting Out as well as a small significant correlation with Undoing would reduce 
the unique contribution by Reaction Formation and may have been the reason it was not 
identified by the standardized coefficient as a significant unique predictor variable despite the 
significant medium correlation with the resulting discriminant function.  
Previous researchers have identified Acting Out (Hoglend & Perry, 1998), Projection 
(Bronnec et al., 2005; Corruble et al., 2004; Hoglend & Perry, 1998; Holi et al., 1999; Watson, 
2002) and Isolation (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997; Watson, 2002) as defenses found in those 
with higher levels of depressive symptomatology. Moreover, all three of these defenses have 
been found to be used more often by those with depression than those with anxiety (Bloch et al., 
1993; Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997). As was mentioned previously, Turning Against Self is not 
assessed by most defense measures, but has been identified as a predominant defense for 
depression in psychodynamic theory (Freud, 1917/2001; Milrod, 1988; Rudden et al., 2003; 
White & Watt, 1973b). Popular measures such as the DSQ and DMRS incorporate this defense 
into other defenses (i.e., Devaluation & Passive Aggression), thus complicating an integration of 
the theory and research. 
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Combined, the defenses resulted in a correct classification of 72.4% of the anxious 
participants, 68.4% of the depressed participants and 71.4% of the participants overall. This is a 
significantly higher percentage than the 50% probability of which the analysis originally set 
classification. Although defense mechanisms can clearly contribute information to the 
differentiation of those in the depressed and anxious groups, nearly 30% of participants remain 
incorrectly classified. Therefore, while these results are promising and indicate defenses warrant 
further examination of their utility in psychological assessment and diagnosis, the results also 
indicate that defenses alone are not sufficient for making accurate group differentiation for such 
an important task as psychological assessment.  
Hypothesized Analysis 2 (DSQ Individual Defenses) 
 The second hypothesis for Study 2 was that the individual DSQ defenses identified in 
previous research and theory could be used to classify participants into the depressed and 
anxious groups correctly. As was found with the Defense-Q, participants were significantly more 
likely than chance to be classified correctly using the individual DSQ defenses. Three defenses 
(Reaction Formation, Undoing, & Isolation) were identified as important for classification using 
the discriminant function. Two of these defenses (Reaction Formation & Undoing) were 
defenses identified in the literature as being found more predominantly in people with anxiety 
than depression, while the other (Isolation) has been found to be used more by those with 
depression than anxiety. Consistent with previous literature, Reaction Formation and Undoing 
were more representative of the anxious group, while Isolation was more representative of the 
depressed group. As was found with the DSQ, some defenses (i.e., Idealization & Displacement) 
with significant correlations with the resulting discriminant function did not produce significant 
standardized coefficients. Idealization had a medium correlation with Reaction Formation as well 
as a small significant correlation with Acting Out. Similarly, Displacement had small significant 
correlations with Acting Out and Passive Aggression. These correlations with other defenses in 
the analysis may have sufficiently decreased the unique contributions of the defenses to the point 
where they no longer added a sufficient amount of unique information to be significant 
predictors despite their medium correlation with the resulting discriminant function. 
Previous researchers have identified elevated use of Reaction Formation (Andrews, 
Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989) and Undoing (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; 
Birmes et al., 2000; Kipper et al., 2004; 2005; Muris & Merckelbach, 1994; Pollock & Andrews, 
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1989; Watson, 2002; Yuan, Bao Zhang, & Qin Wu, 2002) by those with anxiety. Additionally, 
Isolation has been found to be related to depressive symptomatology (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 
1997; Watson, 2002). In terms of differentiating between the two groups, all three defenses have 
been found to be important in differentiating persons with depression and anxiety (Busch et al., 
1995; Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997). Examining the defenses found to be most important for 
discriminating between the depressed and anxious groups using the self-report DSQ, it seems 
that the discriminant function is more heavily weighted toward anxiety-related defenses than 
toward depression-related defenses. 
As was mentioned, Displacement had a medium correlation with the discriminant 
function. Interestingly, although Displacement has been found to account for a significant 
portion of the variance in depression scores before (Holi et al., 1999; Watson, 2002) it is 
typically considered a defense more related to anxiety (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Holi et 
al., 1999; Pollock & Andrews, 1989; Watson, 2002). In the present study, however, the mean 
score was highest in the depressed as opposed to the anxious group, although this difference was 
not sufficient enough that Displacement uniquely contributed enough to be considered important 
for classification. Looking at the three Displacement items on the DSQ 72, they are “Doctors 
never really understand what is wrong with me”, “When I am depressed or anxious, eating 
makes me feel better” and “I smoke when I am nervous”. One of these items may be assessing 
Displacement of blame to doctors, but the other two items seemingly tap consumption while the 
person is not feeling well. These are not assessing the traditional understanding of Displacement, 
where negative feelings from a threatening target are displaced onto a less threatening target. 
Holi and colleagues (1999) have also noted that items on the DSQ-72 are perhaps more 
indicative of depression-related behaviours than of the defense Displacement. It may be that this 
finding is an artifact of the items on the DSQ Displacement scale. 
Only Isolation was found to be an important predictor across both the Defense-Q and 
DSQ individual defense analyses when using the standardized coefficients. This suggests that 
aspects of Isolation that are apparent both to observers as well as to the individuals themselves 
co-occur with depressive symptomatology and help to differentiate it from anxiety. Interestingly, 
previous researchers using the Defensive Functioning Scale from the DSM have found that the 
defense level containing Isolation is negatively related to depressive symptomatology in a patient 
sample (DeFife & Hilsenroth, 2005). A closer examination of this result, however, reveals that 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 87 
the defensive level contains two other defenses, Intellectualization and Undoing. This is true for 
the DMRS defensive levels as well. While Isolation appears to be related to increased depressive 
symptomatology in the literature, Undoing has been shown to be related to decreased depressive 
symptomatology (Busch et al., 1995). While using defensive levels rather than individual 
defenses can increase the reliability of the scores, it can create problems such as the one 
highlighted here where different defenses within the level have opposite patterns for the relations 
in question. 
Additionally, Reaction Formation was found to be an important predictor for the DSQ 
analysis and had a medium correlation with the Defense-Q discriminant function. When 
differentiating between depression and anxiety on either observer or self-reporting of defenses, it 
may be that Isolation is an important defense for identifying depression, whereas Reaction 
Formation may be important for identifying anxiety. This is tempered somewhat because 
Reaction Formation did not have a significant standardized coefficient in the Defense-Q analysis, 
perhaps in part due to the correlations with Acting Out and Undoing. Further investigation is 
warranted to elucidate the importance of these defenses in differentiation between depression and 
anxiety. 
Combined, the defenses resulted in a correct classification of 64.8% of the anxious 
participants, 64.0% of the depressed participants and 64.7% of the participants overall. As was 
found with the Defense-Q individual defenses, this is a significantly higher percentage than the 
50% probability the analysis originally set classification at. This percentage is somewhat lower 
than the 71.4% overall classification rate for the Defense-Q analysis.  
Hypothesized Analysis 3 (DSQ Defense Styles) 
 The third hypothesis for Study 2 was that the DSQ defense styles could be used to 
classify participants into the depressed and anxious groups correctly. As was found with 
individual defense mechanisms on both the Defense-Q and DSQ, the DSQ defense styles 
resulted in significantly more participants being correctly classified than would be expected by 
chance. Two of three defense styles (Neurotic & Immature) were identified as important for 
classification using the discriminant function while the third defense style (Mature) was 
significantly correlated to the resulting discriminant function. The Mature Defense Style had a 
medium correlation with the Neurotic Defense Style, perhaps resulting in an insufficient amount 
of unique contribution from Mature Defense Style in the classification process. As has been 
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found in the previous literature, the Neurotic Defense Style was more representative of the 
anxious group and the Immature Defense Style was more representative of the depressed group. 
Previous researchers have identified higher reliance on Mature (Flannery & Perry, 1990) 
and Neurotic Defense Styles (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Kipper et al., 2004; 2005; Muris 
& Merckelbach, 1994; Nishimura, 1998; Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997) for those with anxiety 
and higher reliance on Immature Defense Style for those with depression (Akkerman et al., 1992; 
1999; Besser, 2004; Corruble et al., 2003; Flannery & Perry, 1990; Flett et al., 2005; Kennedy et 
al., 2001; Kneepkens & Oakley, 1996; Kwon 2000; Kwon & Lemon, 2000; McMahon et al., 
2005; Milgrom & Beatrice, 2003; Mullen et al., 1999; Nishimura, 198; Oakley et al., 2005; 
Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997). Notably, although some previous researchers (e.g., Gothelf et al., 
1995) have indicated that all disorders share an elevated use of immature defenses, the Immature 
Defense Style in the present study was still important for differentiation. Although an elevated 
use of immature defenses may be characteristic of all disorders, it is seemingly even more 
characteristic of depression than of anxiety. In addition, similar to the results from the individual 
defenses, the discriminant function resulting from the self-report DSQ defense styles is more 
heavily weighted toward the anxiety-related defense styles than the depression related style.  
With regard to differentiation between the two types of disorders previous researchers 
have found neurotic or midlevel defense styles (i.e., Self-sacrificing) to be higher in those with 
anxiety than the comparison group of those with depression (Kennedy et al., 2001; Spinhoven & 
Kooiman, 1997). While immature defenses have been found to be higher in both persons with 
depression and persons with anxiety, Bond (2004) argues that evidence suggests neurotic 
defenses (unlike mature or immature defenses) such as Reaction Formation, Pseudoaltruism, 
Primitive Idealization and Undoing are stable across pre- to post-treatment for depression. The 
present results confirm that elevated levels of neurotic defenses, might be an important way to 
differentiate those with anxiety from those with depression. Additionally, the present results 
suggest that although both depression and anxiety might be related to elevated use of immature 
defenses, it appears that those with depression may have even more elevated levels than those 
with anxiety. 
Combined, the defense styles resulted in a correct classification of 64.8% of the anxious 
participants, 64.0% of the depressed participants and 64.7% of the participants overall. This 
percentage for each group as well as overall is the same percentage as was correctly classified 
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with the individual DSQ defenses. If this finding that defensive levels may correctly classify 
participants into depressed or anxious groups at the same rate as individual defenses, this may 
help to avoid some of the difficulties with reliability of individual defenses. However, as noted 
before the measures with the most difficulty with reliability of individual defenses tend to be 
observer report measures. Also, as was noted by the work of DeFife and Hilsenroth (2005) 
above, the defensive levels containing some of the key differentiating individual defenses are 
confounded by containing defenses with differing patterns of relations to depression and anxiety. 
More research is needed to understand the benefits and costs to using levels as opposed to 
individual defenses for differentiating between those with depression and anxiety. It is possible 
that this is less problematic in the defense levels of the DSQ than it is in those levels identified in 
the DMRS. Additionally, while the Defense-Q does not currently have defensive levels to assess, 
the individual defenses provided a higher rate of correct classification than either the defense 
styles or individual defenses on the DSQ. 
Confirmatory Analysis 1 (Defense-Q Individual Defenses) 
 The first of the confirmatory analyses was intended to highlight which defenses from the 
Defense-Q best differentiated between the depressed and anxious groups. It was anticipated that 
the defenses that best differentiated would be the same defenses highlighted in the previous 
literature, and specifically the ones used in the first discriminant analysis in this study. Eleven of 
the 25 Defense-Q defenses were important for classification, including the four defenses from 
the first analysis (Acting Out, Turning Against Self, Projection, & Isolation), one defense that 
was hypothesized in the initial analysis but did not reach significance (Idealization), and six 
other defenses (Repression, Fantasy, Turning Against Others, Dissociation, Psychotic Denial, & 
Neurotic Denial). 
 Two of the 11 defenses (Idealization & Dissociation) were more representative of the 
anxiety group, while the remaining defenses were more representative of the depressed group. Of 
the seven other defenses found to differentiate in the stepwise discriminant analysis but not in the 
standard discriminant analysis, Turning Against Others and Psychotic Denial are not typically 
assessed by other defense measures. Additionally, although Dissociation has been found to be 
related to anxiety scores by other researchers (Holi et al., 1999) the conceptualization for 
Dissociation on the DSQ as well as on the DMRS is substantially different than the 
conceptualization of Dissociation on the Defense-Q. This makes it difficult to compare the 
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current findings to the limited previous findings about the relation of Dissociation to depression 
and anxiety. With regard to other defenses, however, persons with anxiety have been found to 
have elevated use of Idealization, (Kipper et al., 2005; Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997; Watson, 
2002), while those with depression have been found to have elevated use of Fantasy (Bronnec et 
al., 2005; Corruble et al., 2005; Holi et al., 1999; Watson, 2002), and Neurotic Denial (Bronnec 
et al., 2005; Corruble et al., 2005).  
No research has previously found a relation between Repression and either depression or 
anxiety scores. This may be because the DSQ does not assess Repression, in part because of the 
previously mentioned difficulties with self-reporting an inability to remember something 
(Besser, 2004; Brody et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 1991; Cramer 1998a; 1998b; Joiner et al., 2000; 
Kwon, 1999; Norem, 1998; Skodol & Perry, 1993), which is a key component of the 
conceptualization or Repression. Although the DMRS does assess Repression, it is grouped in 
with Dissociation, Reaction Formation, and Displacement, all of which have been identified in 
the current research as defenses that are more associated with elevated levels of anxiety than of 
depression. This is another example of potential difficulties of attempting to differentiate 
between disorders based on defensive levels. In this case, while three of the defenses are 
primarily related to anxiety, the remaining defense is more related to depression. 
 As was mentioned earlier, defense mechanism measures sometimes conceptualize some 
defenses slightly differently. Although Devaluation and Passive Aggression have often been 
found to be frequently used defenses by those with depression, it was determined that the 
components of these two defenses that was accounting for the elevated use were the aspects of 
Turning Against Self that had been incorporated into their conceptualization. As would be 
expected, neither Devaluation nor Passive Aggression on the Defense-Q was indicated as an 
important defense in this stepwise analysis despite the discriminant function relying heavily on 
depression-related defenses. This, combined with the finding that Turning Against Self had the 
second highest standardized coefficient in the analysis, supports the theoretical argument that 
Turning Against Self is an important defense in understanding depression and it should be 
attended to when attempting to understand the defensive functioning of an individual with 
depression. 
The stepwise analysis improved the classification rate somewhat over the initial 
hypothesized analysis for the Defense-Q. Combined, the defenses resulted in a correct 
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classification of 75.4% of the anxious participants, 73.7% of the depressed participants and 
75.0% of the participants overall. As would be expected by adding more possible predictor 
variables and entering them based on maximizing the classification rather than on theory, this 
classification rate is slightly higher than was found in the hypothesized Defense-Q analysis. 
Although it correctly classified more participants, it only improved the overall classification rate 
by 3.6%, suggesting the originally hypothesized defenses from research and theory came close to 
maximizing the differentiation between the depressed and anxious groups. 
Confirmatory Analysis 2 (DSQ Individual Defenses) 
 Unlike the previous confirmatory analysis, which produced a large number of individual 
defenses that contributed to the differentiation between the depressed and anxious groups, the 
second confirmatory analysis produced only five individual DSQ defenses that were important 
for classification. The initial three defenses from the previous DSQ individual defenses analysis 
(Reaction Formation, Undoing, & Isolation) were again important for differentiation, as were 
Sublimation and Suppression. Reaction Formation, Sublimation, and Undoing were all more 
representative of the anxious group and Isolation and Suppression were more representative of 
the depressed group.  
 Whereas the Defense-Q discriminant function was weighted toward depression-related 
defenses, the DSQ discriminant function was weighted toward anxiety-related defenses. This 
was true for both the hypothesized as well as the confirmatory analyses. Numerous reasons for 
this difference are possible. For example, it may be that observational measures better tap 
observable aspects of depression than anxiety, making the defenses related to depression more 
crucial to differentiating between the two. Similarly, the internal aspects of anxiety including 
worrying and mental ruminations might be more easily accessible via self-report, thus making 
these defenses more crucial for differentiating with self-report measures. Additional research is 
required to explain and explore the importance of this finding more fully. 
 Interestingly, although the two confirmatory analyses identified 16 defenses across the 
two measures that were important for differentiating between the depressed and anxious groups, 
only Isolation was identified across both measures using the standardized coefficients. On both 
the observer report Defense-Q and the self-report DSQ Isolation was used more frequently by 
those in the depressed group than those in the anxious group. This further supports the 
conclusion from the hypothesized analyses 1 and 2 that aspects of Isolation that are apparent to 
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both external observers as well as internally to the person are important to differentiating 
depression from anxiety. 
Research related to Reaction Formation, Undoing, and Isolation was reviewed after 
Hypothesized Analysis 2. The two defenses that have been added to the differentiation (i.e., 
Sublimation & Suppression) are both considered mature defenses. Suppression has been found to 
be negatively related to depression (Bronnec et al., 2005; Milgrom & Beatrice, 2003; Muris & 
Merckelbach, 1994; Watson, 2002) and anxiety (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 1993; Pollock & 
Andrews, 1989). Sublimation, on the other hand, has been found to be negatively related to both 
depression (Bronnec et al., 2005; Corruble et al., 2004) and anxiety (Andrews, Singh, & Bond, 
1993; Pollock & Andrews, 1989), but has also been found to be positively related to anxiety 
(Kipper et al., 2004; 2005). Kipper and colleagues argued that their finding that patients with 
anxiety used Sublimation more than their control group was likely indicative of a greater usage 
of defenses overall compared to the people in the control group, who were not experiencing any 
psychological difficulties. In the present study, it may be that participants in the anxiety group 
are using Sublimation more often than their counterparts in the depressed group, but perhaps not 
more than persons with no psychological disorder. Regardless, it appears that higher scores on 
Sublimation and lower scores on Suppression are important for classifying participants in the 
anxious rather than depressed group. More research is warranted to clarify the inconsistent 
pattern of relations between anxiety symptomatology and mature defense mechanisms further. 
Research including a control group of psychologically healthy participants will assist in 
clarifying these relations. 
Overall Summary of Study 2 
As was mentioned previously, although there are numerous studies looking individually 
at defense use in either depression or anxiety, there is very limited research examining the 
differences in defense use between the two types of disorders. Research has previously 
demonstrated that those with depression score higher on Acting Out, Devaluation, 
Hypochondriasis, Isolation, Passive Aggression, Projection, and Projective Identification and 
score lower on Idealization, Reaction Formation, and Undoing than do persons with anxiety 
(Bloch et al., 1993; Busch et al., 1995, Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997). The results of the current 
study also found Acting Out, Isolation, Projection, Idealization, Reaction Formation, and 
Undoing to be important when differentiating between the two types of disorders. The only two 
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defenses (excluding ones not assessed by either the Defense-Q or DSQ) that were previously 
found to be important in differentiating depression and anxiety and were not replicated on one of 
the measures in the present investigation were Devaluation and Passive Aggression. As was 
mentioned previously, these two defenses incorporate aspects of Turning Against Self when 
assessed on the DMRS, which was the measure used in that study. In the present research, 
Turning Against the Self was found to be important for differentiation using the Defense-Q. 
In addition to the previously mentioned defenses, the confirmatory analyses highlighted 
several other defenses that may be important when differentiating depression from anxiety. 
Repression had not been found to be related to either depression or anxiety, but was heavily 
weighted (as representative of depression) in the discriminant function from the Defense-Q 
analysis. In addition, other defenses not previously found to differentiate between depression and 
anxiety were found to be important in the two analyses. Namely, Fantasy, Turning Against 
Others, Dissociation, Psychotic Denial, Neurotic Denial, Suppression, and Sublimation all 
warrant further investigation to examine the extent to which they contribute to the differentiation 
between depression and anxiety in other samples. 
In terms of previous literature looking specifically at differences in defense level 
functioning between persons with depression and anxiety, the results of the present study are 
largely similar. Both studies using the DSQ (Spinhoven & Kooiman, 1997; Kennedy et al., 2001) 
found neurotic level defenses (i.e., Neurotic Defense Style & Self-sacrificing Defense Style) to 
be higher in those with anxiety than those with depression. Result from hypothesized analysis 3 
similarly found Neurotic Defense Style to be the predominant predictor in differentiating 
between these two groups. Additionally, the current results identified the Immature Defense 
Style as an important predictor in group differentiation. This was not found in the 
aforementioned studies, but is consistent with the third study examining this area (i.e., Bloch et 
al., 1993), which used the DMRS. Bloch and colleagues found use of 3 of the 4 most 
maladaptive defense styles on the DMRS (i.e., Narcissistic, Disavowal, & Action) to be 
significantly higher in those with depression compared to those with anxiety. 
Similarly, the results from hypothesized analyses 1 and 2 were largely consistent with the 
results from previous studies comparing persons with depression and anxiety. Spinhoven and 
Kooiman (1997) found higher scores on Isolation in the depression group and higher scores 
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Idealization in anxiety group using the DSQ. Hypothesized analysis 2 identified Isolation as an 
important predictor and Idealization had a structure coefficient of .49.  
The observer report measures also performed similarly across the previous and current 
research. Only two of the six defenses (Acting Out & Projection) that were previously found to 
be different across groups were common between the DMRS and Defense-Q (Bloch et al., 1993). 
Both of these defenses were found to be important in the differentiation between these groups in 
hypothesized analysis 1. These two defenses were among the top three defenses in relative 
importance for differentiation with the Defense-Q, with the third defense being Turning Against 
Self. Turning Against Self is encompassed in Passive Aggression and Devaluation on the 
DMRS, both of which were also among the six defenses Bloch and colleagues found to be 
significantly different between those with depression and anxiety. Finally, Busch and colleagues 
(1995) also found Reaction Formation and Undoing to be higher in the anxiety group than the 
depression group using the DMRS. Although Reaction Formation had a structure coefficient of -
.43, neither defense was considered important in the final differentiation between groups using 
the Defense-Q when looking at the standardized coefficients. This may have been partially 
attributable to the discriminant function of the Defense-Q being primarily weighted with 
depression-related defenses. The hypothesized analysis 2 with the DSQ was primarily weighted 
with anxiety-related defenses and included both of these defenses in the most important defenses 
for classification. 
Overall the classification rates were roughly similar between observer and self-report 
measures, with observational measures perhaps having a slightly higher correct classification 
rate. Whether this is a function of observer report measures in general or of the Defense-Q in 
particular remains to be determined. Future research should include the DMRS as well to 
examine whether the extra time and training required for observationally assessing defenses is 
worth the resulting difference in correct classification rates
23
. 
Finally, since the time that the original literature review was completed and the 
hypotheses developed for the present study, a recent article was added to the PsychINFO search 
engine. Blaya and colleagues (2006) used a stepwise discriminant analysis to assess the extent to 
which defense mechanisms from the DSQ could be used to classify patients diagnosed with 
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 The interested reader is directed to Appendix K for a stepwise discriminant analysis including both Defense-Q and 
DSQ defenses. 
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either anxiety or depression correctly. After using the same cross-validation used in the present 
study, they found 63.9% of participants were correctly classified as controls, 53.6% were 
correctly classified as depressed, 21.2% were correctly classified in the social anxiety group, 
43.0% in the panic disorder group, and 40.7% in the obsessive compulsive disorder group. With 
regard to individual defenses, Projection was the most characteristic defense for those in the 
Major Depressive Disorder group, Sublimation was the most characteristic defense for the Panic 
Disorder group, and Acting Out was the most characteristic defense for the Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder group. Although a most characteristic defense was listed for each disorder, 
the authors note that “one anxiety disorder patient could hardly be differentiated from another” 
(p. 182). 
Projection being related to depression and Sublimation being related to anxiety is 
consistent with the results of the confirmatory analyses in Study 2. However, the finding that 
Acting Out is the most characteristic defense for those with OCD is opposite to what would be 
expected from the results of the present study. Although Andrews, Singh, and Bond (1993) 
previously found those with OCD to have the highest scores on Acting Out among patients with 
Panic Disorder, Social Phobia, and OCD, no previous findings have indicated that Acting Out 
would be found to be more indicative of an anxiety disorder than of depression. Indeed, Bloch 
and colleagues (1993) found Acting Out to be an important depression-related defense in 
differentiating depression from anxiety. More research is needed to determine whether this 
finding regarding Acting Out is anomalous and perhaps attributable to the capitalization of 
chance differences that sometimes happens with a stepwise analysis, or whether Acting Out is 
more indicative of OCD than depression in some circumstances. Additionally, incorporation of 
an observer report measure would have helped to determine if the result that persons with 
anxiety disorders had largely similar defensive functioning was an artifact of the self-report 
assessment as previously hypothesized, or whether it represents actual similarities in persons 
with these disorders. Finally, this research added further support for a higher usage of some 
adaptive defenses (i.e., Sublimation) in persons with Panic Disorder than in control participants. 
Addressing the question of whether this is due to an overall increase in activation of defenses or 
a relative increased use of Sublimation remains unanswered. Future researchers should consider 
using a measure such as the Defense-Q that assesses relative use of defenses to clarify this 
continuing question in the literature. 
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General Discussion 
Comparison Between Observer and Self-report 
 Taking the results of Study 1 and Study 2 together, the general theme is that there is a 
substantial difference between what is being assessed on observer and self-report measures of 
defenses. This is generally consistent with previous findings comparing the two types of 
measures, but is problematic for researchers wishing to combine findings from the literature 
across measures. In Study 1 there was little overlap between similarly named defenses when 
compared in the same sample. Moreover, differentiation between participants in the depression 
and anxiety groups in Study 2 resulted in only a single defense being common to both observer 
and self-report predictor variables. Despite the limited overlap, defenses from both the observer 
and self-report analyses were largely consistent with both theory and previous research combined 
from observer and self-report measures. This bolsters the argument above that, despite the 
limited overlap, both observer and self-report measures of defenses may be assessing different 
aspects of the same constructs. This conclusion supports the current trend in the literature to use 
multiple methods when empirically assessing defenses. 
Can Defenses aid in the Differentiation of Depression and Anxiety? 
In her seminal book on defenses, Anna Freud (1995) wrote that “there is a regular 
connection between particular neuroses and special modes of defense” (p. 34). Decades later this 
argument is still being investigated. In general, the results from the present study support Anna 
Freud’s original argument. Defense mechanisms assessed through both observer and self-report 
can be used to classify participants into either the depressed or anxious group. Although this 
classification rate is significantly better than chance, approximately 25% of participants 
remained incorrectly classified even with the most accurate of the discriminant functions. 
Perhaps the standard of conducting assessment on defenses alone is too high to meet. 
Psychological assessment is a complex task, often requiring several sources of information, 
including interviews, observation, informant information, and self-report questionnaires. It may 
be that although decisions cannot be made on defensive functioning alone, they may be a useful 
addition to the list of other sources of information considered during assessments. The results of 
this study indicate that defenses can be useful in discriminating those with depression from those 
with anxiety, but the results further indicate that measurement issues across all measures will 
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need to be addressed before assessment at the individual defense level is reliable enough to 
warrant a prominent role in diagnosis. 
Measurement Issues 
 Defense mechanisms have long been noted for their difficulty of being assessed. In their 
1989 paper, Bond, Perry and colleagues noted that over more than a decade of trying to measure 
the “elusive” defense mechanism, substantial measurement error remained. Although 
improvements have been made to both Bond’s DSQ and Perry’s DMRS, both measures remain 
largely below the level of acceptable reliability at the individual defense level. With the DSQ, 
the movement beyond the 88-item version has improved psychometric properties somewhat, and 
this work continues with the emergence of even newer revisions of the DSQ (e.g., DSQ-60; 
Kramer et al., 2007; Trijsburg, Bond, Drapeau, Thygesen, & de Roten, 2005). The DMRS has 
also been revised several times since its inception, and new changes adding more defenses at the 
most pathological extreme as well as making the measure into a Q-sort measure more like the 
Defense-Q are underway (J. C. Perry, personal communication, March 20, 2008). Additionally, 
MacGregor, Olson, Presniak, and Davidson (2008) have recently revised the coding manual for 
the Defense-Q. While the revisions to the DSQ and DMRS have been more at the structural 
level, the Defense-Q revisions were focused on increasing clarity and ease of use of the measure. 
These improvements were specifically targeted at decreasing the measurement difficulties that 
have long been associated with defense assessment. Overall the predominant measures to assess 
defenses each fall short in terms of measurement issues when assessing individual defenses. Low 
reliability numbers makes understanding exactly what is being assessed a difficult question 
despite some convergence across the measures. 
Limitations and Strengths 
One of the limitations of Study 1 is that the DMRS was only coded by a single coder. 
While multiple people were brought in for training, only one coder successfully completed the 
training and coded the interviews using the DMRS. This is one of the limitations of observation 
defense research. It often takes considerable investment to get researchers trained to code 
defenses reliably. In the case of the present investigation, several attempts to train additional 
coders resulted in additional coders completing part, but not all of the training before 
discontinuing. Future comparisons between the DMRS and other defense measures would 
benefit from having several coders’ scores combined as was done with the Defense-Q in the 
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present investigation or have several “consensus” profiles combined as has been described in 
other research (e.g., Perry, 1990; Perry & Henry, 2004). This would likely increase the reliability 
of the individual defenses and produce a more accurate defense profile. 
Despite having three coders for the Defense-Q, the reliability of the individual defenses 
could be improved. Defenses for the participants in the current study were coded along with 
defenses for participants for other related studies. This may have resulted in coders being 
required to code hundreds of 15 minute interviews over the year. This is a substantial 
commitment to ask of volunteer research assistants in terms of time. Defense coding is a 
mentally taxing activity and coding large data sets may reduce the cognitive sharpness of the 
coder over long periods of coding. Coding smaller numbers of interviews may allow for more 
focus and perhaps more accuracy in the defense coding. As was mentioned above, the Defense-Q 
coding manual has been revised since the data were collected for this investigation (MacGregor 
et al., 2008). While conceptualizations and core of the measure remain largely unchanged, the 
manual has been expanded and reorganized in an attempt to improve reliability for the individual 
defense mechanisms. Other procedures, such as coding with previously constructed transcripts of 
the interviews have been incorporated to help reduce the load on the coder and allow them to 
focus more completely on the task at hand. It is hoped that these steps will improve reliability of 
individual defense mechanisms for future research. 
A third limitation of the present study is that the sample is related to the generalizability 
of the findings. The sample was entirely university students and predominately Caucasian 
females. The decision to use a university sample not only restricts the range of severity of the 
disorders (i.e., the most severely depressed individuals might not be coming to school or not 
volunteering for research credit projects), but also restricts the age range of the participants. The 
extent to which the present results extend beyond a primarily female, Caucasian, late-teens or 
early-20s sample of university students remains to be seen. While the scores of the individuals do 
indicate they were experiencing psychological difficulties, further work on more diverse clinical 
and community samples would be beneficial. Moreover, while the results of numerous studies 
using the DSQ across several different countries (see Appendix A for list of countries) provide 
some convergent evidence of defensive functioning, the present research warrants replication 
across several other cultures. Results from Blaya and colleagues (2006) were comparable to 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 99 
results from the present study, however, supporting the claim that the results may be 
generalizable to older samples of mental health patients in a Brazilian sample. 
One of the biggest strengths of the present investigation is the scale on which it was 
conducted. Over 1000 students completed the psychological assessment measure with which the 
groups were formed. This allowed for using actual clinical cut-offs rather than merely elevated 
scores and allowed for discarding of any participants that were elevated on both depression and 
anxiety or who had suspect PAI profiles. Considering the comorbidity of the disorders, only a 
large scale project would allow for that degree of selectiveness. Additionally, the time required 
on the part of researchers to interview all the participants (5-7 interviewers), to code the 
interviews for attractiveness (2 coders) and defenses using the Defense-Q (3 coders) and the 
DMRS (1 coder) was extensive. The large scale of the investigation, however, was required to 
provide sufficient data to answer the research questions. 
Additionally, the present investigation not only used multiple methods to assess defenses, 
it also addressed a long-standing gap in the literature by further investigating the relation among 
some of the most frequently used measures of defense mechanisms. It is curious how sparse the 
literature is investigating how these measures relate to each other, especially given that the few 
studies that have been published indicate that there are far more differences than there are 
similarities. The present investigation compared four defense measures to each other before 
moving to the important question of how useful defense mechanisms are in differentiating 
depression from anxiety. Although there have been numerous calls in the literature to use the 
multi-method approach to assessing defenses (Besser, 2004; Bond et al., 1989; Davidson & 
MacGregor, 1998; Offer et al., 2000), few recent studies have invested the resources to do it.  
Finally, not only did the present study compare multiple methods of assessing defenses, it 
also included an important measure to rule out a possible confound. Although other authors (e.g., 
Davidson et al., 2004) have noted the possibility that the physical attractiveness of the participant 
might impact the coder’s perception of the maturity of the participant’s defense use, no authors 
have empirically investigated this possibility. The present research had independent coders rate 
the attractiveness of the participants and it was determined that the coders were assessing 
defenses free from bias related to the attractiveness of the participant. This was previously 
assumed but can now be stated with more confidence. 
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Future Directions 
One important future direction for defense research is to examine how defense measures 
relate to each other further. The present study suggests that individual defense mechanisms on 
observer and self-report measures share little overlap on similarly named defenses. This is 
similar to previous research comparing the two types of measures (Bond et al., 1989). Further 
exploring these relations after addressing some compounding factors (e.g., reliability of 
individual defenses on observer report measures) will help to understand and interpret defensive 
functioning from various types of assessment better. Expanding this knowledge to other types of 
defense assessment (e.g., projective) is important. Research utilizing projective (e.g., Defense 
Mechanisms Manual & Rorschach Defense Scales), observer (e.g., Defense-Q & DMRS), and 
self-report (e.g., DSQ & DMI) measures of defenses together in a sample of control and clinical 
groups would greatly add to the understanding of how different defense measures relate to each 
other and would assist in interpreting the current body of literature. 
 Secondly, although the participants in the current investigation scored in the clinical 
range on the relevant PAI scales, replicating the investigation in a clinical sample is important. 
While convenient for research use, it is possible that university students reporting some 
symptomatology on a self-report measure may not have the same pattern of defensive 
functioning as patients seeking psychological services. Conducting the discriminant analyses in 
patients diagnosed with one type of disorder but not the other will either help to confirm the 
findings of the present investigation or to highlight potentially important differences between 
patients and university students endorsing symptomatology on a self-report measure. While 
Blaya and colleagues (2006) have completed some of this work with a self-report measure, 
replicating their work with an observer report measure as well will be important, especially 
considering the differences in results from the present study. 
A final important area for future research is replicating the research design with other 
disorders. Depression and anxiety are only two of several groups of disorders that are difficult to 
differentiate in psychological assessments. Future work on disorders such as Axis II personality 
disorders will further elucidate how useful defenses are in the assessment of psychological 
disorders. In addition to investigating other disorders, separating anxiety disorders and 
examining the utility of defenses in differentiating within the anxiety disorder spectrum might 
help to clarify whether there are identifiably different defense profiles for different anxiety 
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disorders. Although Blaya and colleagues (2006) found little difference between these disorders 
on their recent research, adding an observational measure might help to clarify any differences 
between different anxiety disorders. This future research might extend the current design by 
using multiple groups including separate anxiety disorder groups and group of psychologically 
healthy individuals. To be maximally useful, clinicians would need to be able to differentiate 
between numerous types of psychological disorders based on defense mechanism profiles. 
General Summary 
Although the results from the present study confirm that mental disorders can be 
differentiated by examining the differences in defensive functioning, several points must be 
remembered. First, defense mechanisms are, as Spinhoven and colleagues (1995) put it, “elusive, 
complex, and subtle processes” (p. 133). Researchers and psychodynamic theorists cannot agree 
on the number of defenses that exist or agree on how to define certain defenses. Researchers and 
clinicians must be aware of the elusive nature of defenses and combine methods of assessing 
them to maximize the potential of getting a more complete understanding of a person’s defensive 
functioning. Until such time as a consensus is reached on defense conceptualizations, it will be 
important for researchers and clinicians to pay attention to differences in which defenses are 
assessed by a measure (e.g., does the measure assess Turning Against Self if you are examining 
depression) as well as how those defenses are conceptualized. 
If the Defensive Functioning Scale from the DSM-IV-TR moves from its status as a 
proposed axis for further study to full axis status, the DFS defense conceptualizations will be the 
clear favourite in conceptualizations for other measures to follow. The present study has added 
evidence that defenses can be useful in differentiating between similar mental disorders with 
numerous overlapping symptoms. This, combined with the emerging research on defenses in 
treatment of mental disorders, adds support to the role of defenses in understanding 
psychopathology. More research needs to be done to explore the role of defenses in assessment 
and treatment of mental disorders further, but the results of this and other studies demonstrate a 
promising groundwork from which to build. 
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Appendix B 
Defense-Q Scoring Sheet           
 
Coder ID number and name  ____________________________________  
Coder sex    ____________________________________ 
  
Interviewer ID number  ____________________________________ 
Interviewer sex   ____________________________________ 
 
Participant ID number  ____________________________________ 
Participant sex   ____________________________________ 
 
Tape number    ____________________________________ 
 
Instructions 
Q-sort the 25 defense mechanisms into seven piles with 1, 2, 5, 9, 5, 2, 1, cards in each pile.  The 
cards are sorted according to whether they are characteristic of the individual you are assessing.  
Once you are finished, record the number of the defense mechanisms in the appropriate spaces 
below the category headings. 
 
Uncharacteristic   Neither Characteristic  Characteristic 
     nor Uncharacteristic  
Most (1), Quite (2)    (9)    Somewhat (5) 
Somewhat (5)         Quite (2), Most (1) 
 
 
___          ___  ___   ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ ___  ___  ___  ___  ___ 
 
___  ___  ___  ___  ___         ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___                  ___ 
 
 
Next rate the individual’s overall defensiveness, in terms of : 1) how effective the defenses are 
(in quelling anxiety), 2) the individual’s need for defenses (i.e., how much unresolved anxiety is 
present), and 3) how active are the individual’s defenses typically (i.e., is the person generally 
“defensive” or “non-defensive”). 
     Low         Medium      High 
Typical effectiveness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Typical need for defenses  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Typical activation   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Indicate the degree of confidence you have in the accuracy of the ratings you made of this 
individual at this time. 
     Low         Medium      High 
Confidence in rating   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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Appendix C 
Mean, standard deviation, range, and inter-rater reliability of Defense-Q scores (Study 1). 
Defense-Q score                          M                SD                 Range              ICC  
ADP Similarity Score .43 .22 -0.22 – 0.78 .76 
Acting Out 2.52 .82 1.00 – 5.00 .59 
Devaluation 4.00 .87 2.33 – 6.00 .47 
Displacement 3.73 .37 3.00 – 5.00 .07 
Dissociation 3.89 .75 2.00 – 6.00 .54 
Fantasy 3.96 .37 3.00 – 5.00 .40 
Grandiosity 3.93 .91 2.00 – 6.67 .69 
Humour 5.08 1.08 1.67 – 7.00 .79 
Idealization 3.90 .49 2.67 – 5.00 .30 
Identification 3.45 .86 1.50 – 6.00 .63 
Intellectualization 2.93 .97 1.00 – 5.67 .68 
Isolation 4.44 1.45 1.33 – 7.00 .80 
Neurotic Denial 4.27 .99 2.00 – 6.67 .64 
Passive Aggression 4.18 .87 2.33 – 7.00 .73 
Projection 4.03 .44 3.00 – 5.33 .25 
Pseudoaltruism 4.15 .91 1.67 – 6.00 .69 
Psychotic Denial 2.18 .68 1.00 – 4.00 .38 
Rationalization 5.28 .92 3.33 – 7.00 .66 
Reaction Formation 3.72 .77 1.67 – 5.33 .66 
Regression 4.44 .92 2.67 – 7.00 .70 
Repression 4.49 1.16 2.00 – 7.00 .77 
Splitting 3.40 .58 2.00 – 5.00 .17 
Sublimation 4.20 .91 2.00 – 6.67 .71 
Turning Against Others 4.65 .79 2.50 – 7.00 .65 
Turning Against Self 4.43 .81 2.33 – 6.67 .53 
Undoing 4.72 1.09 2.67 – 7.00 .76 
 
Note. ICC = intraclass correlation coefficients. ICCs were conducted using a two-way random 
effects model. n = 129. Mean ICC = .57 
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Appendix D 
Defense Mechanism Rating Scale scoring sheet  
             Total    Qual # 
       #      & letter 
7 HIGH ADAPTIVE LEVEL[51-66]   
  Affiliation     (51)     Aff  _ ____ _______ 
  Altruism        (53) Alt  _ ____ _______         
  Anticipation     (55) Ant  _ ____ _______         
  Self-assertion    (57)      SA  _ ____ _______          
  Humor     (59)  H  _ ____ _______           
  Self-observation         (61)       Defense SO  _ ____ _______          
  Sublimation             (63)    Subtotal  Weight Sub  _ ____ _______         
  Suppression    (65) Sup  _ ____ _______         
              High Adapt      x 7 = ____    
6 OBSESSIONAL [45-50]  
  Isolation     (45) Iso  _ ____ _______         
  Intellectualization   (47) Intel  _ ____ _______       
  Undoing     (49)  Undo  _ ____ _______        
       Obsession       x 6 = ____    
5 OTHER NEUROTIC [36-44] 
  Repression             (36) Rep  _ ____ _______         
  Dissociation             (38) Diss  _ ____ _______        
  Reaction Formation        (41) RF  _ ____ _______          
  Displacement             (43) Displ  _ ____ _______       
         Other Neurotic _____ x 5 = ____    
4 MINOR IMAGE-DISTORTING (Narcissistic)[30-35] 
  Devaluation of self  (30)                        S-Dev  _ ____                 
  Devaluation of others  (30) O-Dev  _ ____ _______       
  Idealization of others     (32)                        O-Ideal  _ ____              
  Idealization of self       (32) S-Ideal  _ ____ _______       
  Omnipotence             (34) Omnip  _ ____ _______       
          Minor Image ___   x 4 = ____    
3 DISAVOWAL [22-27] 
  Neurotic Denial           (22) Den  _ ____ _______         
  Projection            (24) Proj  _ ____ _______        
  Rationalization           (26) Rat  _ ____ _______         
        Disavow    x 3 =_____       
  Fantasy [28-29]       (28) Fan  _ ____ _______         
        Fantasy _      x 3 =_____     
2 MAJOR IMAGE DISTORTING (Borderline) [16-20] 
  Splitting (Others' Image) (16)                         Splt-O  _ ____               
  Splitting (Self image) (16)  Splt-S  _ ____ _______        
  Projective Identification (19)  ProjId  _ ____ _______        
    Major Image   x 2 =_____     
1 ACTION [7-14] 
  Acting Out             (07) AO  _ ____ _______          
  Passive Aggression  (10) P-Agg  _ ____ _______       
  Hypochondriasis (HRC)  (13)  HRC  _ ____ _______         
          Action       x 1 =      
 
a. Sum of Defenses x Weights          _____      
b. Total # of Defenses         ______        
c. Overall Defensive Functioning (1=low, 7 = high)a/b = __.___ 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 
 
121 
Appendix E 
Mean, standard deviation, and range of DMRS weighted scores (Study 1). 
DMRS score                                M                  SD                    Range                
ODF 5.18 0.54 3.50 – 6.50 
High Adaptive 27.73 15.44 0.00 – 70.00 
Obsessional 21.63 13.38 0.00 – 54.00 
Other Neurotic 13.06 8.85 0.00 – 40.00 
Minor Image Distorting 7.16 7.08 0.00 – 28.00 
Disavowal 8.35 6.28 0.00 – 30.00 
Fantasy sublevel 0.93 1.71 0.00 – 6.00 
Major Image Distorting 0.11 4.46 0.00 – 2.00 
Action 0.32 0.70 0.00 – 3.00 
 
Note. DMRS = Defense Mechanism Rating Scales. Weighted score = number of times a defense in 
that level was coded as present multiplied by the weight of the level (e.g., High Adaptive = 7, Action 
= 1). Possible ODF scores range from 1 – 7. No inter-rater reliability scores were calculated because 
only 1 coder completed data collection. n = 129. 
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Appendix F 
Mean, standard deviation, range, number of items, and internal consistency of DSQ scores (Study 1). 
DSQ score                                            M              SD                   Range               Items          IC  
Overall Defensive Functioning 3.47 .33 2.82 – 4.48 72 .84 
Mature Defense Style 58.15 9.06 35.00 – 82.00 10 .43 
Neurotic Defense Style 73.11 14.69 32.00  – 106.00 16 .63 
Immature Defense Style 166.67 36.89 84.00  – 258.00 46 .85 
Acting Out  26.01 8.50 6.00  - 48.00 6 .66 
Altruism  12.32 3.37 3.00  - 18.00 2 .30 
Anticipation 11.37 3.38 3.00  - 18.00 2 .32 
Autistic Fantasy  5.46 2.54 1.00  - 9.00 1 - 
Denial  5.50 .24 2.00  - 13.00 2 -.20 
Devaluation  12.16 3.78 3.00  - 23.00 3 -.04 
Displacement  10.12 4.97 3.00  - 26.00 3 .23 
Dissociation  10.04 4.74 3.00  - 24.00 3 .32 
Humor 12.90 3.45 4.00  - 18.00 2 .51 
Idealization  16.40 5.20 3.00  - 27.00 3 .33 
Isolation  14.78 6.17 4.00  - 35.00 4 .43 
Passive Aggression  31.97 7.61 1.00  - 52.00 8 .36 
Projection  26.88 9.78 10.00  - 60.00 10 .73 
Rationalization  4.36 2.31 1.00  - 9.00 1 - 
Reaction Formation  33.46 9.29 15.00  - 56.00 8 .60 
Somatization 8.74 4.41 2.00  – 18.00 2 .58 
Splitting  10.65 4.59 3.00  - 22.00 3 .48 
Sublimation  16.90 4.18 4.00  - 27.00 3 .24 
Suppression 16.98 4.53 4.00  - 27.00 3 .26 
Undoing 10.94 4.80 3.00  - 26.00 3 .42 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. IC = Internal consistency calculated with Chronbach’s 
alpha. IC cannot be calculated for the Autistic Fantasy and Rationalization because they only contain 
1 item. n = 129. 
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Appendix G 
Mean, standard deviation, range, number of items, and internal consistency of DMI scores (Study 1). 
DMI score                                            M              SD               Range             Items           IC  
Overall Defensive Functioning -34.68 25.48 -94.00 – 26.00 200 - 
Principalization 43.90 6.47 30.00 – 60.00 40 .73 
Reversal 38.76 8.00 16.00 – 62.00 40 .82 
Turning Against Self 38.82 7.12 16.00 – 56.00 40 .77 
Turning Against Other 39.38 9.74 17.00 – 62.00 40 .86 
Projection 39.14 6.30 23.00 – 52.00 40 .70 
 
Note. DMI = Defense Mechanisms Inventory. IC = Internal consistency calculated with Chronbach’s 
alpha. IC cannot be calculated for the Overall Defensive Functioning scale because there is no 
variance in the total scores for a valid profile of all 200 items.  n = 129.  
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Appendix H 
Reliability of Defense-Q Individual Defenses for Study 2 
Defense Mechanism    ICC for 3 coders 
Acting Out .72 
Devaluation .74 
Displacement .09 
Dissociation .15 
Fantasy .34 
Grandiosity .66 
Humour .66 
Idealization .46 
Identification with the Aggressor .68 
Intellectualization .66 
Isolation .55 
Neurotic Denial .60 
Passive Aggression .60 
Projection .44 
Pseudoaltruism .82 
Psychotic Denial .41 
Rationalization .46 
Reaction Formation .50 
Regression .58 
Repression .76 
Splitting .11 
Sublimation .59 
Turning Against Others .58 
Turning Against Self .67 
Undoing .60 
Mean ICC .54 
 
Note. ICC = intraclass correlation coefficients. ICCs were conducted using a two-way random 
effects model.
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Appendix I 
Internal consistency of DSQ scores (study 2). 
DSQ score                                          IC  
Overall Defensive Functioning .79 
Mature Defense Style .65 
Neurotic Defense Style .61 
Immature Defense Style .82 
Acting Out  .72 
Altruism  .41 
Anticipation .38 
Autistic Fantasy  - 
Denial  -.47 
Devaluation  .24 
Displacement  .29 
Dissociation  .39 
Humor .64 
Idealization  .27 
Isolation  .50 
Passive Aggression  .43 
Projection  .67 
Rationalization  - 
Reaction Formation  .52 
Somatization .42 
Splitting  .46 
Sublimation  .34 
Suppression .30 
Undoing .62 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. IC = Internal consistency calculated with Chronbach’s 
alpha. IC cannot be calculated for the Autistic Fantasy and Rationalization because they only contain 
1 item. n = 116. 
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Appendix J  
Corrected Versus Noncorrected Classification Rates for all Study 2 Analyses  
    Corrected for Group Size  Uncorrected for Group Size 
   ____________________________    _____________________________ 
Analysis     % correct     % correct     Total %       % correct   % correct Total % 
            anxious depressed     correct      anxious        depressed        correct 
      Before Cross-validation 
Hypothesized #1 96.6 52.6 85.7 77.6 78.9 77.9 
Hypothesized #2 97.8 28.0 82.8 70.3 64.0 69.0 
Hypothesized #3 96.7 16.0 79.3 64.8 64.0 64.7 
Confirmatory #1 94.7 68.4 88.2 84.2 84.2 84.2 
Confirmatory #2 94.4 32.0 80.9 75.6 68.0 73.9 
      After Cross-validation 
Hypothesized #1 84.5 31.6 71.4 72.4 68.4 71.4 
Hypothesized #2 90.1 16.0 74.1 64.8 64.0 64.7 
Hypothesized #3 95.6 16.0 78.4 64.8 64.0 64.7 
Confirmatory #1 89.5 52.6 80.3 75.4 73.7 75.0 
Confirmatory #2 94.4 32.0 80.9 72.2 68.0 71.3 
 
Note. Hypothesized analyses refer to the first three analyses in Study 2, which were based on the 
defenses selected from the literature as most likely to differentiate between the depression and 
anxiety groups. Confirmatory analyses refer to the following stepwise analyses that were conducted 
to confirm whether those defenses initially selected from the literature were the defenses most 
important for differentiation between the groups.  
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Appendix K  
Combination Defense-Q and DSQ stepwise discriminant analysis 
    Standardized         Structure      Anxious group    Depressed group 
      coefficient       coefficient  M (SD)       M (SD) 
Acting Out (1)   .70  .34   2.77 (0.98)   3.69 (1.33) 
Reaction Formation (2) -.62 -.38 35.86 (8.18) 28.21 (8.05) 
Dissociation (2) -.60 -.12 10.75 (5.21)   9.26 (4.66) 
Suppression (2)  .55  .14 15.73 (4.63) 17.32 (4.32) 
Turning Against Self (1)   .53  .16   4.46 (0.94)   4.84 (0.98) 
Repression (1)  .49  .10   4.14 (1.21)   4.45 (1.37) 
Reaction Formation (1) -.46 -.26   3.76 (0.86)   3.20 (0.81) 
Anticipation (2) -.35 -.21 11.64 (3.51)   9.74 (4.05) 
Passive Aggression (2)  .29  .10 37.02 (8.18) 39.05 (8.41) 
Splitting (1) -.25 -.10   3.50 (0.53)   3.38 (0.54) 
 
Note. 1 = Defense-Q, 2 = Defense Style Questionnaire. The combined Defense-Q and DSQ stepwise 
discriminant analysis correctly classified 91.2% of anxious and 78.9% of depressed group members 
with an overall classification rate of 88.2%. After cross validation, 91.2% of anxious and 68.4% 
depressed participants remained correctly classified, with an overall classification rate of 85.5%.
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Table 1 
Comparison Table of Defense Mechanism Definitions 
DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Acting Out 
  Acting Out is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
through potentially 
destructive actions where the 
negative consequences are 
not considered. The actions 
must be related to the conflict 
or stressor. 
 
Acting Out 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by acting without reflection 
or apparent regard for 
negative consequences.  
Acting Out 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
actions rather than reflections 
or feelings. Defensive acting 
out is not synonymous with 
"bad behaviour" because it 
requires evidence that the 
behaviour is related to 
emotional conflicts. 
 
Devaluation 
 Devaluation is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by attributing exaggerated 
negative qualities to the 
nonself object causing the 
conflict in order to mitigate 
the threat. 
 
Devaluation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by attributing exaggeratedly 
negative qualities to oneself 
or others. Unlike reaction 
formation, devaluation may 
conceal admiration or 
positive feelings towards 
others. 
 
Devaluation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
attributing exaggerated 
negative qualities to self or 
others. 
Displacement 
  Displacement is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by transferring anxiety-
provoking feelings or 
responses for one object onto 
another object that is 
perceived as less threatening. 
 
Displacement 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by generalizing or 
redirecting a feeling about 
or a response to an object 
onto another, usually less 
threatening, object. The 
person using displacement 
may or may not be aware 
that the affect or impulse 
expressed towards the 
displaced object was meant 
for someone else. 
Displacement 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors 
transferring a feeling about, or 
a response to, one object onto 
another (usually less 
threatening) substitute object. 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 
 
129 
DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Dissociation 
  Dissociation is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by temporarily breaking 
down the integration of the 
components of consciousness 
then detaching from and 
losing conscious contact with 
the environment and persons 
in the environment. 
 
Dissociation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by a temporary alteration in 
the integrative functions of 
consciousness or identity.  
Dissociation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors with a 
breakdown in the usually 
integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, 
perception of self or the 
environment, or 
sensory/motor behaviour. 
Fantasy 
  Fantasy is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by fantasizing or 
daydreaming, often as a 
substitute for relationships 
with others. 
 
Autistic Fantasy 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by excessive daydreaming 
as a substitute for human 
relationships, more direct 
and effective action, or 
problem solving.  
 
Autistic Fantasy 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
excessive daydreaming as a 
substitute for human 
relationships, more effective 
action, or problem solving. 
Grandiosity 
  Grandiosity is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by acting or thinking in a 
manner where exaggerated 
positive qualities or abilities 
are attributed to the self in an 
attempt to make the self 
superior to others. 
 
Omnipotence 
  Omnipotence is a defense 
in which the subject 
responds to emotional 
conflict or internal and 
external stressors by acting 
superior to others, as if one 
possessed special powers or 
abilities. 
Omnipotence 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
feeling or acting as if he or 
she possesses special powers 
or abilities and is superior to 
others. 
Humour 
  Humour is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by making light of, or 
emphasizing the amusing or 
ironic aspects of the situation. 
 
 
Humor 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by emphasizing the amusing 
or ironic aspects of the 
conflict or stressor.  
Humor 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
emphasizing the amusing or 
ironic aspects of the conflict 
or stressor. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Idealization 
  Idealization is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by ascribing exaggerated 
positive qualities to a nonself 
object related to the anxiety 
and then, through their 
association to this 
exaggeratedly positive object, 
they have an increase in self-
esteem. 
 
Idealization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by attributing exaggerated 
positive qualities to self or 
others 
Idealization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
attributing exaggerated 
positive qualities to others. 
Identification With the 
Aggressor 
  Identification With the 
Aggressor is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by taking on the same 
characteristics of the nonself 
object causing the anxiety. 
 
  
Intellectualization 
  Intellectualization is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by using abstract 
thinking, language, and 
generalizations, thereby 
controlling or minimizing the 
related affect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectualization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by the excessive use of 
abstract thinking or 
generalizations to avoid 
experiencing disturbing 
feelings. 
Intellectualization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by the 
excessive use of abstract 
thinking or the making of 
generalizations to control or 
minimize disturbing feelings. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Isolation 
  Isolation is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by separating affective 
processes from cognitive 
processes related to the 
impulse and then preventing 
conscious awareness of the 
affect related to the 
threatening ideas and 
cognitions. 
 
Isolation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by being unable to 
experience simultaneously 
the cognitive and affective 
components of an 
experience, because the 
affect is kept from 
consciousness. In the 
defense of Isolation, the 
subject loses touch with the 
feelings associated with a 
given idea (e.g., a traumatic 
event) while remaining 
aware of its cognitive 
elements (e.g., descriptive 
details). 
 
Isolation of Affect 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by the 
separation of ideas from the 
feelings originally associated 
with them. The individual 
loses touch with the feelings 
associated with a given idea 
(e.g., a traumatic event) while 
remaining aware of the 
cognitive elements of it (e.g., 
descriptive details). 
Neurotic Denial 
  Neurotic Denial is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by not 
acknowledging consequences 
of the conflict or stressor that 
are apparent to most others, 
such as related affect, action, 
or intentions. The conflict or 
stressor is recognized but the 
consequences are not.  
 
 
 
Denial (Neurotic Denial) 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by refusing to acknowledge 
some aspect of external 
reality or of his or her 
experience that would be 
apparent to others. The 
subject actively denies that a 
feeling, behavioural 
response, or intention was or 
is not present, even though 
its presence is considered 
more than likely by the 
observer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors refusing 
to acknowledge some painful 
aspect of external reality or 
subjective experience that 
would be apparent to others. 
The term psychotic denial is 
used when there is a gross 
impairment in reality testing. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Passive Aggression 
  Passive Aggression is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by indirectly and 
unassertively expressing 
thoughts, words, or actions 
toward the object causing the 
conflict or stress. There is an 
overt appearance of general 
compliance or indifference 
masking a more covert 
resistance or disapproval. 
 
Passive Aggression (TAS) 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by indirectly, unassertively 
and often self-detrimentally 
expressing aggression 
toward others. There is a 
facade of overt compliance 
masking covert resistance 
toward others. Passive 
Aggression is characterized 
by venting hostile or 
resentful feelings in an 
indirect, veiled, and 
unassertive manner towards 
others. Includes “turning 
against the self”.  
Passive Aggression 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
indirectly and unassertively 
expressing aggression toward 
others. There is a facade of 
overt compliance masking 
covert resistance, resentment, 
or hostility. Passive 
aggression often occurs in 
response to demands for 
independent action or 
performance or the lack of 
gratification of dependent 
wishes but may be adaptive 
for individuals in subordinate 
positions who have no other 
way to express assertiveness 
more often.  
 
Projection 
  Projection is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by falsely attributing their 
own distressing impulses to a 
nonself object. 
 
Projection 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by falsely attributing his or 
her own unacknowledged 
feelings, impulses, or 
thoughts to others.  
Projection 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by falsely 
attributing to another his or 
her own unacceptable 
feelings, impulses, or 
thoughts. 
 
Pseudoaltruism 
  Pseudoaltruism is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by helping others 
address an apparently similar 
conflict or stress rather than 
by helping oneself.  
 
Altruism 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by dedication to fulfilling 
the needs of others.  
 
Altruism 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
dedication to meeting the 
needs of others. Unlike the 
self-sacrifice sometimes 
characteristic of reaction 
formation, the individual 
receives gratification either 
vicariously or from the 
response of others. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Psychotic Denial 
  Psychotic Denial is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by breaking contact 
with and distorting external 
reality. 
 
See Neurotic Denial Denial 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors refusing 
to acknowledge some painful 
aspect of external reality or 
subjective experience that 
would be apparent to others. 
The term psychotic denial is 
used when there is a gross 
impairment in reality testing. 
 
Rationalization 
  Rationalization is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress through distorted 
elaborations and 
explanations, which may be 
exaggerated. 
 
Rationalization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by devising reassuring or 
self-serving but incorrect 
explanations for his or her 
own or others’ behaviour. 
Rationalization 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
concealing the true 
motivations for his or her own 
thoughts, actions, or feelings 
through the elaboration of 
reassuring or self-serving but 
incorrect explanations. 
 
Reaction Formation 
  Reaction Formation is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by substituting 
opposite thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviours. The thoughts, 
feelings, or behaviours 
substituted may be either 
positive or negative. 
 
 
Reaction Formation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by substituting behaviour, 
thoughts, or feelings that are 
diametrically opposed to his 
or her own unacceptable 
thoughts or feelings. 
Reaction Formation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
substituting behaviour, 
thoughts, or feelings that are 
diametrically opposed to his 
or her own unacceptable 
thoughts or feelings (this 
usually occurs in conjunction 
with their repression). 
Regression 
  Regression is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by reverting to a previously 
developmentally appropriate 
way of responding. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
th
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Repression 
  Repression is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by expelling wishes, 
thoughts, or experiences from 
conscious awareness, 
although traces of the conflict 
may remain, such as related 
affect. 
 
Repression 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by being unable to be 
cognitively aware of 
disturbing wishes, thoughts, 
or experiences. In contrast to 
isolation, the affective 
component often remains in 
consciousness. 
 
Repression 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
expelling disturbing wishes, 
thoughts, or experiences from 
conscious awareness. The 
feeling component may 
remain conscious, detached 
from its associated ideas. 
 
Splitting 
 Splitting is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by compartmentalizing the 
related affect states, objects, 
feelings, cognitions, etc., into 
contradictory components and 
then failing to integrate the 
components into a complete 
and cohesive whole. 
 
 
Splitting 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by viewing himself or 
herself as all good or all bad, 
failing to integrate the 
positive and negative 
qualities of the self and 
others into cohesive images. 
Often the same individual 
will be idealized and 
devalued. In splitting of 
other’s images (object 
images), the subject 
demonstrates that his views, 
expectations and feelings 
about others are 
contradictory and that he 
cannot reconcile ambivalent 
affects to form realistic and 
coherent views of others. 
Splitting 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
compartmentalizing opposite 
affect states and failing to 
integrate the positive and 
negative qualities of the self 
or others into cohesive 
images. Because ambivalent 
affects cannot be experienced 
simultaneously, more 
balanced views and 
expectations of self or others 
are excluded from emotional 
awareness. Self and object 
images tend to alternate 
between polar opposites: 
exclusively loving, powerful, 
worthy, nurturant, and kind - 
or exclusively bad, hateful, 
angry, destructive, rejecting, 
or worthless. 
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DEFENSE-Q DMRS 5
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 ed. DSM-IV-TR 
Sublimation 
  Sublimation is the process 
by which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress 
by channelling feelings or 
impulses into socially 
acceptable and productive 
behaviours. 
Sublimation 
 The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by channelling potentially 
maladaptive feelings or 
impulses into socially 
acceptable behaviour.  
Sublimation 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
channelling potentially 
maladaptive feelings or 
impulses into socially 
acceptable behaviour (e.g., 
contact sports to channel 
angry impulses). 
 
Turning Against Others 
  Turning Against Others is 
the process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by blaming a nonself 
object for the conflict or for 
the outcome of one’s 
behaviour or actions. 
 
  
Turning Against Self 
  Turning Against Self is the 
process by which a person 
deals with emotional conflict 
or stress by attributing 
exaggerated negative qualities 
to and blaming the self for the 
cause of the conflict or 
anxiety. 
 
See Passive Aggression  
Undoing 
  Undoing is the process by 
which a person deals with 
emotional conflict or stress by 
making amends for previous 
behaviour through verbal or 
behavioural negation, often 
via repetitive thoughts or 
actions that are directly or 
symbolically related to the 
conflict. 
 
Undoing 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflicts, or 
internal or external stressors, 
by words or behaviour 
designed to symbolically 
make amends for or negate 
previous thoughts, feelings, 
or actions. 
 
Undoing 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by words 
or behaviour designed to 
negate or make amends 
symbolically for unacceptable 
thoughts, feelings, or actions. 
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 Suppression 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or 
internal or external stressors 
by voluntarily avoiding 
thinking about disturbing 
problems, wishes, feelings, 
or experiences temporarily. 
 
Suppression 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
intentionally avoiding 
thinking about disturbing 
problems, wishes, feelings, or 
experiences. 
 Hypochondriasis (HRC) 
  Hypochondriasis involves 
the repetitious use of a 
complaint or series of 
complaints in which the 
subject ostensibly asks for 
help. However, covert 
feelings of hostility or 
reproach toward others are 
expressed simultaneously by 
the subjects rejection of the 
suggestions, advice, or help 
that others offer.  
Help-rejecting Complaining 
  The individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by 
complaining or making 
repetitious requests for help 
that disguise covert feelings 
of hostility or reproach 
toward others, which are then 
expressed by rejecting the 
suggestions, advice, or help 
that others offer. The 
complaints or requests may 
involve physical or 
psychological symptoms or 
life problems. 
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 Projective Identification 
 In projective identification 
the subject has an affect or 
impulse that he or she finds 
unacceptable and projects 
onto someone else, as if it 
was really that other person 
who originated the affect or 
impulse. However, the 
subject does not disavow 
what is projected – unlike in 
simple projection – but 
remains fully aware of the 
affects or impulses, and 
simply misattributes them as 
justifiable reactions to the 
other person!  
Projective Identification 
  As in projection, the 
individual deals with 
emotional conflict or internal 
or external stressors by falsely 
attributing to another his or 
her own unacceptable 
feelings, impulses, or 
thoughts. Unlike simple 
projection, the individual does 
not fully disavow what is 
projected. Instead, the 
individual remains aware of 
his or her own affects or 
impulses but misattributes 
them as justifiable reactions 
to the other person. Not 
infrequently, the individual 
induces the very feelings in 
others that were first 
mistakenly believed to be 
there, making it difficult to 
clarify who did what to whom 
first. 
 
Note: DMRS = Defense Mechanism Rating Scale; DSM-IV-TR = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision. From “The Defense-Q: An idiographic Q-sort 
measure of defense mechanisms. A manual for clinicians and researchers. (2
nd
 ed.),” by M. Wm. 
MacGregor, T. R. Olson, M. D. Presniak, & K. Davidson, 2008, unpublished manual, pp. 94-103. 
Adapted with permission of the authors. 
                                                                               Differentiating Depression and Anxiety 
 
138 
Table 2 
Defensive Levels of the DSQ-88, DSQ-72, DSQ-40, and DMRS 
        DSQ-88         DSQ-72 & DSQ-40      DMRS (5
th
 edition) 
Adaptive 
a
 Mature 
a
 High Adaptive Level 
a
 
Humor, Sublimation,  
Suppression [Affiliation, 
Anticipation] 
Anticipation, Humor, 
Sublimation, Suppression 
Affiliation, Altruism, 
Anticipation, Humor, Self-
assertion, Self-observation, 
Sublimation, Suppression 
 
 Self-sacrificing 
b
   Neurotic 
b
           Obsessional 
b
 
(Pseudo)altruism,  
Reaction Formation [Denial*]  
Isolation, Intellectualization, 
Undoing 
Image Distorting 
b
 Other Neurotic 
b
 
Devaluation, Idealization,  
Omnipotence, Splitting 
[Denial*, Isolation, Projection*] 
Idealization, (Pseudo)altruism,  
Reaction Formation, Undoing 
Displacement, Dissociation, 
Reaction Formation, Repression  
 
Maladaptive 
c
 Immature 
c
 Minor Image Distorting 
c
 
Devaluation (self), Devaluation 
(other), Idealization (self), 
Idealization (other), 
Omnipotence 
Disavowal 
c
 
Neurotic Denial, Projection, 
Rationalization 
 
Major Image Distorting 
c
 
(Borderline) 
Splitting (self), Splitting (other), 
Projective Identification 
Action 
c
 
Acting Out, Inhibition,  
Passive Aggression, Projection*, 
Regression, Withdrawal 
[Consumption, Fantasy, Help-
Rejecting Complaining, 
Projective Identification, 
Somatization] 
Acting Out, Denial, Devaluation,  
Displacement, Dissociation, 
Fantasy, Isolation, Passive 
Aggression, Projection, 
Rationalization, Somatization, 
Splitting 
Acting Out, Hypochondriasis 
(Help-rejecting Complaining), 
Passive Aggression 
 
Note. DMRS = Defense Mechanism Rating Scale; DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. Defensive 
levels with the same superscript are considered to be at the same level of personality organization 
(Bond, 2004; Perry & Ianni, 1998). DSQ-88 defenses in square brackets are not included in the DSQ 
defense style from Bond et al., 1983, but have some items scored in the four broad defense styles in 
the DSQ Manual (Bond & Wesley, 1996). DSQ-88 defenses marked with an asterisk appear on 
multiple defense styles. Rationalization was added to the DSQ-40 but is not represented on the DSQ-
72. Although it was originally scored in the Immature Defense Style, recent articles (e.g., Blaya et 
al., 2006) have moved Rationalization to the Mature Defense Style. 
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Table 3 
Pearson r Values Between Defense-Q and DSQ 
Defense style      Defense-Q ADP Similarity Score 
DSQ Immature -.26** 
DSQ Neurotic  .01 
DSQ Mature  .23** 
DSQ ODF  .37*** 
 
Note. ADP = Adaptive Defense Profile; DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire; ODF = Overall 
Defensive Functioning scale. n = 129 for all cells. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Similarly Named Defense-Q and DSQ Individual Defenses 
DSQ defense / Defense-Q defense    r value 
Acting Out / Acting Out  .33*** 
Altruism / Pseudoaltruism  .16 
Autistic Fantasy / Fantasy  .08 
Denial / Neurotic Denial  .15 
Devaluation / Devaluation  .03 
Displacement / Displacement  .09 
Dissociation / Dissociation  .06 
Humor / Humour  .16 
Idealization / Idealization  .04 
Isolation / Isolation  .16 
Passive Aggression / Passive Aggression -.02 
Projection / Projection -.01 
Rationalization / Rationalization   .22* 
Reaction Formation / Reaction Formation  .30** 
Splitting / Splitting  .05 
Sublimation / Sublimation  .20* 
Undoing / Undoing  .02 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. n = 129 for all cells. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table 5 
Pearson r Values for Defense Levels and ODF of Various Defense Measures 
Defense level/style     Defense-Q     DSQ            DSQ          DSQ              DSQ 
       ADP SS     ODF            Mature      Neurotic        Immature 
DMRS ODF  .24**  .05  .04  .10  .01 
DMRS High Adaptive  .26** -.01  .05 -.03  .01 
DMRS Obsessional  .04  .05 -.15 -.12 -.10 
DMRS Other Neurotic -.08 -.03 -.08 -.05  .03 
DMRS Minor I/D  .05 -.12  .03 -.04  .14 
DMRS Disavowal  .08  .05 -.03 -.10 -.13 
DMRS Fantasy sublevel -.21* -.02 -.05 -.02 -.07 
DMRS Major I/D   .00  .00  .02  .03 -.04 
DMRS Action -.25** -.14 -.12 -.10  .13 
DMI ODF  .11  .37***  .35***  .09 -.27** 
DMI Principalization  .16  .30**  .31***  .11 -.21* 
DMI Reversal  .04  .35***  .31***  .06 -.26** 
DMI Turning Against Self -.15  .06 -.13  .28** -.11 
DMI Turning Against Other -.01 -.35*** -.22* -.25**  .30** 
DMI Projection -.03 -.28** -.23* -.13  .20* 
 
Note. ADP SS = Adaptive Defense Profile Similarity Score; DMI = Defense Mechanisms Inventory; 
DMRS = Defense Mechanism Rating Scale; DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire; I/D = Image 
Distorting; ODF = Overall Defensive Functioning scale. n = 129 for all cells. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table 6 
Pearson r Values for Defense-Q Scores and General Physical Attractiveness 
Defense-Q score                    General Physical Attractiveness 
ADP Similarity Score  .05 
Acting Out  .08 
Devaluation  .04 
Displacement -.01 
Dissociation -.14 
Fantasy -.09 
Grandiosity  .10 
Humour -.05 
Idealization  .00 
Identification  .03 
Intellectualization -.07 
Isolation  .01 
Neurotic Denial -.02 
Passive Aggression  .08 
Projection  .04 
Pseudoaltruism -.16 
Psychotic Denial  .01 
Rationalization -.05 
Reaction Formation  .04 
Regression  .11 
Repression  .00 
Splitting  .05 
Sublimation  .00 
Turning Against Others  .15 
Turning Against Self -.07 
Undoing -.07 
 
Note. n = 111. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table 7 
Pearson r Values for DMRS scores and General Physical Attractiveness 
DMRS level   General Physical Attractiveness 
DMRS ODF  .17 
DMRS High Adaptive -.05 
DMRS Obsessional -.01 
DMRS Other Neurotic -.01 
DMRS Minor I/D -.10 
DMRS Disavowal -.18 
DMRS Fantasy sublevel -.15 
DMRS Major I/D  -.08 
DMRS Action -.03 
 
Note. DMRS = Defense Mechanism Rating Scale; I/D = Image Distorting; ODF = Overall Defensive 
Functioning scale. n = 111 for all cells. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table 8 
Coefficients, Means and Standard Deviations for Hypothesized Analysis 1 (Defense-Q Defenses) 
Defense-Q      Standardized   Structure     Anxious group      Depressed group 
defense       coefficient  coefficient          M (SD)                   M (SD) 
Acting Out  .85  .62 2.76 (0.97) 3.69 (1.33) 
Turning Against Self  .67  .27 4.48 (0.98) 4.84 (0.98) 
Projection  .46  .16 3.91 (0.50) 4.03 (0.47) 
Isolation  .32  .27 4.06 (1.28) 4.54 (1.33) 
Reaction Formation -.25 -.43 3.73 (0.88) 3.20 (0.81) 
Splitting -.18 -.18 3.51 (0.53) 3.38 (0.54) 
Undoing -.08 -.23 4.73 (1.05) 4.38 (1.24) 
Idealization  .05 -.27 3.84 (0.53) 3.62 (0.69) 
Displacement -.01  .16 3.78 (0.44) 3.89 (0.62) 
 
Note. Mean scores for all defenses range from 1 (least characteristic defense) to 7 (most 
characteristic defense). Defenses are arranged by descending absolute value of the standardized 
coefficients.
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Table 10 
Coefficients, Means, and Standard Deviations for Hypothesized Analysis 2 (DSQ Defenses) 
       Standardized    Structure    Anxious group     Depressed group 
DSQ defense       coefficient   coefficient          M (SD)       M (SD) 
Reaction Formation  .75  .71 36.51 (8.17) 30.00 (8.44) 
Isolation -.53 -.38 14.93 (6.69) 17.64 (5.35) 
Undoing  .36  .28 13.91 (5.68) 12.20 (4.80) 
Idealization  .22  .49 16.78 (4.99) 14.04 (5.41) 
Passive Aggression -.16 -.22 36.54 (8.73) 38.60 (7.78) 
Devaluation -.15 -.05 13.35 (4.06) 13.60 (5.17) 
Displacement -.14 -.31 11.91 (5.60) 13.76 (4.09) 
Projection  .10 -.24 32.15 (9.90) 34.64 (7.75) 
Splitting  .09 -.16 12.08 (4.77) 12.92 (4.65) 
Acting Out -.05 -.18 29.82 (8.99) 31.64 (9.01) 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. Mean scores for defenses vary according to the 
number of items tapping the defense and are not directly comparable between defenses. Higher 
scores indicate more frequent use of the defense. Defenses are arranged by descending absolute 
value of the standardized coefficients. 
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 Table 12 
Coefficients, Means and Standard Deviations for Hypothesized Analysis 3 (DSQ Defense Styles) 
             Standardized         Structure  Anxious group    Depressed group 
Defense style  coefficient        coefficient       M (SD)  M (SD) 
Neurotic  .96  .91  80.12 (13.87)  67.64 (13.28) 
Immature -.43 -.31 189.54 (36.69) 199.52 (31.32) 
Mature  .00  .36  57.25 (11.40)  53.16 (10.68) 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. Mean scores for defense styles vary according to the number 
of items tapping the defense style and are not directly comparable between defense styles. Higher scores 
indicate more frequent use of the defense style. Defense styles are arranged by descending absolute 
value of the standardized coefficients. 
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Table 13 
Correlations of DSQ Defense Styles (Study 2, Hypothesized Analysis 3) 
Defense style   Mature   Neurotic  Immature 
Mature   --  .39*** -.04 
Neurotic    --  .07 
Immature     -- 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. n = 119 for all cells. 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
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Table 14 
Coefficients, Means, and Standard Deviations for Confirmatory Analyses (Defense-Q & DSQ Defenses) 
    Standardized       Structure  Anxious group       Depressed group 
Defense mechanism    coefficient     coefficient        M (SD)    M (SD) 
           Defense-Q 
Acting Out 1.07  .43 2.73 (0.95) 3.69 (1.33) 
Turning Against Self  .88  .17 4.49 (0.99) 4.84 (0.98) 
Repression  .70  .10 4.17 (1.23) 4.45 (1.37) 
Idealization  .57 -.19 3.85 (0.53) 3.62 (0.69) 
Fantasy  .49  .25 3.99 (0.37) 4.20 (0.50) 
Turning Against Others  .43  .14 4.45 (0.76) 4.68 (0.80) 
Dissociation -.42 -.11 3.90 (0.75) 3.73 (0.78) 
Isolation  .40  .19 4.03 (1.26) 4.54 (1.33) 
Projection  .38  .10 3.92 (0.51) 4.03 (0.47) 
Psychotic Denial  .37  .13 2.14 (0.71) 2.34 (0.67) 
Neurotic Denial  .30  .13 4.08 (0.98) 4.36 (0.97) 
 
     Defense Style Questionnaire 
Reaction Formation  .67  .63 36.79 (8.40) 30.00 (8.44) 
Suppression -.48 -.27 15.86 (4.80) 17.48 (4.00) 
Sublimation  .44  .46 17.14 (4.25) 14.56 (4.71) 
Isolation -.43 -.37 14.60 (6.67) 17.64 (5.35) 
Undoing  .41  .23 13.83 (5.77) 12.20 (4.80) 
 
Note. DSQ = Defense Style Questionnaire. Mean scores for defenses vary according to the number of 
items tapping the defense and are not directly comparable. Higher scores indicate more frequent use of 
the defense. Defenses are arranged by descending absolute value of the standardized coefficients. 
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